gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-02358 · 2026-07-20 · Unknown

GABRIEL PIES LONSDALE v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL, SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL COUNSELING OFFICE, DEPUTY ROJAS ARJIS

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Anthony J. Battaglia (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:24Z · confidence high

The court considered a motion for reconsideration filed by a pro se plaintiff nearly nine months after his civil rights case was dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the high standard for Rule 60(b) relief and did not address the specific legal basis for the prior dismissal.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 5) is denied.
“For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Lonsdale’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 5).”
agree with court
The order correctly identifies that a motion for reconsideration filed more than 28 days after judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court correctly notes that Rule 60(b) relief is an 'extraordinary remedy' reserved for exceptional circumstances. The plaintiff's motion, as described in the order, failed to address the specific legal ground for the prior dismissal (the three-strikes bar under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) and instead raised unrelated, vague allegations of mail tampering and discrimination. Because the plaintiff failed to articulate any of the six specific grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) (such as excusable neglect or newly discovered evidence) and did not rebut the prior finding that he was barred from proceeding IFP, the denial is supported by the record recited in the order.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly classifies the motion as a Rule 60(b) petition due to the timing (9 months post-judgment). It correctly applies the 'extraordinary remedy' standard from Ninth Circuit precedent. It accurately identifies the fatal flaw in the plaintiff's motion: the failure to address the specific legal bar (PLRA three-strikes) that caused the initial dismissal. The court did not need to reach the merits of the new 'mail tampering' allegations because they do not constitute a valid ground for Rule 60(b) relief from a judgment based on a statutory fee requirement.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 GABRIEL PIES LONSDALE, Case No. 3:25-cv-2358-AJB-DEB Booking No. 25707540, 11 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR Plaintiff, 12 RECONSIDERATION vs. 13 (Doc. No. 5) SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL, SAN 14 DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 15 SAN DIEGO COUNTY JAIL COUNSELING OFFICE, DEPUTY 16 ROJAS ARJIS, 17 18 Defendants. 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 On September 4, 2025, Plaintiff Gabriel Pies Lonsdale (“Plaintiff” or “Lonsdale”), 22 filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion to proceed 23 in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. No. 1.) In his Complaint, Lonsdale alleged Defendants 24 violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him with a “voodoo diet,” and 25 “printouts” of voodoo prayers. (See id. at 3–5.) The Court, however, denied Lonsdale’s IFP 26 motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because Lonsdale has had three or more prior civil 27 suits “dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a 28 claim upon which relief may be granted.” (See Doc. No. 3 at 2 (citing Lomax v. Ortiz- 1 Marquez, 590 U.S. ----, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g))).) The 2 case was therefore dismissed for failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement pursuant to 28 3 U.S.C. § 1914(a), and judgment was entered on September 26, 2025. (See Doc. Nos. 3; 4.) 4 On June 24, 2026, nearly nine months after the case was dismissed and judgment 5 entered, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he seeks to add “late claim[s] 6 due to mail theft” in which he asks the Court to “prohibit discrimination” and alleges 7 Defendants have violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1708 and 1709, both statutes dealing with criminal 8 mail tampering. (Doc. No. 5.) 9 II. DISCUSSION 10 Lonsdale’s request for reconsideration must be denied. Requests for reconsideration 11 filed more than 28 days after judgment1 are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 60(b), which permits a district court to relieve a party from an order or judgment on grounds 13 of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 14 evidence . . .; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment 15 has been satisfied . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 16 judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” that should 17 be used sparingly. See Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). As a result, 18 a motion for reconsideration should not be granted absent highly unusual circumstances. 19 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 20 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). 21 Here, Plaintiff fails to meet the high standard required for reconsideration. Most 22 notably, he fails explain why the Court’s determination that he was barred from proceeding 23 24 25 1 The Court may grant reconsideration under either Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 458–59 (9th Cir. 1995). A motion to alter or amend a judgment 26 under Rule 59(e) must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Therefore, a “motion for reconsideration” is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 27 59(e) if it is filed within 28 days of entry of judgment; otherwise, it is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment or order. Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482, 490 (9th Cir. 2016); see Am. Ironworks 28 1 || IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and that the action must be dismissed for failure to satisfy 2 || the filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) requires reconsideration based on vague and 3 |}unspecified allegations “mail tampering” and “discrimination.” (See Doc. No. 5.) In 4 ||addition, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts or argument relevant to the six enumerated 5 || grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). In short, Lonsdale has failed to set forth any argument 6 suggesting that relief from judgment or reconsideration is appropriate in this instance, let 7 || alone raise any of the “exceptional circumstances” or enumerated grounds described above 8 would necessitate such an “extraordinary remedy.” See Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945. 9 Hl. CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Lonsdale’s Motion for 11 || Reconsideration (Doc. No. 5). The Clerk of Court shall close the file. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 ||Dated: July 20, 2026 © 14 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 a co