MARIO REBELLON LONDONO v. MARKWAYNE MULLIN; TODD LYONS; PATRIC DIVVER; WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER; and TODD BLANCHE
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- James E. Simmons (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a non-citizen who was previously released on conditional parole and subsequently re-detained by ICE. The court granted the petition and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner, relying on the respondents' concession and prior district court precedent regarding due process rights for previously released individuals.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus“Thus, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus.” | agree with court The court relied on the respondents' concession that the petitioner was previously released on conditional parole and that such individuals are not mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). The court cited recent S.D. Cal. cases (Totskii and Isoev) to support the finding that a prior grant of release creates a liberty interest entitling the petitioner to procedural due process, which in this context requires release. Given the concession and the cited precedent, the decision follows logically from the record and law recited in the order. |
Ordering immediate release of Petitioner“Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions of his prior that existed at the time he was re-detained.” | agree with court The order for release is the direct consequence of granting the habeas petition. The condition that release be subject to prior conditions is a standard administrative safeguard to ensure continuity of supervision or restrictions previously imposed. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound in the context of a district court ruling where the government has conceded the legal premise. The court correctly identified the relevant statutes and relied on recent, binding district court precedent (within the same district) to support its conclusion. While the court declined to engage in a 'full analysis' due to the concession, this is a permissible judicial economy measure when the opposing party agrees the law controls the outcome. The reasoning directly answers the motion by applying the conceded legal standard to the facts.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIO REBELLON LONDONO, Case No.: 3:26-cv-4053-JES-SBC 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN; TODD LYONS; PATRIC DIVVER; WARDEN, [ECF No. 1] 15 OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER; 16 and TODD BLANCHE, 17 Respondents. 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Mario Rebellon Londono’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for 19 Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s 20 Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 2), Respondents filed a return to the petition and Petitioner 21 filed a response. ECF Nos. 4, 5. 22 Petitioner is a native of Colombia who came to the United States on March 24, 2022, 23 near San Luis, Arizona. ECF No. 1 ¶ 13. He was detained upon entry, but was subsequently 24 released on his own recognizance. Id. ¶ 14. After his admission to the United States, he 25 alleges that he lived in the community peacefully, maintained a clean criminal record, 26 married a U.S. citizen, and pursued immigration status through legal means. Id. ¶ 17. On 27 June 23, 2026, Petitioner was stopped by military police at the Naval Air Station North 28 1 Island, and because he lacked documentation at that time, was transferred to ICE custody. 2 J 17. 3 In their return, Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner had previously been 4 ||released on conditional parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and courts have routinely 5 || held that such petitioners are not mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). ECF No. 6 ||4 at 1 (citing multiple cases so holding). As such, Respondents state that “this Court’s prior 7 || decisions will control the result here if the Court adheres to its prior decisions, as the facts 8 not materially distinguishable for purposes of the Court’s decision” and that they “defer 9 || to the Court as to the appropriate relief.” Jd. at 2. 10 In light of Respondents’ statements, the Court will decline to engage in a full analysis 11 |/of the claims as well. Petitioner states that he was previously released by the government 12 March 2022. Many courts, including this one, have repeatedly held that a prior grant of 13 || release raises a liberty interest for the petitioner and entitles the petitioner to due process 14 |/nghts under procedural due process. See, e.g., Totskii v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-1053-JES- 15 || JLB, 2026 WL 905331 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2026); Isoev v. Larose, No. 26-CV-1361-JES- 16 || DDL, 2026 WL 776308 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2026). Accordingly, the Court adopts its 17 ||reasoning and finds that due process requires release of Petitioner here. 18 Thus, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. Respondents are 19 || ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions of 20 ||his prior that existed at the time he was re-detained. The Parties are ORDERED to file a 21 || Jomt Status Report by July 27, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 22 The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 || Dated: July 21, 2026 26 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 7 United States District Judge 28