Andreiver Alfredo Munoz v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- writ granted — the Petition is GRANTED.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a Venezuelan national who was re-detained by ICE after being previously released on his own recognizance. The court granted the petition, ordering the immediate release of the petitioner and requiring a pre-deprivation hearing before any future re-detention.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus granted“Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court relies on its own prior unpublished decision in Faizyan v. Casey and other district court cases to determine that the petitioner is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that the revocation of his release without a hearing violated due process. While the court cites binding Ninth Circuit authority (Ortega-Cervantes) to support the equivalence of release on recognizance and conditional parole, the core holding that re-detention of a previously released individual requires a pre-deprivation hearing under § 1226 is based on non-binding district court precedent. The respondent did not oppose the petition, acknowledging the court's prior decisions control. The decision follows the logic of the cited authorities and the specific facts of the case. |
Immediate release of Petitioner ordered“The Government is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Release on Own Recognizance.” | agree with court This relief is a direct consequence of the finding that the detention was unlawful due to the lack of a pre-deprivation hearing. The court cites multiple district court cases (E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, Jorge M.F. v. Jennings, Domingo v. Kaiser) to support the proposition that post-deprivation hearings are inadequate procedural safeguards. This is consistent with the due process analysis applied. |
Requirement for pre-detention hearing before any re-detention“The Court ORDERS that, prior to any re-detention, the Government SHALL provide Petitioner with adequate notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to determine whether detention is warranted.” | agree with court The court imposes a procedural requirement based on its due process analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge. It correctly cites Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland for the burden of proof standard in § 1226(a) hearings. This is a standard remedy in such habeas cases to prevent future violations. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and applies the correct legal standards for a § 2241 habeas petition. It correctly identifies the burden of proof and the nature of the writ. The substantive legal reasoning relies heavily on a string of recent, non-binding district court decisions (Faizyan, Pinchi, E.A. T.-B., Jorge M.F., Domingo) to establish that re-detention of a previously released individual requires a pre-deprivation hearing under § 1226. While the court cites binding Ninth Circuit authority (Ortega-Cervantes, Rodriguez Diaz) for the statutory interpretation and burden of proof, the core due process holding is based on persuasive, non-binding precedent. However, given that the respondent did not oppose the petition and acknowledged the court's prior decisions control, and the facts are materially identical to Faizyan, the result is defensible and follows from the law as applied by this court. The order is clear and well-reasoned within the context of the district court's own precedent.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 ANDREIVER ALFREDO MUNOZ, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03655-RBM-DDL 10 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 11 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 12 WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION [Doc. 1] CENTER, 13 Respondent. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Andreiver Alfredo Munoz’s (“Petitioner”) 17 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) 18 For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 A. Factual Background 21 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States near Eagle 22 Pass, Texas, on September 21, 2023. (Doc. 1 at 3.) After presenting himself to immigration 23 authorities, Petitioner was processed and issued a Notice to Appear which charged him 24 with removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 25 (“INA”) as a noncitizen present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and 26 commenced removal proceedings against him. (Id. at 4; see Doc. 1-3, Ex. A at 3.) On 27 September 26, 2023, Petitioner was released pursuant to an Order of Release on 28 Recognizance. (Id. at 4; see Doc. 1-3, Ex. D at 12.) Petitioner’s removal proceedings 1 remain pending. (Id. at 4.) 2 On December 30, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by Utah Highway Patrol in 3 connection with a 2024 uninsured motorist traffic citation. (Id.) Petitioner was then 4 transferred to U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (“ICE”) custody and has 5 remained detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center ever since. (Id.) 6 B. Procedural Background 7 On March 13, 2026, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed his first Petition for a Writ 8 of Habeas Corpus (“Original Petition”). See Munoz v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Ctr., 9 Case No. 3:26-cv-01601-RBM-VET (S.D. Cal., Mar. 13, 2026), ECF No. 1. On March 17, 10 2026, this Court dismissed the Original Petition on screening with leave to amend based 11 Petitioner’s failure to sufficiently state a habeas claim. See id., ECF. No. 2 at 1–3. 12 Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on April 20, 2026. Id., ECF No. 3. The Court 13 dismissed the Amended Petition without prejudice, finding that Petitioner again failed to 14 state a habeas claim. Id., ECF No. 5 at 2–3. 15 On June 22, 2026, Petitioner commenced the instant action by filing a third Petition. 16 (Doc. 1.) Pursuant to this Court’s Order (see Doc. 5), Respondents filed a Response on 17 July 7, 2026. (Doc. 6.) 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 20 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 21 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 22 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 23 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 24 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 25 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 26 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 27 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 28 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Petitioner “challenges the legality and constitutionality of his continued 3 [immigration] detention.” (Doc. 1 at 3.) Respondents assert that “Petitioner was 4 previously released from immigration custody on conditional parole issued under 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1226(a)[,]” but nonetheless maintain their position that “Petitioner is subject to 6 mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” (Doc. 6 at 2.) Respondents “acknowledge[ ] 7 that this Court’s prior decisions will control the result here . . . , as the facts are not 8 materially distinguishable for purposes of the Court’s decision, and on that basis . . . does 9 not oppose the [P]etition and defers to the Court on the appropriate relief.” (Id. at 2–3.) 10 This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners 11 who were previously released from detention on their own recognizance and re-detained 12 several years later. In Faizyan v. Casey, the Court held such petitioners are “subject to the 13 discretionary detention procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and [their] detention without a 14 bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause.” Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 15 WL 3208844, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 16 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘release on 17 recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a).”). Applying the 18 due process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court also found that 19 Respondents’ summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an 20 opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” Faizyan, 2025 WL 21 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25- CV- 22 01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding a due process 23 violation where the petitioner was initially released on his own recognizance); Leiva Flores 24 v. Albarran, Case No. 25- cv-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 25 2025) (finding the same and requiring a hearing before detention). 26 Like in Faizyan, Petitioner was previously released from ICE custody pursuant to 27 an Order of Release on Recognizance. (See Doc. 1-3, Ex. D at 12; see also id., Ex. C at 9.) 28 “As ICE was not authorized to release [Petitioner] if [he] was a danger to the community 1 or a flight risk, the Court must infer from [his] release that ICE determined [he] was 2 neither.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). 3 After residing in the United States for over two years, Petitioner was re-detained and 4 taken into ICE custody in December 2025. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The Court therefore adopts its 5 reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here. For those same reasons, the Court finds that: (1) 6 Petitioner is subject to § 1226’s discretionary detention procedures; and (2) ICE’s 7 revocation of Petitioner’s release on his own recognizance without a pre-deprivation 8 hearing violated his due process rights and rendered his detention unlawful. See Faizyan, 9 2025 WL 3208844, at *7; see also E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 10 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Although . . . Petitioner may request a bond hearing while detained, 11 such a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard because 12 it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Jorge M.F. v. 13 Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[I]f Petitioner is detained, he will 14 already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid”); Domingo v. Kaiser, Case 15 No. 25-cv-05893 (RFL), 2025 WL 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (“Even if 16 Petitioner[ ] received a prompt post-detention bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 17 was released at that point, he will have already suffered the harm that is the subject of his 18 motion; that is, his potentially erroneous detention.”). 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 21 1. The Government is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 22 subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Release on Own 23 Recognizance. 24 2. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any re-detention, the Government SHALL 25 provide Petitioner with adequate notice of the reasons for revocation of his 26 release and a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 27 to determine whether detention is warranted. At such a hearing, the noncitizen 28 bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is 1 not a danger to the community or a flight risk. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 2 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022). 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||DATE: July 17, 2026 6 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28