Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BRYAN JOSUE ARTEAGA Case No.: 3:26-cv-03527-JES-BJW PALACIOS, 12 ORDER GRANTING PETITION Petitioner, 13 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 14 Warden; CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, [ECF No. 1] 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Bryan Josue Arteaga Palacio’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 19 for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on June 12, 20 2026. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Pursuant to the Court’s order to show cause, Respondents filed 21 a return to the petition. ECF No. 4. (“Return”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court 22 GRANTS the petition. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States on October 19, 25 2024. ECF No. 4-1 at 2; Pet. at 6. Petitioner applied for admission into the United States 26 and was paroled into the United States. Id. On March 6, 2026, Petitioner was arrested in 27 Miami, Florida for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia and transferred to 28 1 immigration custody. ECF No. 4-2 at 3; Pet. at 6. Petitioner has an asylum application 2 pending. Pet. at 6. Since May 5, 2026, Petitioner has been detained at Otay Mesa Detention 3 Center. Id. 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 6 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 7 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 8 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 9 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 10 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 11 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 12 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 13 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 14 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 15 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 16 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 In his petition, Petitioner argues for his release from custody and construing the pro 19 se petition liberally, alleges a violation of Due Process. Pet. at 7. Respondents argue only 20 that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but correctly 21 concede that courts have consistently held otherwise. See generally, Return. The Court 22 does not find that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) for 23 the reasons set forth in Martinez Lopez v. LaRose, No. 25- cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 24 3030457 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the reasoning 25 stated therein and incorporates it by reference. The Court analyzes Petitioner’s Procedural 26 Due Process claim below. 27 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 28 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of 1 law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 2 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 3 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 4 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 5 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering 6 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 7 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 8 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 9 Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of 10 release. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. 11 Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 12 2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public 13 benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. 14 § 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own 15 recognizance” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 16 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘released on 17 recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”). 18 While courts have recognized these as distinct procedures, they have consistently 19 applied the same procedural due process analysis to petitioners under these forms of parole. 20 In the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), courts have held that such parole status entitles 21 the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the 22 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 23 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. 24 Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural due process). 25 Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained similar 26 procedural due process rights: 27 [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a 28 1 danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations 2 authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the 3 noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is 4 “likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release 5 [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. 6 Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. 7 Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then 8 released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release 9 [Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither. 10 [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that 11 her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The 12 regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain 13 neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly, [Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant. 14 15 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Several district courts 16 have followed suit and found due process violations where the petitioners in the cases were 17 specifically identified to be released under Order of Release on Recognizance with an 18 accompanying I-220 form. See, e.g., C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 19 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding due process violation where 20 petitioner was originally released on OREC). 21 The Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that Respondents 22 created a liberty interest in Petitioner when they granted his release. See Pet. at 6. As this 23 Court explained in Sanchez v. LaRose, due process requires not only notice and opportunity 24 to be heard regarding the revocation of such an interest, but also that the notice and 25 opportunity be meaningful. No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629 at *3 (S.D. 26 Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). Respondents acknowledge they have insufficient information 27 regarding termination of Petitioner’s parole. Return at 2. Further, without changed 28 circumstances or another factor justifying re-detention, any notice and opportunity to be 1 || heard that did occur could not have been meaningful. See Rios v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2866- 2 || JES-VET, 2025 WL 3141207, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“An alien's opportunity to 3 ||be heard regarding a change in his status is only meaningful if the government comports 4 || with its own internal standards regarding parole revocation. DHS has the authority to 5 ||revoke an alien's supervised release ‘at any time’ on a discretionary, but not unlimited, 6 ||basis.”). While Petitioner’s drug possession arrest could have been a change in 7 || circumstances, Petitioner was never provided notice prior to his re-detention. Accordingly, 8 ||the Court finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they re- 9 || detained him in March of 2026. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas 12 ||corpus, and does not reach the remainder of Petitioner’s claims as the requested relief is 13 || granted. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process grounds and concludes 14 ||that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s supervised release violates procedural due 15 process, Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 16 ||subject to any conditions of his preexisting release that existed at the time he was re- 17 detained. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by July 28, 2026, 18 confirming that Petitioner has been released. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: July 21, 2026 21 Sa— Sin, 22 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 3 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 «