gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-01073 · 2026-07-16 · Unknown

Eric Tallaksen v. Alexander Smith, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Thomas J. Whelan (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:25Z · confidence high

The court considered Plaintiff's unopposed motion to file two exhibits under seal in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion, where the Plaintiff relied solely on a Stipulated Protective Order. The court denied the motion without prejudice, ruling that a protective order does not satisfy the 'compelling reasons' standard required for sealing judicial records, and directed the parties to file a new motion with specific factual support by July 31, 2026.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to file documents under seal denied without prejudice
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s motion to file Exhibits 6 and 12 under seal [Doc. 57].”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit precedent from Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, which establishes that a 'strong presumption of access' applies to dispositive motions and that a 'blanket protective order' is not a 'compelling reason' to seal records. Because the Plaintiff explicitly stated they were filing the motion solely to comply with the Protective Order and did not independently argue for sealing, the court was correct to deny the motion for failure to meet the legal standard.

The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable standard of review (compelling reasons) for sealing documents attached to dispositive motions. It accurately cites binding Ninth Circuit authority (Kamakana) to reject the Plaintiff's reliance on a Stipulated Protective Order as a basis for sealing. The court properly notes that the Plaintiff did not make independent arguments for sealing, which is a fatal flaw in the motion under the cited precedent. The denial without prejudice allows the parties to cure the deficiency by providing specific factual findings, which is a procedurally appropriate remedy.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 ERIC TALLAKSEN, Case No.: 3:25-CV-1073 W (DDL)

14 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 15 v. PREJUDICE MOTION TO FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL [DOC. 57] 16 ALEXANDER SMITH, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 Pending before is Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to file under seal certain documents 21 cited in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ summary-judgment motion. The Court 22 decides the matter on the papers submitted. Civ.L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons that 23 follow, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the motion [Doc. 57]. 24 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public 25 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City 26 and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner 27 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Although access to judicial records is 28 not absolute, there is a “narrow range” of documents that have traditionally been kept 1 secret for policy reasons: “grand jury transcripts and warrant materials in the midst of a 2 preindictment investigation.” Id. (citing Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 3 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1989)). The importance of this narrow range is that “[u]nless a 4 particular court record is one ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of 5 access’ is the starting point.” Id. (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance 6 Company, 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). 7 “[T]he strong presumption of access to judicial records applies fully to dispositive 8 pleadings, including motions for summary judgment and related attachments.” 9 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. The reason is “because the resolution of a dispute on the 10 merits, whether by trial or summary judgment, is at the heart of the interest in ensuring 11 the ‘public’s understanding of the judicial process and of significant public events.’” Id. 12 (quoting Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986)). 13 “Thus, ‘compelling reasons’ must be shown to seal judicial records attached to a 14 dispositive motion.” Id. (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). This standard applies “even if 15 the dispositive motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or protective 16 order.” Id. Relying on “a blanket protective order is unreasonable and is not a 17 ‘compelling reason’ that rebuts the presumption of access.” Id. at 1183 (citing Foltz, 331 18 F.3d at 1138). 19 The compelling reasons standard imposes a high threshold on parties seeking to 20 maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions. Kamakana, 447 F.3d 21 at 1180. The moving party “must articulate compelling reasons supported by specific 22 factual findings [citation] that outweigh the general history of access and the public 23 policies favoring disclosure, such as the ‘public interest in understanding the judicial 24 process.’” Id. at 1178–79 (citations omitted). A broad, categorical approach that 25 “[s]imply mention[s] a general category of privilege, without any further elaboration or 26 any specific linkage with the documents, does not satisfy the burden.” Id. at 1184. 27 “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in 28 disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have 1 become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private 2 spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” 3 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). “The mere fact that the 4 production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure 5 to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. 6 (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). 7 Here, Plaintiff moves to file under seal two exhibits relied on in opposing 8 Defendants’ summary-judgment motion. The exhibits are Chapters 1 (Exhibit 12) and 3 9 (Exhibit 6) to the California Highway Patrol Manual 70.6. (Motion [Doc. 57] 2:5–6.) The 10 basis for Plaintiff’s request is that Defendants produced the documents during discovery 11 and designated them as “confidential” pursuant to a Stipulated Protective Order [Doc. 16] 12 approved by the magistrate judge. (Id. at 2:7–10.) According to the motion, because the 13 documents are designated “confidential,” Plaintiff is required to move to file the exhibits 14 under seal pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Stipulated Protective Order. (Id. 2:11–15.) 15 However, “Plaintiff does not independently contend that the documents should remain 16 under seal but files this motion solely to comply with the Protective Order. . . .” (Id. at 17 2:1–3.) 18 As set forth above, relying on a protective order governing discovery does not 19 satisfy the compelling reason standard applicable to a motion to seal filed in connection 20 with a summary-judgment motion. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183. Accordingly, the Court 21 DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s motion to file Exhibits 6 and 12 under 22 seal [Doc. 57]. 23 If either party believes Exhibits 6 and 12 should be filed under seal, they must file 24 a new motion to seal on or before July 31, 2026. The motion to seal must specify the 25 reason for the request, must cite relevant legal authority and, to the extent either party 26 contends disclosure would cause harm, the motion should identify the harm and basis for 27 believing such harm will result. General assertions of the need for confidentiality or harm 28 will not suffice. 1 If no additional briefing is filed by July 31, 2026, the Court will issue an order 2 || placing the exhibits on the public docket. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: July 16, 2026 \ ° ihe Dor 6 Hn. 1 omas J. Whelan 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28