Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 Case No.: 25-cv-03351-DMS-GC 9 JASON FARRELL, 10 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 11 v. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS CITY OF ESCONDIDO et al., 12 AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S B A N E A C T A N D M O N E L L CLAIMS 13 Defendants. WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 14 15 16 17 On November 28, 2025, Plaintiff Jason Farrell, proceeding pro se, filed this action 18 against the City of Escondido and Escondido Police Officers Does 1–10 (collectively, 19 “Defendants”). (Compl., ECF No. 1).1 Plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth 20 Amendment through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California’s Bane Act. (Compl. 3–4); Cal. Civ. 21 Code § 52.1 (West 2026). On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In 22 Forma Pauperis (“Motion”), which is currently pending before the Court. (Mot., ECF No. 23 2). For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion and sua sponte dismisses 24 the Bane Act and Monell claims with leave to amend. 25 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 26 27 1 Although the pages of the Complaint appear out of sequence on the docket, the Court cites to them as 28 1 Parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay a filing fee 2 of $405. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)–(b).2 However, a court may authorize a party to proceed in 3 forma pauperis (“IFP”) without the prepayment of fees if the party submits an affidavit 4 demonstrating their inability to pay. § 1915(a)(1); see CivLR 3.2(a) (listing specific 5 requirements for the affidavit). Although a party need not be “absolutely destitute” to 6 proceed IFP, they must “allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty” 7 such that they could not “pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” 8 Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). 9 Plaintiff’s Motion consists of an Application to Proceed in District Court Without 10 Prepaying Fees or Costs (Form AO 239). (Mot. 1). Plaintiff reports that he lost his job in 11 November 2025 and expects no future income besides $0.75 in interest or dividends and 12 $192 in public assistance. (Mot. 1–2, 5). Plaintiff reports that he has $1,140 across two 13 bank accounts and a fifth wheel trailer worth $1,000. (Id. at 2–3). Plaintiff does not allege 14 any other assets and itemizes monthly expenses totaling $2,168. (Id. at 4–5). The Court 15 finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he cannot “pay the court costs and 16 still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. Accordingly, the Court 17 grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP. 18 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING 19 A. Background 20 Plaintiff alleges that on November 29, 2024, he left work as a school crossing guard 21 and went to the Escondido Police Station. (Compl. 2). Plaintiff intended to visit the fire 22 department merchandise area on the third floor, which he had been told was open to the 23 public. (Id. at 2). According to Plaintiff, when he arrived, he was granted access to the 24 elevator by a first-floor staff member. (Id.). Upon arriving on the third floor, Plaintiff 25 26 2 The $405 fee consists of a $350 filing fee mandated by § 1914(a) and a $55 administrative fee prescribed 27 by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to § 1914(b). See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). However, the filing fee for an 28 1 alleges he was greeted by an employee and expressly told he was allowed to take photos 2 of the items displayed on the wall. (Id.). After several minutes, an officer allegedly 3 appeared, stared at Plaintiff for a few seconds, and withdrew without explanation. (Id. at 4 2–3). A few minutes later, Plaintiff alleges that seven to ten police officers confronted 5 Plaintiff and demanded his identification, which he refused to give them. (Id. at 3). 6 According to Plaintiff, the officers then stopped his photography, placed him in handcuffs, 7 and forced him into the stairwell area, where they took his photograph and driver’s license. 8 (Id.). Plaintiff alleges the officers then forcibly removed his personal items, escorted him 9 downstairs, subjected him to “coercive questioning,” and forced him to perform sobriety 10 tests. (Id.). Plaintiff states that he was then released without citation, arrest, or charges. 11 (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that this incident caused him to suffer fear, humiliation, intimidation, 12 emotional distress, handcuff marks on his wrists, and ongoing anxiety. (Id.). 13 Plaintiff brings this action and asserts four claims: (1) a § 1983 claim against 14 unnamed officers for unlawful detention, seizure, and excessive force in violation of the 15 Fourth Amendment; (2) a § 1983 claim against unnamed officers for failure to intervene; 16 (3) a Bane Act claim against all Defendants for interference with his constitutional rights 17 through threats, intimidation, and coercion; and (4) a Monell claim against the City of 18 Escondido (“the City”). (Compl. 3, 4, 5); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 19 (1978). 20 B. Legal Standard 21 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must screen an IFP complaint and dismiss 22 the case if, at any time, it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 23 a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 24 is immune from such relief. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 25 curiam) (confirming § 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to non-prisoners as well). A complaint “is 26 frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” and malicious where “it 27 was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 28 325 (1989); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). 1 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 2 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil 3 Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 4 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 5 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 6 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 7 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept 8 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 9 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 10 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 11 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 12 Finally, dismissal is warranted when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief against an immune 13 defendant, as long as the court “has sufficient information to make a determination on 14 immunity.” Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016). 15 C. Discussion 16 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not appear to be frivolous or malicious. As such, the 17 Court examines each cause of action to determine whether Plaintiff has stated a claim on 18 which relief may be granted. 19 1. Section 1983 Fourth Amendment Claim 20 Plaintiff’s first cause of action is a § 1983 claim against the unnamed officers for 21 unlawful detention, seizure, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 22 (Compl. 3–4). Plaintiff alleges he was detained without reasonable suspicion and that the 23 “use of handcuffs, physical force, photography, & coercive questioning constituted a de 24 facto arrest requiring probable cause.” (Id.). The Fourth Amendment protects against 25 unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Police officers may conduct 26 a brief, investigative stop of an individual when they have reasonable suspicion that the 27 ‘person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.’” Reynaga 28 Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation modified) (citing Terry 1 v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Here, Plaintiff alleges he was photographing a publicly 2 accessible display with express permission when the officers confronted him. (Compl. 2– 3 3). As such, he has plausibly alleged that the officers lacked a “‘particularized and 4 objective basis’ for suspecting criminal wrongdoing.” Reynaga, 969 F.3d at 937 (quoting 5 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). “To determine whether a Terry stop 6 has escalated into a full-blown arrest, [courts] evaluate the severity of the intrusion, the 7 aggressiveness of the officer’s actions, and the reasonableness of the officer’s methods 8 under the circumstances.” Reynaga, 969 F.3d at 940. Plaintiff’s assertion that he was 9 handcuffed and forced downstairs, taken as true, is enough to plausibly allege an arrest. 10 (Compl. 2–3); see Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 1996) 11 (“Handcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an otherwise routine 12 investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop.” (citation modified)). 13 Furthermore, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the officers lacked probable cause, a 14 higher standard than reasonable suspicion. United States v. Willy, 40 F.4th 1074, 1080 (9th 15 Cir. 2022). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the officers used excessive force in violation of 16 his constitutional rights. (Compl. 3). The relevant question here “is whether the officers’ 17 actions [were] objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 18 them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 19 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (citation modified). The evaluation of reasonableness “requires a 20 careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 21 Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 22 396 (citation modified). Plaintiff alleges that the officers handcuffed him and forcibly 23 escorted him without any evidence of criminal wrongdoing, causing him to suffer handcuff 24 marks on his wrists. (Compl. 3). Taking these allegations as true, there does not appear to 25 have been a countervailing governmental interest in applying force against a compliant 26 individual not suspected of criminal wrongdoing. Accordingly, Plaintiff has plausibly 27 alleged his first cause of action under the Fourth Amendment. 28 1 2. Section 1983 Failure to Intervene Claim 2 Plaintiff’s second cause of action is a § 1983 claim against the unnamed officers for 3 a failure to intervene in the “unlawful detention, excessive force, & coercive conduct.” 4 (Compl. 4). “Police officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the 5 constitutional rights of a suspect or other citizen.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 6 1289 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation modified). However, officers may be held liable “only if 7 they had an opportunity to intercede.” Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that seven to ten officers 8 were present throughout the incident but failed to prevent the unconstitutional conduct. 9 (Compl. 2–3). Unlike situations that occur within a matter of seconds, Plaintiff describes 10 a prolonged encounter involving handcuffing, escorting, questioning, and sobriety testing. 11 (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a failure to intervene and this derivative claim 12 likewise survives screening. 13 3. Bane Act Claim 14 Plaintiff’s third cause of action, brought against all Defendants, alleges a violation 15 of California’s Bane Act. (Compl. 4–5); Civ. § 52.1. The Bane Act provides a cause of 16 action against anyone who “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to 17 interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any 18 individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, 19 or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California].” Civ. § 52.1(b)–(c). 20 However, this state-law claim seeking damages against a public entity or its employees 21 must comply with California’s Government Claims Act. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 945.4, 22 950.2 (West 2026); (see Compl. 5 (requesting general, special, statutory, and punitive 23 damages)). Claims relating to personal injury must be presented to the public entity within 24 “six months after the accrual of the cause of action” and an application to present a late 25 claim must be filed “within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of 26 the cause of action.” Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 911.2(a), 911.4(a)–(b) (West 2026). “[F]ailure 27 to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation 28 requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a [motion to dismiss] for failure to 1 state a cause of action.” California v. Superior Ct., 90 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2004). Here, 2 Plaintiff has not alleged that he timely presented his claim to the City or that he is excused 3 from doing so. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim with leave to 4 amend. 5 4. Section 1983 Monell Claim 6 Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is a Monell claim alleging that the City “maintained 7 policies, customs, or failures in training that caused Plaintiff’s injuries, including: unlawful 8 ID demands without RS, misuse of handcuffs inside public buildings, failure to train 9 officers on First Amendment photography rights, approval of intimidation-based policing 10 within the station, inadequate supervision of officers’ conduct.” (Compl. 5); see Monell, 11 436 U.S. 658. “To establish municipal liability under Monell, [Plaintiff] must prove that 12 (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the 13 policy amounted to deliberate indifference to [his] constitutional right; and (4) the policy 14 was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Lockett v. County of Los 15 Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). A policy is “a deliberate choice to follow a 16 course of action [] made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 17 responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” 18 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). A policy can come in the form 19 of an expressly adopted official policy, a longstanding practice or custom, or ratification 20 by an official with final policymaking authority. Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 21 973–74 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, even construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiff does not 22 allege the existence of an official policy, a “permanent and well settled” custom, or 23 ratification by an appropriate official. Id. at 974 (“Liability for improper custom may not 24 be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of 25 sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional 26 method of carrying out policy.” (citation modified)); see Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 27 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights 28 cases,” the obligation of the court is “to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 1 || petitioner the benefit of any doubt’). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Monell 2 claim with leave to amend. 3 Finally, the Court does not have sufficient information to determine whether 4 || Defendants are immune from monetary relief and thus dismissal 1s not warranted under § 5 |} 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 6 TIT. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 7 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed Jn Forma Pauperis 1s 8 ||GRANTED. Plaintiff's Bane Act and Monell claims are dismissed for failure to state a 9 claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).* Within twenty-one 10 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: July 21, 2026 2» 13 Jrrn Yn « L4\ 14 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 > Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment and Failure to Intervene claims survive screening. However, as they are brought against the unnamed police officers, Does 1-10, the Court does not presently direct service. °