Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOAQUIN CARRILLO, Case No.: 26-CV-3627 JAO (DEB)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of (ECF No. 1) Homeland Security, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Before the Court is Petitioner Joaquin Carrillo’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 19 Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1). Also before the Court is 20 Respondents Gregory J. Archambeault’s (Field Office Director of Enforcement and 21 Removal Operations, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 22 (“ICE”)), Markwayne Mullin’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security), 23 Todd Lyon’s (Director of ICE), Todd Blanche’s (Acting Attorney General of the United 24 States), and Christopher LaRose’s (Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center) 25 (collectively, “Respondents”) Return to the Petition (ECF No. 5). 26 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process 27 grounds. 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a Guatemalan national who last entered the United States in 2015 and 3 was placed in removal proceedings that were terminated thereafter, suggesting Petitioner 4 was released on some form of supervision. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. He was again detained on 5 May 28, 2026, and has remained in detention without a custody determination hearing. 6 See id. ¶ 24. 7 LEGAL STANDARD 8 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 9 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district 10 of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 11 judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 12 removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas 13 v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 14 13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral 15 issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of 16 indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 17 Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 18 grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. 19 Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 20 DISCUSSION 21 Petitioner argues that his detention without notice or a hearing violates the Due 22 Process Clause. ECF No. 1 ¶ 24–25. Respondents maintain that “Petitioner is subject to 23 mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2),” but “acknowledge[] that this Court, and Courts 24 in this District, have repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion under the same and/or 25 similar facts.” See ECF No. 5 at 1–2. Thus, they “do[] not oppose the petition.” See id. 26 The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates the Due Process Clause. 27 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 28 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 1 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 2 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 3 533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment 4 entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 5 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 6 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 7 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their 8 liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a 9 protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 10 Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 11 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 12 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 13 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 14 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 15 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 16 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a 17 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 18 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 19 Petitioner has been out of custody since 2015, when the government implicitly 20 determined he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and released him from 21 detention. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. There is no suggestion that Petitioner violated the terms 22 of his release in the approximately eleven years he has been out of detention. See 23 generally ECF Nos. 1, 5. Further, Petitioner has no criminal history, and enjoys 24 community ties include a wife, children, and his church community. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 25. 25 Petitioner thus has a protected liberty interest continuing to remain out of custody. See, 26 e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after [his] 27 initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that [he] was neither a 28 flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in 1 remaining at liberty unless [he] no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. 2 Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] 3 present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is 4 afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga 5 Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding the petitioner 6 had a protected liberty interest in his release). 7 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 8 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. 9 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 10 sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors. 11 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: 12 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 13 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 14 additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the 15 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 16 procedural requirement would entail.” 17 Id. 18 The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the government’s 19 detention of Petitioner without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard, 20 denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a 21 significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his release in 2015. 22 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 23 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” 24 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the 25 conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and 26 friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”). 27 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as 28 Respondents detained Petitioner without providing him with notification, reasoning, or a 1 hearing. Since the government’s initial determination in 2015 that Petitioner should be 2 released because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is 3 no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 4 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that 5 the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Indeed, after his 6 release from custody, Petitioner has apparently complied with all conditions of release 7 and established deep bonds with his community here. “Once a noncitizen has been 8 released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is 9 subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present 10 evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is 11 in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. 12 “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of 13 an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor 14 [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] 15 detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 16 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up). 17 Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 18 and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F. 19 Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the 20 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 21 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). 22 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in 23 violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy 24 Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of 25 habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was 26 revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 27 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the 28 conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). I CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN Part the Petition for Writ of 3 || Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release 4 || Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court 5 |} ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of 6 || the reasons for revocation of his release on bond and a hearing before a neutral decision 7 ||maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the 8 burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger 9 || to the community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038. The 10 || Parties aae ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by July 22, 2026, confirming that 11 || Petitioner has been released. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: July 9, 2026 14 ~eaLy; - 16) Py aee V7 dot Jill A. Otake 18 > “| United States District Judge 19 ea a 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 |} 7 ' Petitioner requested attorney’s fees, related expenses, and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See ECF No. 1 at 10. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate 2g || EAJA fee application within 30 days of the issuance of this Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).