Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HELEN MIDORI ARIAS RIVERA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03587-JES-SBC 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LaROSE, Senior Warden Otay Mesa Detention Center; [ECF No. 1] 15 TODD BLANCHE, Acting United States 16 Attorney General; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of the Department of 17 Homeland Security; PATRICK DIVVER, 18 ICE San Diego Field Office Director, in their official capacities, 19 Respondents. 20 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Helen Midori Arias Rivera’s (“Petitioner”) Petition 22 for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on June 17, 23 2026. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Pursuant to the Court’s order to show cause, Respondents filed 24 a return to the petition (ECF No. 4, “Return”) and Petitioner filed a Traverse (ECF No. 5). 25 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition. 26 27 // 28 // 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 The following facts are alleged in the Petition and not contested by Respondents. 3 Petitioner, a citizen of Peru, entered the United States on December 21, 2023. Pet. ¶ 28. 4 She was detained and had a credible fear interview with a positive credible fear 5 determination. Id. Around December 30, 2023, Petitioner was released from detention on 6 her own recognizance and served with a Notice to Appear for a removal proceeding. Id. 7 Removal proceedings began on January 9, 2024, and in April 2024, Petitioner filed an 8 asylum application. Id. ¶ 29. On March 25, 2026, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied 9 Petitioner’s application for relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture 10 and ordered removal to Peru. Id. On April 23, 2023, Petitioner filed an appeal to the Board 11 of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. The BIA appeal is pending. Id. 12 Throughout her removal proceedings, Petitioner attended each of her check ins and 13 even after the IJ ordered her removal, Petitioner appeared for a check in and had a GPS 14 ankle monitor placed on her and was allowed to go home. Id. ¶ 30. Around June 5, 2026, 15 Petitioner was in a motor vehicle that was stopped by Border Patrol agents and was 16 detained. Id. ¶ 30. Petitioner was sent to Otay Mesa Detention Center, where she remains 17 today. Id. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 20 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 21 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 22 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 23 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 24 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 25 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 26 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 27 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 28 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 1 of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 2 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 In her petition, Petitioner argues that her re-detention and the manner in which it was 5 carried out violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and Procedural Due Process. Pet. 6 ¶¶ 32-35. Respondents argue only that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 7 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but correctly concede that courts have consistently held otherwise. See 8 generally, Return. The Court does not find that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 9 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) for the reasons set forth in Martinez Lopez v. LaRose, No. 25- 10 cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, 11 elects to follow the reasoning stated therein and incorporates it by reference. The Court 12 analyzes Petitioner’s Procedural Due Process claim below. 13 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 14 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of 15 law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 16 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 17 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 18 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 19 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering 20 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 21 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 22 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 23 Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of 24 release. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v. 25 Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 26 2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public 27 benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. 28 § 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own 1 recognizance” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 2 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘released on 3 recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”). 4 While courts have recognized these as distinct procedures, they have consistently 5 applied the same procedural due process analysis to petitioners under these forms of parole. 6 In the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), courts have held that such parole status entitles 7 the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the 8 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 9 1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. 10 Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural due process). 11 Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained similar 12 procedural due process rights: 13 [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a 14 danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining 15 at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the 16 noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release 17 would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release 18 [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is 19 not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. 20 Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE 21 officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release 22 [Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court 23 must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither. [Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that 24 her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions 25 of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain 26 neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly, 27 [Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant.

28 1 Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034-35 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Several district courts 2 have followed suit and found due process violations where the petitioners in the cases were 3 specifically identified to be released under Order of Release on Recognizance with an 4 accompanying I-220 form. See, e.g., C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 5 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding due process violation where 6 petitioner was originally released on OREC). 7 The Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that Respondents 8 created a liberty interest in Petitioner when they granted her release. See Pet. ¶ 1. As this 9 Court explained in Sanchez v. LaRose, due process requires not only notice and opportunity 10 to be heard regarding the revocation of such an interest, but also that the notice and 11 opportunity be meaningful. No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629 at *3 (S.D. 12 Cal. Sept. 26, 2025). Petitioner alleges that she has not been provided notice or opportunity 13 to be heard regarding the revocation of his parole. Pet. ¶ 35. Further, without changed 14 circumstances or another factor justifying re-detention, any notice and opportunity to be 15 heard that did occur could not have been meaningful. See Rios v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2866- 16 JES-VET, 2025 WL 3141207, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“An alien's opportunity to 17 be heard regarding a change in his status is only meaningful if the government comports 18 with its own internal standards regarding parole revocation. DHS has the authority to 19 revoke an alien's supervised release ‘at any time’ on a discretionary, but not unlimited, 20 basis.”). Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not contest, that there were no changed 21 circumstances or individualized findings in Petitioner’s case justifying her re-detention. Id. 22 at 10. Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process 23 rights when they re-detained her in June of 2026. 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas 26 corpus, and does not reach the remainder of Petitioner’s claims as the requested relief is 27 granted. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process grounds and concludes 28 that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s supervised release violates procedural due | process, Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 2 ||subject to any conditions of her preexisting release that existed at the time she was re- 3 ||detained. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by July 21, 2026, 4 || confirming that Petitioner has been released. Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite filed on July 5 || 14, 2026, is DENIED as moot. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: July 14, 2026 9 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6B