Jeovany Jose Ucros Bovea v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- writ granted — the Petition is GRANTED.
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Ruth Bermudez Montenegro (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a Colombian national who was paroled into the United States and subsequently detained without a bond hearing. The court granted the petition, ordering the petitioner's immediate release and requiring a due process hearing before any future re-detention.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Granting the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus“Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court relied on its own prior unpublished decisions (Faizyan, Salazar) and a district court decision from another district (Pinchi) to find that the petitioner's detention violated the Due Process Clause because he was subject to the discretionary framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than the mandatory detention of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The court found that the government's failure to provide a pre-deprivation hearing after revoking parole, without showing a change in circumstances, rendered the detention unlawful. This follows the logic of the cited authorities and the record presented. |
Ordering immediate release of Petitioner“Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole.” | agree with court This is the standard remedy for a successful habeas petition challenging the legality of custody. The court conditioned the release on existing parole terms, which is consistent with the finding that the petitioner was lawfully paroled but unlawfully detained without due process. |
Ordering a hearing prior to any re-detention“The Court ORDERS that, prior to any re-detention, Petitioner SHALL receive notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to determine whether detention is warranted.” | agree with court The court imposed a procedural safeguard to prevent future due process violations. By requiring a hearing under § 1226(a) and placing the burden on the government to prove danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, the court aligned the relief with the due process requirements identified in its analysis. |
The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and logically consistent. It correctly identifies the legal standard for habeas corpus and applies the Mathews v. Eldridge due process framework. The court relies heavily on its own recent, unpublished precedents (Faizyan, Salazar) and a persuasive district court opinion from another district (Pinchi) to establish that the petitioner falls under the discretionary detention regime of § 1226 rather than the mandatory regime of § 1226(c). The reasoning that the initial parole implies a finding of no danger/flight risk, and that re-detention without a hearing or changed circumstances violates due process, is a defensible application of the cited authorities. The relief granted (release and future hearing requirement) is appropriate for the violation found. There are no significant gaps or questionable legal applications evident in the text.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
unusual dispositionOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEOVANY JOSE UCROS BOVEA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-02302-RBM-DEB 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior [Doc. 1] Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jeovany Jose Ucros Bovea’s (“Petitioner”) 20 Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 21 (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a citizen of Colombia, fled his home country “fearing for his life due to 24 his political opinions.” (Doc. 10 at 2.) “He was paroled into the United States on August 25 4, 2024.” (Id.) On January 18, 2026, he was arrested on a warrant for failure to pay a 26 traffic citation. (Id.) When Petitioner attempted to pay the fine, “he was told he could no 27 longer pay the fine because ICE would be picking him up.” Petitioner has been in 28 immigration custody since then. (Id.) 1 On April 10, 2026, Petitioner, then proceeding pro se, filed his original petition. 2 (Doc. 1.) The Court dismissed the petition without prejudice. (Doc. 2.) Petitioner timely 3 filed an amended petition. (Doc. 4.) The Court referred the amended petition to Federal 4 Defenders of San Diego, Inc. (“FDSDI”) for an evaluation of whether appointment of 5 counsel was appropriate (Doc. 5), and FDSDI accepted appointment (Doc. 6). Shortly 6 thereafter, pursuant to Chief Judge Order 134-A, FDSDI “referred this case for 7 representation by a CJA panel attorney who has volunteered to handle such 8 representations.” (Doc. 7 at 1.) The Court granted the subsequent motion to substitute 9 counsel. (Doc. 9.) New counsel for Petitioner filed the Petition on June 10, 2026. 10 (Doc. 10.) Respondents filed their Return to Petition on July 1, 2026. (Doc. 11.) Petitioner 11 was authorized to file a reply on or before July 8, 2026, but did not file one. 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 14 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 15 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 16 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 17 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 18 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 19 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 20 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 21 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Administrative Procedure Act and 24 the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 10 at 3–7.) Respondents 25 acknowledge[ ] that this Court’s prior decisions will control the result here if the Court 26 adheres to its prior decisions, as the facts are not materially distinguishable, . . . and do[ ] 27 not oppose the petition and defer[ ] to the Court on the appropriate relief.” (Doc. 11 at 1– 28 2.) 1 This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners 2 who were previously released from detention on their own recognizance or paroled into the 3 country and re-detained several years later. In Faizyan v. Casey, the Court held such 4 petitioners are “subject to the discretionary detention procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 5 and [their] detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause.” Case No.: 6 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025). Applying 7 the due process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court also found 8 that Respondents’ summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an 9 opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” Faizyan, 2025 WL 10 3208844, at *7; see C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25- CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 11 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding a due process violation where the 12 petitioner was initially released on his own recognizance). 13 Like the petitioners in the cases above, Petitioner was previously paroled into the 14 United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (See Doc. 11 at 2; Doc. 10 at 2–3.) “As ICE 15 was not authorized to release [Petitioner] if [he] was a danger to the community or a flight 16 risk, the Court must infer from [the] release that ICE determined [he] was neither.” Pinchi 17 v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Respondents therefore implicitly 18 promised Petitioner’s continued release, and he reasonably relied on that promise. See 19 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032. And nothing in the record before the Court indicates any 20 change in circumstances or individualized justification for Petitioner’s re-detention. See 21 Salazar v. Casey, Case No.: 25-CV-2784 JLS (VET), 2025 WL 3063629, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 22 Nov. 3, 2025) (“Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should be paroled 23 because [he] posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no 24 evidence that these findings have changed.”). 25 The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here. For those 26 same reasons, the Court finds that: (1) Petitioner is subject to § 1226’s discretionary 27 framework; and (2) ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release on parole without a pre- 28 deprivation hearing violated his due process rights and rendered his detention unlawful. 1 || Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 10) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 4 1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 5 subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. 6 2. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any re-detention, Petitioner SHALL receive 7 notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before an 8 immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to determine whether detention 9 is warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and 10 convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of 11 flight. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 ||DATE: July 9, 2026 pt Barra, Mogg 15 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28