Ursula Leon Hernandez v. Black & Veatch Construction, Inc., et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Anthony J. Battaglia (author)
Analysis
The court considered Plaintiff Ursula Leon Hernandez's motions to remand two consolidated employment actions (a putative class action and a PAGA action) that had been removed to federal court. The court denied the motions, finding that it possessed diversity jurisdiction over the putative class action and supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA action.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Sua sponte consolidation of Case No. 25-cv-02241 and Case No. 26-cv-01070“Accordingly, the Court sua sponte consolidates the Putative Class Action and the PAGA Action.” | agree with court The court applied the broad discretion standard for consolidation under Rule 42(a)(2), citing Ninth Circuit precedent. The factual basis (identical parties, near-identical facts, and overlapping legal issues) supports the decision to consolidate for judicial efficiency. |
Denial of Motion to Remand Case No. 25-cv-02241 (Putative Class Action)“For the foregoing reasons, Leon Hernandez’s motions to remand are DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard for the amount in controversy after the plaintiff challenged removal. The calculation of back pay ($72,966.40) plus estimated attorney fees ($30,000) exceeds the $75,000 threshold. The court correctly noted that the removing party need not provide evidence in the notice of removal itself, only a plausible allegation, per Dart Cherokee Basin. The plaintiff failed to rebut the evidence. |
Denial of Motion to Remand Case No. 26-cv-01070 (PAGA Action)“For the foregoing reasons, Leon Hernandez’s motions to remand are DENIED.” | agree with court The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because the PAGA action was consolidated with the putative class action over which the court had diversity jurisdiction. The claims arose from the same conduct and parties, satisfying the 'same case or controversy' requirement. The plaintiff did not provide a compelling reason to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c). |
The order itself: sound — The order is well-reasoned and applies the correct legal standards for removal, amount in controversy, and consolidation. It correctly cites Dart Cherokee Basin regarding the burden of proof timing and Kroske regarding the date of calculation. The calculation of the amount in controversy is supported by the record (timesheets and fee estimates) and the plaintiff's failure to rebut. The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is logically consistent with the consolidation decision.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 URSULA LEON HERNANDEZ, Lead Case No.: 25-cv-02241-AJB-SBC 12 Plaintiff, Consolidated with: 13 v. Case No.: 26-cv-01070-AJB-SBC 14 BLACK & VEATCH CONSTRUCTION, ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO INC., et al., 15 REMAND Defendants. 16 (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 9; 17 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 11) 18 19 Before the Court are Plaintiff Ursula Leon Hernandez’s (“Leon Hernandez”) 20 motions to remand in Case Nos. 25-cv-02241-AJB-SBC and 26-cv-01070-AJB-SBC. 21 (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 9; 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 11.)1 The motions are fully briefed and 22 submitted. (25-cv-02241 Doc. Nos. 9; 12–14; 26-cv-01070 Doc. Nos. 11; 13–14; 23.) 23 For the following reasons, the motions are DENIED. 24 25 26 1 Because this Order addresses motions in two separate cases, the Court includes the case number 27 as part of its citations. For example, the Motion to Remand filed in Case No. 25-cv-02241-AJB-SBC at docket number 9 will be cited as “25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 9.” Additionally, page citations refer to the 28 pagination generated by the Case Management/Electronic Case Files system. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 Defendants Black & Veatch Corporation and Black & Veatch Construction, Inc., 4 (collectively, “Black & Veatch”) employed Leon Hernandez from September 23, 2024, to 5 February 25, 2025. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 3.) Black & Veatch paid Leon Hernandez 6 at a rate of $70.16 per hour. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1 ¶ 58.) Other terms of Leon 7 Hernandez’s employment were set out in a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (See 8 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1-5 at 3–45.)2 9 B. 25-cv-02241 Procedural Background 10 On July 24, 2025, Leon Hernandez initiated case number 25-cv-02241, the “Putative 11 Class Action,” in San Diego County Superior Court. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1-2 at 4.) Leon 12 Hernandez served Black & Veatch five days later. (Id. at 61–62.) 13 On August 28, 2025, Black & Veatch removed the Putative Class Action to this 14 Court. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1.) Black & Veatch contends that the Court has subject 15 matter jurisdiction over the matter because (1) the action is between citizens of different 16 states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; and (2) Leon Hernandez’s claims 17 are preempted by federal law. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12; 64–65.) Black & Veatch suggests that to the 18 extent any claim is not preempted, the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 19 such a claim. (Id. ¶¶ 77–78.) 20 21 22 2 Black & Veatch included copies of the CBA with its notices of removal. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 23 1-5 at 3–45; 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1-3 at 108–52.) Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) allows the Court to take judicial notice of any fact “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within 24 the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” The Court notes the copy filed in 26-cv-01070 is “[e]ffective 25 June 1, 2017 through May 31, 2022.” (26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1-3 at 108.) Because Black & Veatch did 26 not employ Leon Hernandez during this timeframe, the Court will disregard this version of the CBA. There being no dispute as to the 25-cv-02241 CBA’s authenticity, the Court finds it appropriate for judicial 27 notice. Moreover, “courts routinely take judicial notice of the governing collective bargaining agreement where necessary to resolve issues of preemption.” Sarmiento v. Sealy, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1142 28 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (alteration omitted). 1 On September 26, 2025, Leon Hernandez timely moved to remand the Putative Class 2 Action. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 9.) 3 C. 26-cv-01070 Procedural Background 4 On September 16, 2025, Leon Hernandez provided written notice to Black & Veatch 5 and California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency of alleged California Labor 6 Code violations by Black & Veatch. (26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1-3 at 17–22.) 7 Leon Hernandez subsequently initiated case number 26-cv-01070, the “PAGA 8 Action,” in San Diego County Superior Court on January 6, 2026. (Id. at 3.) Leon 9 Hernandez served Black & Veatch 14 days later. (Id. at 31–32.) 10 On February 19, 2026, Black & Veatch removed the PAGA Action to this Court. 11 (26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1.) Black & Veatch claims the Court has subject matter jurisdiction 12 over the matter because Leon Hernandez’s claim contained therein is preempted by federal 13 law. (Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 14–40.) 14 On March 20, 2026, Leon Hernandez timely moved to remand the PAGA Action. 15 (26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 11.) 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction 18 only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian 19 Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A defendant may remove a civil action to federal 20 court only if the district court would have original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1441(a). “In general, removal statutes are strictly construed against removal.” Luther v. 22 Countywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations 23 omitted). There is a “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and the party 24 seeking removal always bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Gaus v. 25 Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). If there is any doubt as 26 to the propriety of removal, federal jurisdiction must be rejected. Id. (citation omitted). 27 28 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. The Court consolidates these actions sua sponte. 3 “If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may 4 consolidate the actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(2). “A district court generally has ‘broad’ 5 discretion to consolidate actions.” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th 6 Cir. 2008) (quoting Inv’s. Rsch. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 877 F.2d 7 777, 777 (9th Cir. 1989)). “[T]rial courts may consolidate cases sua sponte.” In re Adams 8 Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 9 Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2383 at n.37). In determining whether to consolidate cases, 10 courts should weigh “the saving of time and effort consolidation would produce” against 11 “any inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would cause.” Thomas Inv. Partners, Ltd. v. 12 United States, 444 F. App’x 190, 193 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Huene v. United States, 743 13 F.2d 703, 704 (9th Cir. 1984)). 14 Consolidation is warranted because the underlying actions involve common 15 questions of fact and law. 16 First, the parties in the underlying actions are identical. Leon Hernandez initiated the 17 Putative Class Action against Black & Veatch and 50 Doe Defendants. (25-cv-02241 Doc. 18 No. 1-2 at 4.) Leon Hernandez similarly initiated the PAGA Action against Black & Veatch 19 and 50 Doe Defendants. (26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1-3 at 3.) In fact, Leon Hernandez 20 identifies the parties in each of the underlying actions using identical or near identical 21 descriptions. (Compare 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 1–3, 6–7, with 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 22 1-3 ¶¶ 5–7, 10–11.) 23 Second, Leon Hernandez relies on near identical facts to bring both actions. Leon 24 Hernandez essentially copies and pastes her allegations regarding the challenged conduct 25 from the Putative Class Action into the PAGA Action. (Compare, e.g., 25-cv-02241 Doc. 26 No. 1-2 ¶¶ 8–14, with 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1-3 ¶¶ 12–18.) 27 Third, Leon Hernandez raises similar legal issues in both actions. For example, the 28 Putative Class Action alleges that Black & Veatch violated California Labor Code §§ 201, 1 202, 203, 226, 226.7, 233, 246, 510, 512, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, and 2802. (25-cv-02241 2 Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 59–114.) The PAGA Action, meanwhile, raises a PAGA claim for Black 3 & Veatch’s alleged “violation of California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, . . . , 226.7, 246, 4 510, 512, . . . , 1194, 1197, 1197.1, . . . , [and] 2802.” (26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1-3 ¶ 9.) 5 Given these similarities, Black & Veatch notes that the PAGA Action is “derivative 6 of the [Putative Class Action], and the cases should likely be consolidated.” (26-cv-01070 7 Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12.) Leon Hernandez has also treated these actions as if they are already 8 consolidated. (See 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 24 (filing a single status report in response to 9 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 21 and 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 16).) 10 Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the judicial efficiency that 11 consolidation provides will likely outweigh any inconvenience, delay, or expense that it 12 would cause. In fact, it is unlikely that the consolidation will cause any inconvenience, 13 delay, or expense as the Putative Class Action and the PAGA Action have been subject to 14 identical scheduling order deadlines. (Compare 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 19, with 15 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 17.) 16 Accordingly, the Court sua sponte consolidates the Putative Class Action and the 17 PAGA Action. See Adams Apple, 829 F.2d at 1487. All future documents must be filed 18 under Lead Case No. 25-cv-02241-AJB-SBC. All subsequent filings must provide the 19 following case number is their captions: 20 Lead Case No.: 25-cv-02241-AJB-SBC Consolidated with: 21 Case No.: 26-cv-01070-AJB-SBC 22 23 B. The Court will exercise jurisdiction over Leon Hernandez’s claims. 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), a defendant removing an action from state court to 25 federal court must file a notice of removal “containing a short and plain statement of the 26 grounds for removal.” The grounds for removal may consist of federal question 27 jurisdiction, where a federal court can exercise original jurisdiction over “all civil actions 28 arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 1 and/or diversity jurisdiction, where a federal court can exercise original jurisdiction over 2 “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, 3 exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States,” 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1332(a)(1). Additionally, a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction “over all 5 other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 6 they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 7 Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 8 In removing the underlying actions to federal court, Black & Veatch asserts that the 9 Court possesses federal question jurisdiction over claims in both the Putative Class Action 10 and the PAGA Action. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 63–76; 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 1 11 ¶¶ 14–40.) In turn, Black & Veatch asks the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 12 over other claims in the Putative Class Action. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 77–78; 13 26-cv-01070 ¶¶ 41–42.) Alternatively, Black & Veatch argues that the Court possesses 14 diversity jurisdiction over the Putative Class Action. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 10–62.) 15 Leon Hernandez disagrees. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 9; 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 11.) 16 Black & Veatch correctly argues that the Court possesses diversity jurisdiction over 17 the Putative Class Action claims. Given its sua sponte consolidation of the actions, the 18 Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA Action claim. 19 1. The Court possesses diversity jurisdiction over Leon Hernandez’s Putative Class Action claims. 20 21 Leon Hernandez contends that this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over the 22 Putative Class Action claims because Black & Veatch has “failed to provide sufficient, 23 summary judgment style evidence[] to establish, by a preponderance, that the amount in 24 controversy meets the Court’s jurisdictional threshold.” (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 9-1 at 25 24–32.) In so arguing, Leon Hernandez does not dispute that the complete diversity 26 requirement is satisfied. (See generally id.) 27 Leon Hernandez is incorrect. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the 28 Court possesses diversity jurisdiction over Leon Hernandez’s Putative Class Action. 1 The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. 2 Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566–67. To carry this burden, Black & Veatch estimates that the amount 3 in controversy is “at least $221,316.96” based on Leon Hernandez’s hourly rate, claims, 4 and awards in similar actions. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 20–61.) 5 As a preliminary matter, Leon Hernandez’s complaint regarding the sufficiency of 6 Black & Veatch’s evidence in its notice of removal misunderstands when a removing 7 defendant must provide evidence to support removal. To remove an action to state court, a 8 defendant must file a notice of removal “containing a short and plain statement of the 9 grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (emphasis added). A “defendant’s notice of 10 removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds 11 the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 12 81, 89 (2014). “Evidence establishing the amount is required by [28 U.S.C.] 13 § 1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s 14 allegation.” Id. Under these circumstances, Black & Veatch was not obligated to offer 15 evidence to support its allegations regarding the amount in controversy until after Leon 16 Hernandez moved to remand the action. Id. 17 Black & Veatch carries this burden. 18 After a plaintiff challenges a defendant’s assertion of federal jurisdiction, “both sides 19 submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the 20 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Dart, 574 U.S. at 88. 21 Beginning with Black & Veatch’s evidence, Black & Veatch submits a compilation 22 of Leon Hernandez’s timesheets from September 23, 2024, to March 2, 2025, to 23 substantiate its analysis of the amount of backpay to which Leon Hernandez may be 24 entitled. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 12-2 at 6–7.)3 Using this evidence and awards in other 25 26 27 3 Black & Veatch also asks the Court to take judicial notice of a memorandum of points and authorities that Leon Hernandez’s counsel filed in a similar case to justify a fee award to provide evidence 28 1 cases, Black & Veatch contends that Leon Hernandez may be entitled to at least $75,722.80 2 in lost wages (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 12 at 25–26), over $30,000.00 for alleged emotional 3 distress damages (id. at 26–28), more than $55,000.00 for alleged punitive damages (id. at 4 28–29), and in excess of $30,000.00 for attorney fees (id. at 29–31). 5 Leon Hernandez does not offer any evidence to rebut Black & Veatch’s. (See 6 generally 25-cv-02241 Doc. Nos. 9; 13.) 7 Leon Hernandez’s potential back pay and attorney fees are sufficient to satisfy the 8 amount in controversy. In calculating the potential amount in controversy for a removed 9 case, courts consider the potential amount as of the date of removal. See Kroske v. U.S. 10 Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 11 Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997)). 12 Beginning with Leon Hernandez’s potential back pay, Black & Veatch terminated 13 Leon Hernandez on February 25, 2025. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 3.) At that time, Black 14 & Veatch paid Leon Hernandez an hourly rate of $70.16. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1-5 at 2 15 ¶ 4.) Black & Veatch removed the Putative Class Action to federal court on August 28, 16 2025. (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1.) This is a span of 26 weeks and 2 days. A review of Leon 17 Hernandez’s timesheets reveals that Leon Hernandez worked, on average, over 42 hours 18 per week in the 21 weeks in which she worked for Black & Veatch. (See 25-cv-02241 Doc. 19 No. 12-2 at 6–7.) Multiplying 40 hours per week by 26 weeks,4 Leon Hernandez could 20 have been entitled to 1,040 hours of back pay at the time the Putative Class Action was 21 removed to federal court. (See id.) Multiplying 1,040 hours by an hourly rate of $70.16 22 Leon Hernandez could have been entitled to $72,966.40 in back pay. (See 25-cv-02241 23 Doc. No. 1-5 at 2 ¶ 4.) With this figure, Black & Veatch only needs to show that Leon 24 25 26 does not and need not rely on the memorandum to find that the amount in controversy threshold is 27 satisfied. Accordingly, the Court denies as moot Black & Veatch’s request for judicial notice. 28 4 The Court rounds both numbers down to provide a more conservative calculation. 1 Hernandez could be entitled to recover $2,033.61 more to cross the $75,000.00 amount in 2 controversy threshold. 3 Turning to Leon Hernandez’s potential attorney fees, Black & Veatch estimates that 4 Leon Hernandez will incur at least $30,000 in fees to litigate this matter. (25-cv-02241 5 Doc. No. 12 at 29–31.) In support of this estimate, Black & Veatch points out that “[c]ourts 6 have found $300 per hour and 100 hours as reasonable and conservative for employment 7 actions.” (25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 12 at 30 (citing cases).) 8 Leon Hernandez does not meaningfully dispute this estimate. (See 25-cv-02241 Doc. 9 No. 13 at 10.) Instead, Leon Hernandez argues that the 100-hour estimate should consider 10 more than just “individual [California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”)] and 11 wrongful termination claims.” (Id. (“Defendants’ assumptions regarding the number of 12 hours needed to litigate the individual claims are not supported by any evidence.”).) In 13 other words, Leon Hernandez appears to assert that the 100-hour estimate should be applied 14 to the litigation of all of her claims and not just her FEHA claim, which is Count Ten of 15 the Putative Class Action. (Id.; see also 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 115–21.) 16 In light of Leon Hernandez’s apparent concession that it is fair to estimate that the 17 litigation of all of her claims would require at least 100 hours of work at a rate of $300 per 18 hour, the Court agrees with Black & Veatch that Leon Hernandez is likely to incur at least 19 $30,000.00 in attorney fees to litigate this matter. (See 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 12 at 30; see 20 also 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 13 at 10.) 21 Under these circumstances, Black & Veatch has demonstrated by a preponderance 22 of the evidence that Leon Hernandez could be entitled to recover at least $72,966.40 in 23 back pay and over $30,000.00 in attorney fees, which totals more than $102,966.40. This 24 figure exceeds the $75,000.00 amount in controversy threshold. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).5 25 26 5 Because the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the Putative Class Action, the Court declines to 27 address whether it has federal question jurisdiction over the matter as well. See, e.g., Atwood v. Ft. Peck Tribal Court Assiniboine, 513 F.3d 943, 946 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining courts “need not determine 28 1 2. The Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA Action claim. 3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 4 |/over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original 5 ||jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article II of the 6 || United States Constitution.” Given the basis for the Court’s sua sponte consolidation of the 7 Putative Class Action and PAGA Action, the Court finds that the PAGA Action claim is 8 related to” the Putative Class Action claims that it ““form[s] part of the same case or 9 || controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” Jd. (See also supra at 4-5.) 10 Leon Hernandez’s sole objection to the possibility of the Court exercising 11 ||supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA Action claim is based on her contention that none 12 || of the Putative Class Action claims is preempted. (See 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 11-1 at 23; 13 25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 13 at 8-9.) Because the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the 14 || Putative Class Action claims, Leon Hernandez does not offer a compelling reason for the 15 Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the PAGA Action claim. See 28 U.S.C. 16 || § 1367(c). 17 |TV. CONCLUSION 18 For the foregoing reasons, Leon Hernandez’s motions to remand are DENIED. 19 ||(25-cv-02241 Doc. No. 9; 26-cv-01070 Doc. No. 11.) Leon Hernandez must file a 20 ||consolidated complaint on or before August 7, 2026. Black & Veatch must submit a 21 ||responsive filing to the consolidated complaint on or before August 28, 2026. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 ||Dated: July 17, 2026 25 United States District Judge 26 27 Hernandez’s request for judicial notice of a case filing to support her federal question jurisdiction 28 || arguments is denied as moot.