Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 26-cv-01420-DMS-BJW LATAWNYA COWAN, 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 13 v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; DISMISSING 14 SNAP FINANCE LLC, COMPLAINT SUA SPONTE WITH 15 Defendant. LEAVE TO AMEND 16 [ECF Nos. 1–2] 17 18 19 Plaintiff LaTawnya Cowan, appearing pro se, filed a Complaint, (Compl., ECF No. 20 1), and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Appl., ECF No. 2). For 21 the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and dismisses 22 the Complaint sua sponte with leave to amend. 23 I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP 24 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Civil Local Rule 3.2, any action sought to 25 be filed IFP “must be accompanied by an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets 26 which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2. Plaintiff 27 indicates she is not presently employed, receives no monthly income, and has no assets 28 outside her vehicle. (IFP Appl. 1–2.) She has three dependents, all children under 18 years 1 old, and estimates $2,037 in monthly expenses. (Id. at 2–4.) In light of Plaintiff’s financial 2 status, the Court finds she is eligible to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a). Accordingly, 3 Plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED. 4 II. IFP COMPLAINT SCREENING 5 A. Legal Standard 6 An IFP complaint must be screened by the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The 7 Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 8 a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.; 9 see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[T]he 10 provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 11 The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under 12 § 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure 13 to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) 14 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 15 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 16 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 17 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the 18 Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 19 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not 20 initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 21 1982). 22 B. Discussion 23 Plaintiff is financing furniture through the Defendant company, Snap Finance LLC. 24 (Compl. 5.) Between February 1, 2026 and March 1, 2026, Plaintiff, who is blind, asked 25 Defendant to provide her emails and contracts with “audio-format” or alternatively have a 26 company representative call to read her the communications. (Id.) Defendant refused 27 Plaintiff’s requests and continued to send inaccessible emails and contracts. (See id.) The 28 Court construes the Complaint to be asserting violations of (1) the Americans with 1 Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) the Rehabilitation Act; and (3) California’s Unruh Civil 2 Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). (See id. at 3–4.) 3 1. ADA 4 “Title III of the ADA prevents discrimination against the disabled in places of public 5 accommodation.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 951 (N.D. 6 Cal. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). Relevant regulations require a public 7 accommodation to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to 8 ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities,” 28 C.F.R. § 9 36.303(c)(1), including “accessible electronic and information technology” or “other 10 effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals who are 11 blind or have low vision,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(2); Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 12 F.3d 898, 904–905 (9th Cir. 2019). To prevail on her ADA claim, Plaintiff must 13 sufficiently plead that: (1) she is disabled per the ADA; (2) Defendant “is a private entity 14 that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation”; and (3) Plaintiff was 15 denied public accommodations by Defendant because of her disability. Erasmus v. Charles 16 W. Perry, M.D., Inc., No. 221CV00915, 2021 WL 4429462, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 17 2021) (citing Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670 18 (9th Cir. 2010)). In this Circuit, a “place of public accommodation” refers to a physical 19 location. Id. at *4 (citations omitted). To meet the “physical location” requirement, 20 plaintiffs challenging the accessibility of auxiliary services must allege a “nexus” between 21 the auxiliary services and a physical location. See id. 22 Here, the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead the “physical location” requirement. 23 Plaintiff alleges she could not access emails or contracts sent by Defendant, which are 24 auxiliary services. She does not explicitly allege Defendant owns, leases, or operates a 25 physical location. While Plaintiff asserts she is financing furniture from the Defendant 26 company, this sole allegation is insufficient to establish Defendant owns, leases, or operates 27 28 1 a physical place of public accommodation. Because this element is insufficiently pled, the 2 ADA claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.1 3 2. Rehabilitation Act 4 The Rehabilitation Act provides in relevant part: “[n]o otherwise qualified individual 5 with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 6 participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 7 program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. 8 Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794). To 9 succeed on her Rehabilitation Act claim, Plaintiff must allege that (1) she has a disability; 10 (2) she is “otherwise qualified to receive the benefit”; (3) she was “denied the benefits of 11 the program solely by reason of [her] disability”; and (4) the “program receives federal 12 financial assistance.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, 13 Plaintiff fails to allege she has been denied a program or activity that receives federal 14 financial assistance, and, therefore, has not asserted a valid cause of action under the 15 Rehabilitation Act. This claim is also DISMISSED with leave to amend.2 16 3. Unruh Act3 17 Plaintiff may prevail under the Unruh Act by “demonstrating either that (1) she has 18 been denied access to a business establishment as a result of intentional discrimination or 19 (2) an ADA violation has occurred.” Erasmus, 2021 WL 4429462, at *6 (citations 20 omitted). “Intentional discrimination” requires Plaintiff to allege “‘willful, affirmative 21 misconduct,” meaning, “more than the disparate impact of a facially neutral policy.” Kong 22 23 1 In light of this determination, the Court does not determine whether the other elements of the ADA claim 24 are sufficiently pled. 25 2 Similar to above, the Court declines to address the other elements of the Rehabilitation Act. 26 3 Plaintiff contends the Court has diversity jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim. (See Compl. II.) She 27 alleges she is a citizen of California, Defendant is a citizen of Utah, and the amount in controversy is $250,000. (Id. at II.B.) On this record, the Court finds there is subject matter jurisdiction over the Unruh 28 1 v. Mana Inv. Co., LLC, No. SACV1801615, 2019 WL 3220027, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2 2019), aff’d, 818 F. App’x 660 (9th Cir. 2020). Ninth Circuit and California courts have 3 also rejected the theory that “intentional discrimination” under the Unruh Act consists of 4 “knowledge that a protected right is substantially likely to be infringed upon, and a failure 5 to act upon that knowledge—‘deliberate indifference.’” Stiner v. Brookdale Senior Living, 6 Inc., No. 17-CV-03962, 2024 WL 5112480, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2024) (citations 7 omitted). 8 Here, Plaintiff fails to assert a cognizable Unruh Act claim. First, Plaintiff has not 9 pled a viable ADA claim as explained above, and, therefore, cannot pursue an Unruh Act 10 claim under that theory. Brooks v. See’s Candies, Inc., No. 20-CV-01236, 2021 WL 11 3602153, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2021). Second, to the extent Plaintiff asserts an Unruh 12 Act claim separate from a violation of the ADA, she fails to sufficiently plead “intentional 13 discrimination.” Here, Defendant’s visual-only emails and contracts have a clear disparate 14 impact on blind customers, like Plaintiff. However, “courts have held that where a 15 defendant’s policy or practice merely has a discriminatory impact, it does not give rise to 16 an Unruh Act claim absent allegations that the policy was a pretext for discriminatory intent 17 or applied [in] a discriminatory manner.” Wilkins-Jones v. Cnty. of Alameda, 859 F. Supp. 18 2d 1039, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The Complaint is void of such allegations. Further, 19 Plaintiff alleges she asked Defendant for accommodations which the company refused. 20 However, California courts do “not recognize a failure to address known discriminatory 21 effects of a policy as alone sufficient to establish intentional discrimination under the 22 Unruh Civil Rights Act.” Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc., 297 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 720 (Ct. 23 App. 2022); see also Martin v. Thi E-Commerce, LLC, 313 Cal. Rptr. 3d 488, 502 (Ct. 24 App. 2023) (“[T]here could be extreme situations where . . . intentional discrimination is a 25 legitimate inference from a failure to correct. But those would be exceptional cases, not 26 the rule.”). The allegations here do not sufficiently establish Defendant intentionally 27 discriminated against Plaintiff. Thus, there is no viable theory for Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 28 claim. As such, the Court DISMISSES this cause of action with leave to amend. I III. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs application to proceed IFP 3 |}and DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an Amended 4 ||Complaint to correct the defects described above within twenty one (21) days from the 5 || date this Order is entered. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: July 14, 2026 3 2 in ym. Lh) Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28