Daymon Eliud Gutierrez-Arauz v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — 1.) The Court 2 dismiss
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a habeas petition filed by a detained non-citizen arguing that his continued detention after a final removal order violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Zadvydas v. Davis. The court denied the petition without prejudice, finding that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that his detention was reasonable because he was within the six-month presumptively reasonable period and offered only conclusory arguments.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus without prejudice“The Petition (Doc. 9) is DENIED without prejudice.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the burden-shifting framework established in Zadvydas v. Davis. The petitioner was within the six-month presumptively reasonable period following the finality of his removal order. Under this framework, the petitioner bears the burden of proving that his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court found the petitioner's arguments conclusory and insufficient to meet this heavy burden, particularly when contrasted with the specific factual showing required in Ndandu v. Noem. The decision to deny without prejudice and order a status report is a standard procedural mechanism in these cases to allow for re-filing if the government fails to effectuate removal. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the applicable legal standard from Zadvydas and applies it to the facts. The court properly notes that the petitioner is within the six-month presumptively reasonable period and therefore bears a heavy burden to rebut the presumption. The court distinguishes the petitioner's conclusory arguments from the specific factual evidence required to meet that burden, citing relevant district court precedent. The procedural remedy of denying without prejudice and ordering a status report is appropriate.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 DAYMON ELIUD GUTIERREZ-ARAUZ, Case No.: 3:26-cv-02082-RBM-VET 11 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 12 v. PREJUDICE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER, et al., 14 [Doc. 9] Respondents. 15 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Daymon Eliud Gutierrez-Arauz’s (“Petitioner”) 19 Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 20 (Doc. 9.) For the reasons below, the Court DENIES without prejudice the Petition. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua who fled his home country to seek asylum in the 23 United States. (Id. at 2.) He was paroled into the United States in December 2022. (Id.) 24 In November 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents detained Petitioner in 25 New Jersey, based on a warrant that they had for a different person. (Id.) Petitioner was 26 then transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Id.) On March 18, 2026, an immigration 27 judge ordered Petitioner removed to Nicaragua. (Doc. 10-2 at 2.) Petitioner “did not appeal 28 this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.” (Doc. 9 at 2.) 1 On April 2, 2026, Petitioner filed his initial habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court 2 dismissed the petition without prejudice. (Doc. 2.) On April 28, 2026, Petitioner filed an 3 amended petition. (Doc. 4.) The Court dismissed the amended petition without prejudice. 4 (Doc. 5.) On June 17, 2026, Petitioner filed a second amended petition. (Doc. 6.) The 5 Court referred the second amended petition to Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. 6 (“FDSDI”) for an evaluation of whether appointment of counsel was appropriate. (Doc. 7 7.) On June 24, 2026, Petitioner, now represented by FDSDI, filed the Petition. (Doc. 9.) 8 On June 29, 2026, Respondents filed their Response to Petition. (Doc. 10.) Petitioner was 9 authorized to file a reply on or before July 8, 2026, but did not file one. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 12 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 13 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 14 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 15 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 16 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 17 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 18 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 19 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 Petitioner argues that his detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and the Supreme Court’s 22 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 9 at 3–6.) Specifically, he 23 argues that his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future 24 because Respondents have failed to remove him in the several months since his order of 25 removal became final. (Id.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention still falls within 26 the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention after an order of removal 27 becomes final. (Doc. 10 at 2–4.) Respondents also argue that Petitioner’s removal is 28 significantly likely because they are “now in the process of obtaining a travel document to 1 effectuate Petitioner’s removal to Nicaragua,” and “[o]nce Petitioner’s travel document is 2 obtained, ICE will arrange for his removal to Nicaragua.” (Doc. 10 at 2.) 3 It is undisputed that Petitioner’s removal order became final between three and six 4 months ago. (See Doc. 9 at 4; Doc. 10 at 4.) As such, Petitioner’s detention is no longer 5 mandatory, but is presumptively reasonable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 6 701. Therefore, to succeed on a Zadvydas claim, Petitioner must rebut the presumption 7 that his detention is reasonable. See Ndandu v. Noem, 819 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1160–61 8 (S.D. Cal. 2026); Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 398 (D.N.J. 2025) 9 (within the six-month period, “the petitioner must claim and prove [ ] that his removal is 10 not reasonably foreseeable”); Cesar v. Achim, 542 F. Supp. 2d 897, 903 (E.D. Wis. 2008) 11 (“the presumption scheme . . . suggests that the burden the detainee must carry within the 12 first six months . . . is a heavier one than after six months has elapsed”). 13 Petitioner has failed to rebut that presumption here. Petitioner argues only that he 14 “has good reason to think that ICE cannot remove him, since months of effort have borne 15 no fruit” and “[h]e does not know when ICE will remove him to Nicaragua.” (Doc. 9 at 16 5.) Given the heavier burden Petitioner faces within the presumptively reasonable six- 17 month detention period to show that his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably 18 foreseeable future, these conclusory statements are not enough. For example, this Court 19 found the petitioner in Ndandu had rebutted the presumption of reasonableness by 20 establishing that: (1) the petitioner was granted deferral of removal and no alternative 21 countries were designated in the removal order; (2) the government had failed to identify 22 a third country in the three years since the petitioner’s grant of deferral of removal; (3) the 23 petitioner’s serious criminal history and mental health conditions made it unlikely that a 24 third country would agree to accept him; and (4) the petitioner cited historical data 25 regarding the unlikelihood of removal of similarly situated detainees. 819 F. Supp. 3d at 26 1160–61. Petitioner’s showing here is a far cry from the showing in Ndandu. 27 Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met his burden to rebut the 28 presumption of reasonableness of his detention. As such, the Court does not consider the 1 ||rest of the Zadvydas burden-shifting framework. The Petition (Doc. 9) is DENIED 2 || without prejudice. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 9) is DENIED without prejudice. On 5 || or before August 17, 2026, Respondents SHALL FILE a status report either (1) indicating 6 whether and when Petitioner was removed from the United States to Nicaragua or 7 appraising the Court of the Government’s progress in removing Petitioner. If Petitioner 8 not been removed by August 17, 2026, Petitioner may file an amended petition. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 DATE: July 13, 2026 Biter Martenc: ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28