Jose S Avalos-Arias v. Jeremy Casey, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
Analysis
The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jose S. Avalos-Arias, a Salvadoran national who had resided in the United States since 2013, challenging his mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The court granted the petition, ordering the government to release the petitioner within 24 hours and enjoining re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing or a material change in circumstances.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for writ of habeas corpus granted“Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Mathews v. Eldridge factors to determine that the petitioner's detention violated procedural due process. The court relied on the undisputed fact that the petitioner was not at the border seeking admission, which excludes him from the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) based on the court's interpretation and the government's concession. The relief ordered is consistent with the core of habeas corpus to prevent the government from circumventing the order through immediate re-detention. |
Request for attorneys' fees denied without prejudice“Accordingly, the request for attorneys’ fees is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.” | agree with court The court properly deferred the fee application to a later date, requiring the petitioner to file a formal application within 30 days of judgment. This is a standard procedural mechanism to ensure fees are calculated based on the final outcome and reasonable hours worked, rather than being awarded prematurely in the initial order. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard (Mathews v. Eldridge) and the statutory provision at issue (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). The court relies on a consistent line of recent district court decisions (including its own) to interpret the statute in a way that excludes the petitioner from mandatory detention. The government's concession strengthens the court's position. The relief ordered is tailored to prevent the government from circumventing the habeas writ, which is a recognized aspect of habeas relief. The court explicitly notes a circuit split but resolves it in favor of the petitioner based on the specific facts and the weight of recent district court authority.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOSE S AVALOS-ARIAS, Case No. 26-cv-04018 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS JEREMY CASEY, et al., Respondents.
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release. (Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”).) As averred in the Petition, and as Respondents do not dispute, Petitioner is a national of El Salvador who last entered the United States on or about May 27, 20131 and has continuously lived in the United States since that date. (See id. ¶ 1; see also id. at 17.)2 Subsequent to his last entry to the United States, Petitioner was placed in removal proceeding and was released on bond. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 24.) Petitioner has not violated the terms of his release. (Id. ¶ 24.) Petitioner’s release on bond necessarily reflects a determination that Petitioner posed neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. See Chang v. Mullin, 26-cv-02218-JLS, 2026 WL 1045679, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026). On June 24, 2026, Petitioner was detained by Respondents while at work, and is currently detained in the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. (Petition ¶¶ 23–24.) He filed the Petition a few weeks after that, seeking, among other things, his immediate release on the bases that his detention violates his Fifth Amendment right to procedural and substantive due process, the Administrative Procedure Act, and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). In response to the Petition, Respondents take the “position that Petitioner is subject to 1 The Petition elsewhere states that Petitioner last entered the United States in 2016. (Petition ¶¶ 20, 63.) This appears to be a clerical error, and the documents submitted in support of the Petition list Petitioner’s date of entry as on or about May 27, 2013. (Id. at 17.) 2 Citations to page numbers refer to ECF pagination. mandatory detention under [8 U.S.C.] § 1225(b)(2).” (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) However, they acknowledge that the Court has “repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion” in cases that are “not materially distinguishable for purposes of the Court’s decision, and on that basis the government does not oppose the petition and defers to the Court on the appropriate relief.” (Id. at 2–3.) Beginning with Petitioner’s procedural due process challenge, it is governed by the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Faizi v. LaRose, No. 25-cv- 02974-JO, 2026 WL 1112035, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2026). Section 1225(b)(2) authorizes mandatory detention “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, this provision does not apply to Petitioner because, at the time of his detention, “he was not at the border or a Port of Entry seeking admission to the United States” and had been living in the country for several years. Martinez Zayas v. Gordon, No. 26-cv-00237-BAS, 2026 WL 266275, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026); see also Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 936–37 (N.D. Cal. 2025).3 Thus, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of finding that Petitioner’s re-detention violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. See, e.g., Lozano Castano v. LaRose, No. 26- cv-01747-RBM, 2026 WL 1194854, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2026). Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED.4 “When a district court grants a writ of habeas corpus it may dispose of the matter as law and justice require. To ensure that Petitioner’s release pursuant to the Court’s [] order is not rendered meaningless, it is necessary to enjoin the government from simply re-detaining Petitioner in the same manner. As a result, the relief 3 There is a circuit split on the meaning of “seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2), which the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed, and the undersigned is of the view that “seeking admission” does not refer to individuals like Petitioner who, at the time of their detention, were not arriving and seeking entry to the country and had been living here for years. See Ibanez Daza v. Albarran, No. 25-cv-10214-RFL, 2026 WL 1906353, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2026). 4 Therefore, this order does not reach the remaining Counts in the Petition. ordered below falls within the core of habeas.” Alva Alva v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06676-RFL, 2026 WL 1910135, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2026) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court, therefore, ORDERS as follows: e Respondents shall release Petitioner within 24 hours of the filing of this Order and shall return all property that had been seized from him. The release shall be on the same terms and conditions as Petitioner’s initial release on bond. e Respondents shall not enroll Petitioner in an Alternative to Detention program or place an ankle monitor on him upon release. e Respondents shall not re-detain Petitioner: (1) without notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker in which an individualized determination 1s made that he poses a flight risk or danger to public safety such that he must be detained; or (2) in the absence of a material change in circumstances justifying his detention. Petitioner also requests an award of attorneys’ fees. The Court will consider an application for reasonable fees that is filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Accordingly, the request for attorneys’ fees is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close the case. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 21, 2026 RITA F. LIN United States District Judge