Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALCIDES GOMES, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03160-RBM-DDL 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior [Doc. 1] Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Alcides Gomes’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for 19 Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) For the reasons 20 below, the Court DENIES without prejudice the Petition. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner, a citizen of Cape Verde, was admitted into the United States “on a 23 nonimmigration visa” on August 31, 1989. (Doc. 9 at 2.) He was authorized to remain in 24 the United States “for a temporary period not to exceed February 27, 1990.” (Doc. 9-1 at 25 2.) Petitioner “came to the attention” of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 26 on April 29, 2025, “following his arrest by the Dorchester Police Department, Dorchester, 27 MA, for Operating Under the Influence.” (Doc. 9-2 at 3.) The following day, Petitioner 28 was detained by ICE, issued a Notice to Appear, and eventually transferred to Otay Mesa 1 Detention Center. (See Doc. 9 at 2.) On December 19, 2025, Petitioner was provided a 2 bond hearing before an immigration judge. (Id.) The immigration judge denied bond, 3 citing Petitioner’s “2 DUIs 1994, 2000 convictions and most recent 2026 DUI arrest.” 4 (Doc. 9-3 at 2.) Petitioner did not file an appeal of the bond denial order. (See Doc. 9-4.) 5 On May 4, 2026, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s applications for relief 6 and ordered Petitioner removed to Cape Verde. (Doc. 9-5 at 3–5.) Petitioner timely filed 7 an appeal of his removal order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Doc. 9-6.) Because 8 that appeal remains pending, Petitioner remains detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 9 Petitioner filed the Petition on May 20, 2026. (Doc. 1.) The Court referred the 10 Petition to Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. (“FDSDI”) for evaluation of whether 11 appointment of counsel was appropriate. (Doc. 2.) FDSDI timely filed a notice informing 12 the Court that appointment would not be beneficial to Petitioner and declining appointment. 13 (Doc. 7.) After receiving that notice, the Court set a briefing schedule on the Petition. 14 (Doc. 8.) Respondent filed their Return to Habeas Petition on June 23, 2026. (Doc. 9.) 15 Petitioner was authorized to file a reply on or before July 8, 2026, but did not file one. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 18 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 19 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 20 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 21 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 22 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 23 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 24 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 25 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 Liberally construed, the Petition argues that Petitioner’s detention has become 28 unreasonably prolonged in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (See 1 Doc. 1 at 2, 6–7.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that he “ha[s] been in detention for 12 2 months and was denied the right to immigration bond,” has not been “receiving adequate 3 medical care for [his diabetes],” and requests release “in order to continue [his BIA appeals 4 process] outside of detention.” (Id.) Respondent argues that (1) Petitioner is lawfully 5 detained under § 1226(a) because the immigration judge already held a bond hearing and 6 denied relief and (2) Petitioner should not be excused from exhausting administrative 7 remedies. (Doc. 9 at 3–5.) The Court agrees with Respondent. 8 Habeas claims are accompanied by a prudential exhaustion requirement. Hernandez 9 v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court may require exhaustion where: 10 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; 11 12 (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 13 14 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 15 16 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). 17 “If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, then 18 ‘a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the 19 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies.’” Hernandez, 872 20 F.3d at 988 (quoting Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)). But a 21 district court may waive the exhaustion requirement if “administrative remedies are 22 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, 23 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Laing v. 24 Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Petitioner bears the 25 burden of showing that an excuse for requiring exhaustion applies. See Leonardo, 646 26 F.3d at 1161. He has not done so here. 27 But even if he had, Petitioner still could not succeed on the merits of his claim. 28 Petitioner appears to bring an as-applied challenge to the length of his detention under 1 1226(a). But Petitioner already received a bond hearing on December 19, 2025 (Doc. 9 2 ||at 2), and the Court does not find it appropriate to order another one. 3 Furthermore, Petitioner may not seek release based on substandard medical care 4 through a habeas petition. “[A] habeas claim is one challenging the fact of confinement, 5 ||rather than the conditions of confinement.” Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1194 (9th 6 || Cir. 2024); accord Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F Ath 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2023) (“the writ of 7 || habeas corpus 1s limited to attacks upon the legality or duration of confinement’) (citation 8 || omitted). 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED without prejudice. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 ||DATE: July 9, 2026 13 eet Barrnucle, Mottiryyes > 14 ON. RUTH BERMGDEZ! MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28