Williams v. State Personnel Board CA4/1

California Court of Appeal · D085468 · 2026-07-08 · Unpublished

Proceeding: appeal from a judgment
Trial court: Superior Court of Imperial County · No. ECU001845
Trial judge: L. Brooks Anderholt
Outcome: reversed — Reversed with directions.
Area: civil
Panel: Laurence D. Rubin (author), O'Rourke, Buchanan

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T03:19Z · confidence high

The trial court granted Williams's petition for writ of mandate, vacating her termination and remanding the case to the State Personnel Board (SPB) for reconsideration of the penalty. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the petition was barred by statute because Williams failed to serve SPB within the one-year limitations period required by Government Code section 19630.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Trial court's grant of the petition for writ of mandate “The trial court therefore erred in granting the petition, and the judgment is reversed.”	de novo	error	agree with court The appellate court determined that the trial court erred by granting the petition because the statutory requirement to serve the respondent within one year was not met, rendering the petition barred regardless of the merits of the underlying termination decision.
Trial court's denial of SPB's motion to dismiss “SPB then asked for the case to be dismissed. The trial court denied that motion and directed Williams’s counsel to prepare a proposed judgment.”	unclear	error	agree with court By denying the motion to dismiss and proceeding to enter judgment, the trial court failed to recognize that the failure to timely serve the proper respondent rendered the action barred by statute, effectively allowing a void or time-barred petition to proceed to a final judgment.

Authorities

relied: Sprague v. County of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 119 — Appearance after the expiration of the limitations period does not waive the statute of limitations defense.
relied: Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 500 — SPB is the proper respondent in a petition for writ of administrative mandate challenging a disciplinary decision.

The appellate opinion: sound — The opinion correctly applies the statutory limitations period of Government Code section 19630, which requires both filing and service within one year. It properly cites Sprague to reject the argument that SPB's late appearance waived the limitations defense, and it correctly identifies SPB as the proper respondent based on Barber. The reasoning is direct and supported by the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

A model's reading — claude-fable-5-1, prompt v1, 2026-10-13T04:29Z · confidence low

The Imperial County Superior Court granted Deanna Williams's petition for writ of administrative mandate, vacated CDCR's termination of her employment, and remanded to the State Personnel Board for a new penalty, even though Williams never served SPB and the court later denied SPB's special-appearance motion to dismiss. On CDCR's appeal, the Court of Appeal held the petition was barred by Government Code section 19630 because it was not served on SPB within one year, reversed, and directed entry of judgment denying the petition.

Ruling reviewed	Standard	The court	The model
Granting the petition for writ of administrative mandate despite Williams's failure to serve SPB, the respondent agency, within the one-year commence-and-serve period of Government Code section 19630 “Accordingly, Williams did not timely serve SPB, and her petition is barred by section 19630. The trial court therefore erred in granting the petition, and the judgment is reversed.”	unclear	error (statutory interpretation)	agree with court Section 19630's text requires that the action be 'commenced and served within one year'; the dates (finality January 11, 2021; no service on SPB ever; SPB's first appearance April 4, 2024) are undisputed, so the statutory bar follows on a plain reading. The court did not articulate a standard of review, but the question is one of law on undisputed facts. Sprague supports the point that a later appearance does not revive an expired limitations period. The court did not address whether CDCR, the appellant, could raise a limitations defense belonging to SPB or whether SPB as a non-appealing respondent could obtain reversal, but the result is defensible.
Denial of SPB's special-appearance motion to set aside the ruling as void and to dismiss the petition for untimely service “SPB then asked for the case to be dismissed. The trial court denied that motion and directed Williams’s counsel to prepare a proposed judgment.”	unclear	error (procedure)	agree with court The appellate court did not separately analyze this ruling but its holding that the petition is time-barred under section 19630 necessarily means the motion to dismiss should have been granted. The trial court's stated reason ('there is no writ or judgment filed so there is nothing to set aside') did not answer the dismissal request, as the opinion itself notes in footnote 5. The appellate court assumed without deciding the personal jurisdiction question SPB raised.
Finding that SPB's decision affirming Williams's termination was an abuse of discretion and unsupported by substantial evidence “Finding SPB’s determination to be an abuse of discretion and unsupported by substantial evidence, the trial court vacated Williams’s termination and remanded the matter to SPB”	unclear	not reached	agree with court Because the court resolved the appeal on the section 19630 service bar, it did not reach CDCR's merits argument that SPB did not abuse its discretion in upholding the termination.

Authorities

relied: Sprague v. County of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 119 — A defendant's appearance after the limitations period has expired does not waive the statute of limitations defense; service after the deadline is not cured by later appearance.
relied: Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 500 — SPB is the forum in which civil service disciplinary cases are first adjudicated, and its decisions are reviewed by petition for writ of administrative mandate inquiring into the validity of the final administrative decision; SPB is the proper respondent.

The appellate opinion: sound with gaps — The opinion applies the plain commence-and-serve language of section 19630 to undisputed dates and cites Sprague for the proposition that a late appearance does not revive the limitations period, which supports reversal. It skips several questions, however: it assumes rather than decides personal jurisdiction over SPB, does not explain whether CDCR as appellant may invoke a limitations defense personal to SPB or whether a non-appealing respondent may obtain reversal, does not state a standard of review, and does not address whether the service defect was curable by amendment or substitution.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition record incomplete

Opinion

Filed 7/8/26 Williams v. State Personnel Board CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DEANNA WILLIAMS, D085468

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Super. Ct. No. ECU001845)

STATE PERSONNEL BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,

Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, L. Brooks Anderholt, Judge. Reversed with directions. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris A. Knudsen, Assistant Attorney General, Jodi L. Cleesattle and Rishi S. Bhatt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest and Appellant. Alvin Gittisriboongul, Chief Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent. Law Offices of Stephen J. Horvath and Stephen J. Horvath, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) terminated Deanna Williams’s employment, and the State Personnel Board (SPB) affirmed that termination. Williams sought review in the trial court through a petition for writ of mandate, which the trial court granted even though Williams never served SPB. CDCR appealed, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed the petition because Williams failed to join SPB, and that SPB did not abuse its discretion in upholding Williams’s termination. SPB filed a respondent’s brief, asserting the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over SPB and that Williams’s petition should be denied as untimely. Assuming without deciding that the trial had personal jurisdiction over SPB, we find that Williams’s petition is barred by Government Code1 section 19630 because she failed to timely serve SPB. We therefore reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter judgment denying the petition. II. BACKGROUND CDCR employed Williams as a licensed vocational nurse. In 2020, CDCR terminated Williams’s employment based on her failure to account for 13 tablets of Tylenol-3, a controlled substance, during a six-week period in 2019.2 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

2 Tylenol-3 contains codeine.

2 Williams appealed to SPB.3 After a three-day evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge entered a proposed decision affirming Williams’s termination. SPB adopted the proposed decision and served the parties with its ruling on January 11, 2021. On April 6, 2021, Williams filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting that the trial court vacate her termination. Williams incorrectly named CDCR as the respondent in her petition. In her opening and reply briefs supporting her petition, Williams named SPB as respondent, and CDCR as real party in interest.4 In that briefing, Williams asked the trial court to review SPB’s decision and to issue a writ commanding SPB to reinstate Williams and to reconsider the proper penalty. Williams served CDCR with her petition, but she did not serve SPB. CDCR opposed the petition as real party in interest, arguing that SPB did not abuse its discretion in affirming Williams’s termination. The trial court provided notice of the hearing on the petition, which it served on CDCR and Williams. The trial court heard the matter on August 9, 2023, with no appearance from SPB. The trial court issued a ruling granting the petition on August 22, 2023. Finding SPB’s determination to be an abuse of discretion and unsupported by substantial evidence, the trial court vacated Williams’s 3 “ ‘Our state Constitution contemplates that SPB shall be the forum in which civil service disciplinary cases are first adjudicated.’ ” (Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 500, 510.) 4 There is no dispute that SPB is the proper respondent in Williams’s petition. “SPB’s decision may be reviewed in the trial court by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate, which may be brought only ‘for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision.’ ” (Barber v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 510.)

3 termination and remanded the matter to SPB to reconsider a disciplinary penalty consistent with the court’s findings. On April 4, 2024, SPB filed an “Entry of Special Appearance of The [SPB] on Motion to Set Aside Void Judgment and Dismiss Action.” In that motion, SPB argued that Williams never served SPB with her writ petition; therefore, the court’s order granting the petition was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Additionally, SPB requested an order dismissing Williams’s petition without leave to amend, arguing that Williams did not serve SPB within the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court heard SPB’s motion on May 9, 2024, determining that “there is no writ or judgment filed so there is nothing to set aside.”5 SPB then asked for the case to be dismissed. The trial court denied that motion and directed Williams’s counsel to prepare a proposed judgment. On October 9, 2024, the trial court entered judgment granting the petition and issuing a writ commanding SPB to reconsider a proper penalty. CDCR’s timely appeal followed. III. DISCUSSION “Any petition for a writ challenging a decision of the [SPB] shall be filed within six months of the date of the final decision of the [SPB].” (§ 19630.) However, such an action “shall not be brought” unless it is “commenced and served within one year after the cause of action or complaint or ground for issuance of any writ or legal remedy first arose.” (Ibid., italics added.) SPB entered its order in Williams’s case on January 7, 2021. That order became final on January 11, 2021, when SPB served its decision on the 5 The trial court’s reasoning for this ruling is unclear.

4 parties. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 51.6.) Williams therefore had to file and serve her writ petition by January 11, 2022. Williams filed her writ petition on April 6, 2021, but she did not serve it on SPB or provide SPB with notice of the hearing. Additionally, even if SPB generally appeared in the trial court when it moved to set aside the judgment, that was on April 4, 2024, which was over two years after the time for service expired. (Sprague v. County of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 119, 130–131 [appearance after expiration of limitations period does not waive statute of limitations defense].) Accordingly, Williams did not timely serve SPB, and her petition is barred by section 19630. The trial court therefore erred in granting the petition, and the judgment is reversed.

5 IV. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter judgment denying Williams’s petition as barred by section 19630. Williams is to bear costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

Cites, in this corpus

Sprague v. County of San Diego D038491 · 2003-02-10