Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYMOND KANGAS, an individual, Case No.: 3:26-cv-02209-H-JAC 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND 14 TRANS UNION LLC, a limited liability [Doc. No. 7] company; and DOES 1 to 25, inclusive, 15 Defendant. 16 17 On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff Raymond Kangas filed a complaint against TransUnion 18 LLC in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. (Doc. No. 1-2.) On April 19 3, 2026, Defendant answered the complaint. (Doc. No. 2.) On April 8, 2026, Defendant 20 removed the action to this court and filed its April 3, 2026 answer in the docket. (Doc. No. 21 1; 2.) On May 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the action to Superior Court of 22 California, County of San Diego. (Doc. No. 7.) On June 1, 2026, Defendant filed its 23 opposition. (Doc. No. 9.) On June 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed his reply. (Doc. No. 10.) On 24 July 8, 2026, the Court took Plaintiff’s motion to remand under submission. For the 25 reasons below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Background 2 The following background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s state court 3 complaint. On or around May 2023, Monevo US hired Plaintiff to work for them. (Doc. 4 No. 1-2, ¶ 17.) On or around April 2025, Defendant acquired Monevo, making Plaintiff 5 an employee of Defendant. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 18.) About one month later in May 2025, 6 Plaintiff disclosed a disability to Defendant and requested reasonable accommodations. 7 (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff’s disability affected his ability to communicate and regulate 8 his emotions, though Plaintiff and his treatment providers believe these limitations can be 9 reasonably accommodated. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 10 repeatedly failed to acknowledge these accommodations or try to implement them or 11 propose alternatives, despite Plaintiff’s requests to do so. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 22.) 12 On or around June 5, 2025, Plaintiff emailed Defendant’s agents Barbara Elky and 13 Briana Cohen, highlighting his concerns about his accommodations. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 23.) 14 On June 13, 2025, Plaintiff sent a follow-up email about the FEHA accommodation process 15 and reiterated he was willing to engage in the interactive process. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 24.) 16 Less than one hour later, Cohen emailed Plaintiff notifying him that he was being 17 terminated. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant cited Plaintiff’s manner 18 of communication as a reason for his termination. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges 19 that Defendant knew or had reason to know his manner of communication was related to 20 his disability and accommodation requests. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff further alleges 21 that Defendant made no effort to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability prior to termination. 22 (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 25.) Plaintiff states that Defendant, at a minimum, did not complete the 23 interactive process under FEHA, accept Plaintiff’s proposed accommodations, or suggest 24 alternatives. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 25.) On November 19, 2025, Plaintiff requested his 25 personnel and payroll records from Defendant. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges that 26 Defendant did not reply. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶ 27.) 27 On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, 28 County of San Diego bringing eight causes of action. (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶¶ 28–103.) Plaintiff 1 alleges disability discrimination (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)), failure to accommodate 2 (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)), failure to engage in interactive process (Cal. Gov’t Code 3 § 12940(n)), retaliation (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h)), failure to prevent discrimination or 4 retaliation (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k)), whistleblower retaliation (Cal. Lab. Code 5 § 1102.5), failure to provide personnel records (Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5), and failure to 6 provide payroll records (Cal. Lab. Code § 226). (Doc. No. 1-2, ¶¶ 28–103.) Plaintiff seeks 7 compensatory damages, special damages, mental and emotional distress damages, back 8 and front pay, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. (Doc. No. 9 1-2.) 10 On April 8, 2026, Defendant removed the action to United States District Court for 11 the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on diversity jurisdiction. 12 (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 4.) By the present motion, Plaintiff moves to remand the action back to 13 Superior Court of California, County of San Diego for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 14 (Doc. No. 7.) 15 16 Discussion 17 I. Legal Standard 18 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, cannot exercise 19 jurisdiction without constitutional and statutory authorization.” Hansen v. Grp. Health 20 Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018). A federal court therefore must order remand 21 if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action. Kelton Arms Condominium Owners 22 Ass’n v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). The removing party 23 bears the burden of overcoming the “strong presumption against removal jurisdiction.” 24 Hansen, 902 F.3d at 1057; see Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The 25 party seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that 26 jurisdiction exists.”). 27 Defendant asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 28 (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 4.) Diversity jurisdiction requires that the amount in controversy exceeds 1 $75,000 and that the suit is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 2 Plaintiff does not challenge the amount in controversy. (Doc. No. 7; 10.) The only issue 3 then is whether Defendant has established that complete diversity exists. 4 II. Analysis 5 Plaintiff argues that Defendant TransUnion LLC improperly uses the citizenship 6 standard for corporations by citing to its state of organization, principal place of business, 7 headquarters, and “nerve center.” (Doc. No. 7.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s 8 citizenship as a limited liability corporation is instead determined by the citizenship of all 9 its members. (Doc. No. 7.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant did not carry its burden of 10 establishing complete diversity and should not be permitted to amend. (Doc. No. 7.) 11 Defendant responds that while it erred in its citizenship standard, the appropriate remedy 12 is amendment rather than remand. (Doc. No. 9.) Defendant also argues that its citizenship 13 is the same under the proper standard and complete diversity exists. (Doc. No. 9.) Plaintiff 14 replies that the law permitting amendment of defective jurisdiction reaches only defects of 15 form, not substance, and that Defendant’s mistake is substantive. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff 16 also contends that Ninth Circuit precedent requires citizenship tracing to stop at 17 TransUnion LLC’s sole member, TransUnion Intermediate Holdings, Inc., which 18 Defendant inadequately alleges the citizenship of. (Doc. No. 10.) 19 A. Amended Notice of Removal 20 A defendant’s notice of removal may be freely amended during the initial thirty-day 21 period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); Overholt v. Airista Flow 22 Inc., 2018 WL 355231, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018). And as both Plaintiff and Defendant 23 acknowledge in their briefing, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that defendants may 24 amend defective allegations of jurisdiction in their notice after the thirty-day period has 25 lapsed, as long as the initial notice was timely filed and the amended notice sets forth the 26 same legal grounds for removal. Barrow Dev. Co. v. Fulton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 318 27 (9th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 791, 793–94 (9th 28 Cir. 1996). Courts have also noted that they are free to construe a defendant’s opposition 1 to a motion to remand as an amendment to its notice of removal. Overholt, 2018 WL 2 355231, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018) (citing Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407 3 n.3 (1969)). 4 Defendant properly requests to amend its defective allegation of jurisdiction. The 5 Ninth Circuit expressly permits such amendments to notices of removal after the initial 6 thirty-day period. Barrow, 418 F.2d at 318. Defendant’s initial notice of removal was 7 timely filed and Defendant does not assert a new ground for removal in the amended notice. 8 (Doc. No. 9, Ex. A.); Jenkins, 95 F.3d at 793–94. Defendant continues to seek removal 9 under diversity jurisdiction and does not substantively alter its legal basis for doing so in 10 its amendment. Plaintiff argues that switching from the LLC test for citizenship to the 11 corporation test for citizenship is too substantive for an amendment; however, Ninth Circuit 12 cases have demonstrated a trend line between what is an acceptable defect in form and 13 what is an unacceptable change in legal basis. Compare Barrow, 418 F.2d at 318 14 (permitting a defendant corporation to amend its “clearly inadequate” and defective 15 allegations of citizenship); with Rockwell Intern. Credit Corp. v. U.S. Aircraft Ins. Group, 16 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying defendant’s amended notice because it 17 switched its legal basis for removal from diversity jurisdiction to a “real party in interest” 18 argument). The Court therefore permits Defendant to amend its defective allegations of 19 jurisdiction. 20 B. Sufficiency of Amended Diversity Jurisdiction 21 For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an individual litigant is a citizen of the state 22 in which he or she is domiciled. Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561, 565–71 (1915); Munoz v. 23 Small Bus. Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1981). Limited liability companies like 24 Defendant are citizens of all states of which their members are citizens. Johnson v. 25 Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 26 Defendant’s amended notice of removal properly establishes diversity jurisdiction. 27 The amended notice states that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges he is domiciled in California. 28 (Doc. No. 9-2, ¶ 5.) Defendant asserts that it is not a citizen of California. Defendant’s 1 ||sole member, TransUnion Intermediate Holdings, Inc., is a citizen of Delaware and IIlinois 2 || because it is a Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Illinois. (Doc. No. 3 ||9-2, 46.) Plaintiff challenges these assertions as insufficient. (Doc. No. 10.) However, 4 ||Defendant attaches a declaration from a Senior Director of Human Resources. at 5 || TransUnion LLC, Danielle Kerry, to support its assertion. (Doc. No. 9-2, 96.) Kerry 6 attests that she is familiar with the corporate structure of Defendant, that TransUnion 7 || Intermediate Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business 8 Illinois, and that TransUnion Intermediate Holdings, Inc. has no employees or assets, 9 nearly all “high-level corporate decisions of TransUnion” are made in its Chicago, 10 Illinois headquarters. (Doc. No. 9-1, Kerry Decl., 9]/4-6.) The Court thus rejects 11 ||Plaintiff's arguments that Defendant’s amended notice fails to establish diversity 12 || jurisdiction. 13 14 Conclusion 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion for remand. 16 || Defendant is ordered to file its amended notice of removal within fourteen (14) days of the 17 || date of this order. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || DATED: July 8, 2026 I duaLen L. JI { fh 20 MARILYN L. HUFF, District J >] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 22 23 24 25 26 27 28