Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OLBAN ROBERTO ERAZO ACOSTA, Case No.: 26-CV-3492 JLS (MMP)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING AMENDED 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, et 15 (ECF No. 6) al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Olban Roberto Erazo Acosta’s Amended 19 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 6). Also 20 before the Court is Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 8) and 21 Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 9). For the reasons set forth below, the Court 22 GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 6). 23 BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States in 2014 25 when he was nine years old. Pet. at 2. Petitioner arrived with his sister, who was sixteen 26 years old at the time. Id. Petitioner was arrested almost immediately after entering the 27 country and was transferred to the custody of the Department of Health and Human 28 Services. Id. Petitioner was placed in a shelter with the Office of Refugee Resettlement 1 (“ORR”) and later released to his mother. Id. at 3. On April 30, 2026, Petitioner was riding 2 in his sister’s car when they were pulled over. Id. Border Patrol agents were quickly called, 3 and Petitioner was arrested. Id. Petitioner was not accused of any violation, provided any 4 advance notice, or provided an individualized custody determination prior to his re- 5 detention. Id. Petitioner has remained in detention since. Id. 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 8 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 9 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 10 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 11 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 12 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 13 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 14 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 15 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 16 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 17 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 18 (citations omitted). 19 DISCUSSION 20 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release without justification or 21 consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. at 22 4–7. The Court agrees. 23 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 24 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 25 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 26 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 27 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 28 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 1 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 2 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 3 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 4 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 5 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 6 Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 7 government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody 8 creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will 9 be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting 10 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial 11 discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that 12 individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of 13 custody.” Id. (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. 14 Cal. May 6, 2022)). 15 Respondents do not oppose an order directing a bond hearing to be held pursuant 16 to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Ret. at 2. The Court finds additional relief appropriate. Petitioner 17 was released from immigration custody in 2014 and placed in an ORR shelter. Pet. at 3. 18 When he was released, he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight 19 risk. See Garcia Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1246, 1250 (D.N.M. 2025) (“The 20 statute that governs the detention of unaccompanied minors encountered at the border, the 21 Trafficking Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act (‘TVPRA’), provides that, in 22 making custody determinations, ORR should consider ‘danger to self, danger to the 23 community, and risk of flight.’”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A)); Saravia v. Sessions, 24 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The statute requires ORR to place the 25 unaccompanied minor ‘in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child,’ 26 considering, among other things, whether the minor is dangerous.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 27 1232(c)(2)(A)). 28 / / / 1 Therefore, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. 2 See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after 3 her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither 4 a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in 5 remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. 6 Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one 7 that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time 8 indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); 9 Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding 10 petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release). 11 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 12 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 13 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient 14 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. See id. 15 Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; 16 (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 17 the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the 18 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 19 burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. 20 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s 21 revocation of Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 22 heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 23 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his release. “Freedom 24 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 25 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 26 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with his family. See Morrissey, 408 27 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and 28 1 is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal 2 life.”). 3 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 4 release was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an 5 opportunity to be heard. Pet. at 6. Since DHS’s determination that Petitioner should be 6 released because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is 7 no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760 8 (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to 9 the community or a flight risk.”). “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits 10 federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. 11 Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed 12 circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a 13 flight risk. . . .” Id. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody 14 hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the 15 government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid 16 basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 17 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 18 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 19 and a hearing is “low.” See id. at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 20 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest 21 [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in 22 doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail to point to any burdens on the 23 Government if it were to have provided proper notice, reasoning, and a pre-deprivation 24 hearing. See generally Ret. 25 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in 26 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Garcia Domingo, 27 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54 (granting a similar challenge based on prior release from ORR 28 1 custody as a minor); Torres Sanchez v. Mullin, No. 26-CV-2957-JLS-AHG, ECF No. 9 at 2 ||2 (S.D. Cal. June 16, 2026) (granting release based on similar facts). 3 CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ 5 ||of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 6). The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release 6 Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court 7 || ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the 8 ||reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to 9 ||determine whether detention is warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of 10 |/establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 11 ||community or a risk of flight.!_ The Parties ace ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by 12 || July 21, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. As this concludes the litigation 13 this matter, the Clerk SHALL CLOSE the file. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 || Dated: July 15, 2026 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 || ———_ 27 Ih This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; Pinchi, 792 28 || F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez y. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).