Negin Nasiri Kenari v. United States of America
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- James E. Simmons (author)
Analysis
The court considered the United States' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second amended complaint, which alleged negligence, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, finding the complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) because it did not plausibly allege that a federal employee committed the specific tortious acts or acted within the scope of employment.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to dismiss granted without prejudice“For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss SAC with leave to amend.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the plausibility standard from Twombly and Iqbal. The complaint failed to allege specific facts connecting the named individual (Lt. Conrad) to the specific harms (supervisor misconduct, health issues, financial account issues) or to establish that he was acting within the scope of his federal employment. Under the FTCA, the government is only liable for the torts of its employees acting within the scope of employment. Because the complaint did not plausibly allege that a federal employee committed the torts, dismissal was appropriate. |
Discretionary function exception not addressed“Therefore, at this point, the Cout declines to address the discretionary function exception in the FTCA.” | agree with court The court declined to address the discretionary function exception because the complaint was too vague to assess the nature of the claims. This is a procedural choice to resolve the threshold pleading deficiencies first. It is a defensible approach to avoid deciding complex legal questions on an insufficient factual record. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the legal standards for a 12(b)(6) motion and Rule 8 pleading requirements. It applies these standards to the specific facts alleged in the complaint, noting the lack of factual connection between the federal employee and the specific harms. The court appropriately grants leave to amend, recognizing the pro se nature of the plaintiff and the possibility that further facts could be discovered. The reasoning is sound and directly addresses the deficiencies in the complaint.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NEGIN NASIRI KENARI, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01959-JES-MSB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 15 Defendant. [ECF No. 17] 16 17 18 Before the Court is Defendant United States of America’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff 19 Negin Nasiri Kenari’s (“Plaintiff”) second amended complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 17 20 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 18. For the reasons stated below, the Court 21 GRANTS the motion to dismiss without prejudice. 22 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 23 Plaintiff alleges that she was previously involved in a personal relationship with 24 Lieutenant Jacob Conrad (“Lt. Conrad”) that ended in approximately November 2020. 25 SAC at 1-2. Lt. Conrad was affiliated with the United States Navy. Id. at 1. After the 26 relationship ended, Lt. Conrad continued attempting to contact Plaintiff through social 27 media and other communication channels until Plaintiff blocked him beginning in 28 1 approximately late 2020 and continuing into 2021. Id. at 2. During that time Plaintiff 2 experienced “professional disruption” at her workplace, Walgreens Pharmacy, where she 3 was employed as a pharmacist. Id. Also, during that time, Plaintiff experienced 4 inappropriate conduct by a supervisor, including romantic advances and unwanted 5 touching. Id. After reporting the conduct, Plaintiff was transferred to a different store 6 location. Id. 7 In January 2024, shortly after Plaintiff’s engagement ended, she received a text 8 message from Lt. Conrad asking whether Plaintiff was still getting married. Id. At the time 9 of the text message, Plaintiff had not communicated with Lt. Conrad for more than one 10 year. Id. At some point after the text message, Plaintiff moved to a residence in downtown 11 San Diego and experienced “repeated disruptions in her residential environment, health 12 symptoms, and other unusual occurrences.” Id. Beginning in approximately July 2024, 13 Plaintiff experienced health problems, including severe headaches, fatigue, abdominal 14 discomfort, and worsening symptoms of fibromyalgia. Id. During the same period, Plaintiff 15 also experienced difficulty accessing her financial accounts and noticed disturbances in her 16 residential environment, including elevator and hot water issues. Id. 17 On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff contacted a former acquaintance, Navy Lieutenant 18 Yousef Ahmed (“Lt. Ahmed”) and described the events she had been experiencing. Id. 19 During the communication, Lt. Ahmed stated that he was “sorry people are treating you 20 poorly,” that “a lot of folks take advantage of others,” and advised Plaintiff to “avoid men 21 in the military.” Id. On July 25, 2025, Lt. Ahmed advised Plaintiff to seek legal advice 22 from a military attorney and told Plaintiff, “the military can be very unfair.” Id. at 3. During 23 the same period, Plaintiff began receiving negative performance reviews from her 24 employer that Plaintiff believed to be inaccurate and inconsistent with her work 25 performance. Id. 26 In early August 2024, while waiting for an elevator in her residential building, 27 Plaintiff met an individual named Robert Radulescu (“Radulescu”), who stated he was an 28 attorney and spoke briefly with Plaintiff. During the elevator conversation, Radulescu 1 suggested that Plaintiff should meet his girlfriend, Baharan, since they were both of Iranian 2 descent. Id. Plaintiff later spoke with Radulescu and Baharan and during the conversation 3 Plaintiff mentioned that her grandmother was ill and had recently been diagnosed with 4 cancer. Id. When Baharan asked what type of cancer it was, Radulescu responded 5 “lymphoma” before Plaintiff could respond. Id. Plaintiff had just learned of the lymphoma 6 diagnosis the evening prior to meeting with Radulescu and Baharan and had not previously 7 discussed the specific diagnosis with them. Id. 8 Plaintiff states that she brings this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act for three 9 causes of action against the United States: (1) negligence; (2) invasion of privacy; and (3) 10 intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 4-6. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 13 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) for 14 failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Navarro v. Block, 15 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When considering the motion, the court must accept as 16 true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast as factual 18 allegations. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the 19 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient). 20 A complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 21 550 U.S. at 570. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include non-conclusory 22 factual content. Id. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The facts and the reasonable inferences 23 drawn from those facts must show a plausible—not just a possible—claim for relief. 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 25 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The focus is on the complaint, as opposed to any new facts alleged 26 in, for example, the opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Schneider v. 27 California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), reversed and 28 remanded on other grounds as stated in 345 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2003). “Determining 1 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] … a context-specific task that 2 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 3 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant- 4 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; 5 see also Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 6 B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 7 Under FRCP 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 8 showing the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, 9 and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (d). While a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is construed 10 liberally, a plaintiff must still allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim 11 sufficient to give a defendant fair notice of what the claims are and the grounds upon which 12 they rest. Brazil v. United States Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995). To this 13 end, a complaint must be logically organized and clearly specify each claim, so that the 14 defendant would have “no difficulty in responding to the claims[.]” Hearns v. San 15 Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 2008). 16 A district court may dismiss an entire complaint for lack of clarity when “one cannot 17 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with 18 enough detail to guide discovery.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). 19 Such a dismissal is appropriate where a complaint’s “true substance, if any, is well 20 disguised.” Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1131 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillibeau 21 v. City of Richmond, 417 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969)). A district court may also dismiss 22 a complaint in which “‘each count … adopts the allegations of fact are intended to support 23 which claim(s) for relief.’” Ewing v. Freedom Forever, LLC, No.: 23-CV-1240 JLS 24 (AHG), 2024 WL 221777, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2024) (quoting Paylor v. Hartford Fire 25 Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2014)). 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 The SAC fails to comply with FRCP 8, which requires a complaint contain “a short 3 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 4 P. 8(a). Specifically, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to “give the defendant fair 5 notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 6 (cleaned up). 7 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that were committed by any employee or agent 8 of the United States. The SAC consists of broad and conclusory assertions that appear to 9 allege a broad conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff’s career and health by Lt. Conrad. 10 However, Plaintiff does not allege that Lt. Conrad personally committed any act that would 11 support any of the causes of action alleged. Plaintiff fails to allege how Lt. Conrad was 12 responsible for the “inappropriate conduct …, including romantic advances and unwanted 13 touching,” by a supervisor at Walgreens. See generally SAC at 2. Further, Plaintiff fails to 14 allege how Lt. Conrad was plausibly responsible for the “repeated disruptions in her 15 residential environment [and] health symptoms.” Id. Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that 16 Lt. Conrad was responsible for her difficulty accessing her financial accounts or the 17 negative performance reviews from her employer. See Id. 18 Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that an employee or agent of the United States 19 committed a negligent act, an invasion of privacy or committed any conduct that caused 20 intentional infliction of emotional distress. The SAC is severely lacking in any plausible 21 theory of liability that would justify any cause of action against the United States. This is 22 most obvious in Plaintiff’s comments on page four of the complaint in which she states, 23 “Plaintiff is currently pursuing [] administrative channels to obtain records that may clarify 24 the events described in this complaint,” and that “Plaintiff does not yet have access to all 25 information regarding individuals or actions that caused these events.” SAC at 4. Plaintiff 26 must allege facts that show a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 27 Specifically, Plaintiff must allege facts that show an employee or agent of the United States 28 committed any of the listed causes of action. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege that any 1 ||actions committed by an employee or agent of the United States was committed in the 2 || course of their employment. As pled, the SAC fails to provide Defendant fair notice of the 3 claims against it and the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the SAC under FRCP 8. 4 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's claim of negligent supervision is barred by the 5 || discretionary function exception in the FTCA. Mot. at 4. The complaint is so lacking any 6 specific allegations; it is difficult for the Court to assess the nature of Plaintiff's claims. 7 || Therefore, at this point, the Cout declines to address the discretionary function exception 8 |}in the FTCA. 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss 11 SAC with leave to amend. The Court grants Plaintiff one final opportunity to file an 12 |}amended complaint. In the event that Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, she 13 do so within thirty (30) days of this Order. Any amended complaint must be 14 || complete in itself, without reference to any prior complaints. See $.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; 15 || Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9 Cir. 1989) 16 ||(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”). The Court cautions Plaintiff that 17 || failure to file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of this case with prejudice. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: July 8, 2026 20 Sa— Sin, 21 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 09 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28