Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 CAMERON EDWARDS Case No.: 3:24-cv-01118-JAH-SBC 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 10 v. MOTION TO DISMISS 11 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al. [ECF No. 39] 12 Defendants. 13 14 15 16 INTRODUCTION 17 Pending before the Court is Defendants Kathy Minella and Stephanie Blumberg’s 18 (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 19 Procedure 41(b), filed on November 12, 2025. ECF No. 39 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). After 20 thorough review of the parties’ submissions and for the reasons discussed in this order, the 21 Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. 22 BACKGROUND 23 On June 27, 2024, Plaintiff Cameron Edwards (“Plaintiff”), a licensed attorney 24 proceeding pro se, filed a complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendants in addition to the 25 City of San Diego and numerous San Diego Police Department Officers (collectively 26 “Codefendants”) under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. ECF No. 1. On December 6, 2024, the 27 Court granted Codefendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 3), with 28 the option for the Plaintiff to file a first amended complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 16. 1 On December 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a FAC against both Defendants and 2 Codefendants. ECF No. 19. On January 13, 2025, Defendants and Codefendants filed 3 separate motions to dismiss the FAC. ECF Nos. 23, 24. On September 10, 2025, the Court 4 granted Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with leave to amend, giving Plaintiff the 5 option to file a second amended complaint (“SAC”) “no later than October 10, 2025.” ECF 6 No. 35 at 18. 7 By October 10, 2025, Plaintiff did not file a SAC, a notice of intent not to amend, 8 an agreement to stipulate to entry of judgement, or any other action regarding failure to 9 timely file the SAC. On October 20, 2025, Defendants’ counsel sent a meet and confer 10 email to Plaintiff asking if he would stipulate an entry of judgement or oppose the Motion. 11 Mot. at 9. Plaintiff responded on October 23, 2025, stating he “would be opposed but . . . 12 was not sure at the moment” and would hopefully get back to them by the end of the week. 13 Id. at 10. On November 12, 2025, Defendants filed the Motion after getting no further 14 response from Plaintiff and the Court set a hearing for December 10, 2025. ECF No. 39. 15 Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion was due November 26, 2025. S.D. CivLR 16 7.1(e)(2) (opposition must be filed no later than 14 calendar days prior to noticed hearing). 17 On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff replied to Defendants’ meet and confer email, stating, “I 18 still don't understand (1) why this is necessary and (2) whether I would be prejudicing 19 myself by agreeing to such a motion if additional facts are uncovered during discovery.” 20 ECF No. 44 at 8. By November 26, 2025, Plaintiff did not file an opposition. On December 21 3, 2025, Defendants filed a notice of a non-filed opposition. ECF No. 44. 22 LEGAL STANDARD 23 Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for 24 Plaintiff’s failure to timely prosecute his claim. ECF No. 39. Courts may dismiss a claim 25 if the plaintiff fails to comply with a court order or fails to prosecute their case. Fed R. 26 Civ. P. Rule 41(b). To determine if dismissal is appropriate, the Court will review five 27 factors: (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, (2) the Court's need 28 to manage its docket, (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendant, (4) the public policy 1 favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and (5) the availability of less drastic 2 alternatives. Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). 3 To fail to prosecute one’s case, a plaintiff must fail to act relating to their complaint 4 rather than take an action that the court disagrees with. Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 5 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, Defendants’ request is to dismiss with 6 prejudice, which is considered a sanction to be imposed only in “extreme circumstances.” 7 Id. at 1063 (quoting Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366 (9th Cir. 1996)). 8 A dismissal requires a minimum of four factors that favor such an action, or three factors 9 that strongly support it, in order to be deemed appropriate. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 10 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has historically given courts discretion on 11 what constitutes “favors” and “strongly favors” and will only intervene if they find a 12 “definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgement … 13 upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Yourish, 191 F.3d at 989 (quoting Malone v. 14 United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)). It is generally preferred, 15 but not required, that each factor is discussed explicitly by the court. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 16 1261 (quoting Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 17 Additionally, while pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a pro se litigant who is 18 also a licensed attorney is not typically entitled to such consideration. See Huffman v. 19 Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2023). 20 DISCUSSION 21 Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice due to his inaction in 22 prosecution, representing that Plaintiff failed to file a SAC in a timely manner and failed 23 to respond to their motions. Mot. at 2. Because of this, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s 24 actions demonstrate that he has failed to prosecute his case and that the relevant 25 circumstances favor dismissal with prejudice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 41(b). Id. at 11. 27 // 28 // 1 I. Factors Supporting Dismissal 2 a. Public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation 3 Defendants argue that the public interest factor always leans towards dismissal, 4 citing that “the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 5 dismissal.” Mot. at 12 (quoting Yourish, 191 F.3rd at 990). 6 Public interest is served by the Court’s efficient proceedings, as it allows cases to be 7 heard in a timely manner without unnecessary delay. Yourish, 191 F.3rd at 990. For this 8 purpose, this element always favors dismissal. Id. 9 At the time of this Order, Plaintiff has missed the deadline to file their SAC by eight 10 months, delaying any such resolution from occurring. Additionally, Plaintiff has not 11 responded with a notice not to amend nor filed a motion to oppose the instant Motion in 12 these eight months, thus meeting the inaction requirement. Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1065. 13 Given the length of such a delay and Plaintiff’s inaction, the Court finds that public interest 14 strongly favors dismissal under 41(b). 15 b. The Court's need to manage its docket 16 Next, Defendants argue the Court’s need to manage its docket favors dismissal in 17 this matter because Plaintiff’s failure to timely file his SAC or take any action related to 18 this matter disrupted the Court’s schedule and control of the docket. Mot. at 12. 19 Courts have an inherent authority to control their docket and to determine how their 20 resources can be best used. Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. For this element to favor dismissal, 21 the Court must determine that dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants would 22 allow the Court’s resources to be used more favorably elsewhere. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. 23 In Ferdik, a year and a half was seen as a drain on the court’s resources, “consuming large 24 amounts of the court’s valuable time,” without any major progress occurring in the court. 25 Id.; see also Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1065 (where the court found that any case sitting idly 26 on a docket consumes resources). 27 This case has been with the Court for almost two years, with the instant motion lying 28 dormant on the docket for several months without any response from Plaintiff. By failing 1 to respond to the Motion or notifying the Court as to his next steps, Plaintiff has forced 2 Defendants and the Court to proceed at Plaintiff’s schedule rather than the Court’s 3 schedule. Given that dismissal would prevent the further usage of resources on a stagnant 4 claim, the Court finds that docket management strongly favors dismissal under 41(b). 5 c. Risk of prejudice to the defendants 6 Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s lack of communication has unfairly prejudiced 7 Defendants by forcing them to suffer the costs of litigation without valid explanation or 8 relief. Mot. at 12. Defendants further argue that even if an excuse is given after such 9 delays, it would not be enough to justify further litigation. Id. at 13. 10 Prejudice occurs when a case is extended or delayed unreasonably to the point where 11 the parties are stuck in proceedings without relief, forcing them to expend additional 12 resources unnecessarily. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 13 1228 (9th Cir. 2006). To this extent, courts must hold plaintiffs accountable for the cases 14 that they bring forth, as the plaintiff is the reason defendants are present in court. See Aboy 15 v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 12-CV-0699 AJB (MDD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143406, at 7- 16 8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2012). Reasonable delays that are inherent to the practice of law, or 17 for an acceptable reason, are not sufficiently prejudicial. Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991. 18 However, without a reason or a reason so flimsy it is deemed insufficient by the court, 19 keeping the defendants locked in litigation is prejudicial to their interests. Id.; see also Van 20 Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Com., 442 F.2d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1971) 21 (defendants have a right to be free from costly and harassing litigation). 22 Here, Plaintiff has not given any excuse nor reasons as to why he has not yet 23 submitted a SAC or a notice stating that he has chosen not to amend, resulting in several 24 months of silence. While the Court acknowledges the time it takes to properly prepare 25 documents, the Court must also acknowledge that Plaintiff has missed their deadline to file 26 his SAC by over half a year while also failing to file a response to the instant Motion. 27 While this could be excused with valid cause or exceptional circumstances, Plaintiff has 28 failed to provide any such justification to the Court. As the prejudice of keeping 1 Defendants locked in litigation without relief outweighs the lack of any valid excuses from 2 Plaintiff, the Court finds that the risk of prejudice strongly favors dismissal in these 3 circumstances. 4 d. Public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits 5 Defendants argue that while public policy generally favors solving cases on their 6 merits, the current case has become so unreasonably delayed that resolution is no longer 7 possible. Mot. at 14. 8 Public policy generally favors handling cases on their merits so that any alleged 9 wrongs may be addressed fully, especially in matters regarding the violation of one’s rights. 10 Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). However, courts may dismiss 11 some claims if they impede the case itself. See In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 12 1228. In In re Phenylpropanolamine, court proceedings were locked due to the hundreds 13 of claims that were attempting to join the proceedings but failed to provide the necessary 14 paperwork, causing dismissal of some claims to be necessary for others to be heard. Id. at 15 1226. As the case as a whole would still be heard, the delay caused by the plaintiffs 16 “substantially neutralize[d] the negative affect” against dismissal that this factor usually 17 has. Id. at 1237. 18 Similarly, dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants would not be against 19 public policy as Plaintiff’s case would still be able to be litigated. While the severity that 20 accompanies the alleged breach of Plaintiff’s civil rights must be considered (ECF No. 1), 21 the dismissal of the claims against Defendants Minella and Blumberg would not preclude 22 Plaintiff from receiving justice, as Plaintiff would still be able to litigate his claims against 23 Codefendants. This fact, when considered along with the overall delay introduced into this 24 case by Plaintiff’s failure to timely file his SAC, essentially neutralizes any impact this 25 factor has towards dismissal. In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1237. As Plaintiff 26 would still be able to proceed in his case even after dismissal of his claims against 27 Defendants, the Court finds this factor does not counsel against dismissal under 41(b). 28 // 1 e. Availability of less drastic alternatives 2 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has already been given enough chances in this case, 3 having been given the opportunity to amend not only his Complaint but also his FAC. 4 Mot. at 15. Given these opportunities and Plaintiff’s delay in filing his SAC, Defendants 5 allege that any action besides complete dismissal would be ineffective. Id. 6 A dismissal under 41(b) is a sanction that removes the case with prejudice, to be 7 done only in the most extreme of circumstances. Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 41(b), see also 8 Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1063. For this element to favor dismissal, the Court will examine 9 what other alternatives to dismissal exist and if it is in the interest of justice to use these 10 other options. In re Phenylpropanolamine, 460 F.3d at 1229. Dismissing with prejudice 11 without consideration of alternatives may be seen as an abuse of discretion. Yourish, 191 12 F.3d at 992. However, should alternatives such as leave to amend or other lesser sanctions 13 be offered and fail to rectify the situation, dismissal with prejudice becomes appropriate. 14 Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. 15 The Court has already considered and granted less drastic measures to Plaintiff, 16 offering time to amend the Complaint as well as the legally deficient FAC. See ECF No. 17 35 at 10 (“the Court finds it appropriate to provide Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend 18 to set forth allegations that state a claim”). Additionally, the Court did not apply harsher 19 sanctions when requested, ensuring that Plaintiff could bring forth actionable claims. Id. 20 (where the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss but did not grant Defendants’ 21 request that such dismissal be with prejudice). Despite these opportunities, Plaintiff’s 22 choice not to file his SAC or inform the Court of his decision demonstrates that lesser 23 sanctions were not sufficient in these circumstances. As the alternatives provided to 24 Plaintiff have failed to bear fruit in this case, the Court finds that the lack of less drastic 25 alternatives strongly favors a dismissal under 41(b). 26 As the Court has determined that four factors strongly favor a dismissal under 41(b), 27 the Court finds dismissal in this case to be both appropriate and necessary. 28 // I CONCLUSION 2 || For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 3 1. Defendants Kathy Minella’s and Stephanie Blumberg’s Motion to Dismiss 4 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) is GRANTED; 5 2. Plaintiff's causes of action against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH 6 PREJUDICE for lack of prosecution. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 Dated: July 9, 2026 12 {United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28