Juventino Morales Juarez v. Markwayne Mullin, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al.
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- writ granted — the Petition is GRANTED IN PART.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by an immigration detainee who argued that his detention without a bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause. The court granted the petition in part, ordering an individualized bond hearing within seven days and specifying that the petitioner bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus granted in part“Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED IN PART.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that the petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b), based on the fact that he was not apprehended upon arrival. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, specifically Rodriguez-Diaz v. Garland, individuals detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing. The court's reliance on its own prior orders and the cited circuit authority supports the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to this relief. |
Request for immediate release from custody denied“To the extent that Petitioner requests to be immediately released from custody, the Petition is DENIED.” | agree with court The court denied immediate release because the proper remedy for a § 1226(a) detainee is an individualized bond hearing to determine if continued detention is warranted, rather than automatic release. This aligns with the procedural requirements of the statute and the precedent cited. |
Burden of proof at bond hearing placed on the petitioner“The noncitizen SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is not a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” | agree with court The court distinguished the petitioner's case from Singh v. Holder, which applied a 'clear and convincing' burden on the government in the context of mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Because the petitioner is detained under § 1226(a), the court correctly applied Rodriguez-Diaz v. Garland, which holds that the detainee must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they are not a flight risk or danger to the community. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly distinguishes between the statutory regimes of § 1225(b) and § 1226(a), applying the appropriate burden of proof for each based on Ninth Circuit precedent. The court addresses the parties' arguments, cites the controlling circuit authority (Rodriguez-Diaz) for the specific factual scenario, and provides a clear, enforceable order with a deadline and specific conditions for the bond hearing.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JUVENTINO MORALES JUAREZ, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03910-RBM-BJW 11 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 12 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et 14 [Doc. 1] al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Juventino Morales Juarez’s (“Petitioner”) 18 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) 19 For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection on or 22 about April 2, 2002. (Doc. 1-2 at 4.) On June 15, 2025, the United States Department of 23 Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner as removable 24 under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) section 212(a)(6)(A)(i). (Doc. 1 ¶ 12.) 25 Petitioner was then arrested and taken to Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he remains 26 today. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 14.) Petitioner has not received a bond hearing because the immigration 27 courts do not have jurisdiction under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 28 2025). (Id. ¶ 17.) The Parties set forth no additional information regarding Petitioner. 1 On July 7, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court set a briefing 2 schedule the next day. (Doc. 2.) Respondents filed their Response to Petition on July 15, 3 2026. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed his Traverse on July 16, 2026. (Doc. 5.) 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 6 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 7 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 8 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 9 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 10 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 11 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 12 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 13 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Petitioner claims that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth 16 Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and the Suspension Clause. 17 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 23–42.) Respondents argue that the Petition fails to sufficiently plead that 18 Petitioner is entitled to relief (see Doc. 4 at 1–3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8)), but “do not 19 oppose an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 20 § 1226(a)” (id. at 3–4). 21 In light of Respondents’ non-opposition, and the Court’s previous orders concerning 22 similarly situated petitioners, the Court finds that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. 23 § 1226(a) and “his arrest and detention without a meaningful bond hearing [therefore 24 violated] the Due Process Clause.” See N.A. v. LaRose, No. 3:25-CV-03028-RBM-DEB, 25 2025 WL 3512412, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025) (finding a petitioner who was not 26 apprehended upon arrival and resided in the United States for 17 years was detained 27 pursuant to § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing). The Court therefore finds that 28 1 Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. 2 The Parties disagree as to the burden of proof at the bond hearing. Respondents 3 argue that “the burden is on the detainee to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 4 that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community.” (Doc. 4 at 3–4 (citing Rodriguez- 5 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) and Dos Santos v. Becerra, Case No.: 6 26-cv-01423-GPC, VET (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026)).) Petitioner argues that the correct 7 burden, clear and convincing evidence, must be placed on the Government. (Doc. 5 at 4– 8 5.) He argues that Rodriguez-Diaz arose in the context of “individuals who had already 9 received initial custody processing,” and that the Ninth Circuit has already found the clear 10 and convincing burden appropriate to place on the Government. (Id. (citing Singh v. 11 Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)).) 12 The Court finds that Respondents have the better argument here. See Rodriguez- 13 Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197 (“If at [the § 1226(a)] hearing the detainee demonstrates by the 14 preponderance of the evidence that he is not [a flight risk or danger to the community], the 15 IJ will order his release.”) (emphasis added). Additionally, although the Court has 16 previously ordered bond hearings where the burden is on the Government in line with the 17 constitutional holding in Singh, see Zeray v. Warden, Case No.: 3:26-cv-02344-RBM- 18 DEB, ECF No. 10 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2026), those cases concerned petitioners detained 19 pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b). Petitioner is detained 20 pursuant to § 1226(a); the distinction brings Petitioner within Rodriguez-Diaz’s ambit. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED IN PART. To 23 the extent that Petitioner requests to be immediately released from custody, the Petition is 24 DENIED. The Court further ORDERS as follows: 25 26 27 28 1 1. Respondents are ORDERED to arrange an individualized bond hearing for 2 Petitioner before an immigration judge within seven (7) days of entry of this 3 Order—aunless the noncitizen requests a continuance—to determine whether his 4 continued detention is warranted. 5 2. The Government SHALL NOT deny Petitioner’s bond on the basis that his 6 detention is governed by the mandatory detention provision under 8 U.S.C. 7 § 1225(b)(2). 8 3. The noncitizen SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of 9 the evidence, that he is not a danger to the community or a risk of flight. If the 10 noncitizen does not request a continuance, and no hearing occurs within seven (7) 11 days of entry of this Order, Petitioner shall be released from Respondents’ custody. 12 4. If the immigration judge determines that bond is appropriate, the immigration judge 13 SHALL consider alternative conditions of release and the noncitizen’s ability to 14 pay.” 15 5. On or before August 7, 2026, Respondents SHALL FILE a status report indicating 16 whether Petitioner received a bond hearing, and the outcome of that bond hearing. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || DATE: July 17, 2026 9 pA Bormedr 0 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 || 26 |!2 See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A bond determination 27 ||process that does not include consideration of financial circumstances and alternative 28 release conditions is unlikely to result in a bond amount that 1s reasonably related to the government’s legitimate interests.’’).