gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-03820 · 2026-07-09 · Unknown

Byron Noe Herrera Ajtun v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.

Proceeding
original
Outcome
writ granted — the Petition is GRANTED.
Area
civil
Panel
Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:26Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a detained noncitizen seeking a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The court granted the petition, ordering respondents to hold an individualized bond hearing within seven days, with the burden of proof on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community.

What the court decidedThe model
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus granted
“For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The court relied on the respondents' stipulation that a bond hearing was appropriate and prior district court orders in similar cases. Given the lack of opposition and the established precedent in the district, granting the petition to secure a hearing is a defensible procedural outcome.
Burden of proof at bond hearing placed on the petitioner
“The noncitizen SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is not a danger to the community or a risk of flight.”
agree with court
The court explicitly rejected the petitioner's argument that the government bears the burden of proving continued detention is justified. It cited Rodriguez-Diaz v. Garland, a Ninth Circuit decision, which holds that the detainee must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that they are not a flight risk or danger to the community. This application of binding circuit authority is correct.
Order for individualized bond hearing within seven days
“Respondents are ORDERED to arrange an individualized bond hearing for Petitioner before an immigration judge within seven (7) days of entry of this Order”
agree with court
The court ordered a specific timeline for the hearing, consistent with the relief requested and the parties' agreement that a hearing was appropriate. The inclusion of a release mandate if the hearing does not occur within the timeframe is a standard protective measure in such orders.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standard for habeas corpus and applies the specific burden of proof required by Ninth Circuit precedent (Rodriguez-Diaz) for § 1226(a) bond hearings. It addresses the parties' disagreement on the burden of proof by citing binding authority. The order also incorporates the requirement from Hernandez v. Sessions to consider ability to pay and alternative conditions, ensuring the bond setting process is constitutionally sound. The reasoning is complete and directly responsive to the petition and the parties' arguments.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 BYRON NOE HERRERA AJTUN, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03820-RBM-MMP 11 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 12 v. [Doc. 1] 13 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 14 al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Byron Noe Herrera Ajtun’s (“Petitioner”) 20 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) 21 For the reasons below, the Petition is GRANTED. 22 I. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 24 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 25 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 26 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 27 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 28 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 1 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 2 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 3 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 4 II. DISCUSSION 5 Petitioner argues that his detention without a bond hearing violates 8 U.S.C. § 6 1226(a) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 27–37.) He seeks a 7 prompt bond hearing. (Id., Prayer for Relief; Doc. 5 at 2.) Respondents “acknowledge the 8 prior orders from this District directing bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) in 9 similar cases” and “therefore do not oppose an order from this Court directing a bond 10 hearing.” (Doc. 4 at 2.) In light of the Parties’ agreement that a bond hearing is 11 appropriate, and the Court’s grants of petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners, see 12 Hussain v. LaRose, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00194-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 206715, at *2–4 (S.D. 13 Cal. Jan. 27, 2026), the Court GRANTS the Petition. 14 The Parties disagree, however, as to the burden of proof at the bond hearing. 15 Respondents argue that “the burden is on the detainee to demonstrate by a preponderance 16 of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community.” (Doc. 4 at 2 (citing 17 Rodriguez-Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) and Dos Santos v. Becerra, 18 Case No.: 26-cv-01423-GPC, VET (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026)).) Petitioner argues that, 19 “[b]ecause no Immigration Judge has ever considered whether Petitioner’s continued 20 detention is necessary, due process requires a bond hearing at which Respondents bear the 21 burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s continued detention 22 is justified because he presents a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” (Doc 1 at 23 10; Doc. 5 at 2–4.) The Court finds that Respondents have the better argument here. See 24 Rodriguez-Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197 (“If at [the § 1226(a)] hearing the detainee demonstrates 25 by the preponderance of the evidence that he is not [a flight risk or danger to the 26 community], the IJ will order his release.”) (emphasis added). 27 III. CONCLUSION 28 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 1 1. Respondents are ORDERED to arrange an individualized bond hearing for 2 Petitioner before an immigration judge within seven (7) days of entry of this 3 Order—aunless the noncitizen requests a continuance—to determine whether his 4 continued detention is warranted. 5 2. The noncitizen SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of 6 the evidence, that he is not a danger to the community or a risk of flight. If the 7 noncitizen does not request a continuance, and no hearing occurs within seven (7) 8 days of entry of this Order, Petitioner shall be released from Respondents’ custody. 9 3. If the immigration judge determines that bond is appropriate, the immigration judge 10 SHALL consider alternative conditions of release and the noncitizen’s ability to 11 pay.! 12 4. On or before July 31, 2026, Respondents SHALL FILE a status report indicating 13 whether Petitioner received a bond hearing, and the outcome of that bond hearing. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 ||DATE: July 9, 2026 Biter Marten: 7 ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 || 26 See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A bond determination 27 ||process that does not include consideration of financial circumstances and alternative 28 release conditions is unlikely to result in a bond amount that 1s reasonably related to the government’s legitimate interests.’’).