Jian Yang v. Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court considered a habeas petition by a non-citizen detained at the border who argued his detention was arbitrarily prolonged and that he was denied a bond hearing. The court denied the petition, holding that it had jurisdiction, that the petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), and that his nine-month detention did not violate due process.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of the habeas petition“For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Petition.” | disagree with court · fact finding unsupported The court correctly applied the legal standards for § 1252(g) jurisdiction and § 1225(b) mandatory detention. However, the court's analysis of the 'arbitrary and unreasonably prolonged' detention claim is legally flawed. The court relied on the *Banda* factors, which are generally applied to § 1226 detainees, but failed to address the specific constitutional holding in *Jennings v. Rodriguez* (2018), which the court itself cited in the jurisdiction section. *Jennings* held that § 1225(b) does not authorize indefinite detention without a bond hearing and that due process requires a bond hearing after a certain period (typically six months). By denying the petition based on the speculative timeline of an appeal and the likelihood of success, the court effectively ignored the *Jennings* requirement for a bond hearing for § 1225 detainees detained for more than six months. The court's reliance on *Rodriguez v. Marin* (9th Cir. 2018) is also problematic as that case was decided before *Jennings* and was effectively superseded by the Supreme Court's ruling on the constitutionality of § 1225(b) detention. |
The order itself: questionable — The court's analysis of jurisdiction under § 1252(g) is sound and correctly applies *Reno* and *Jennings*. However, the court's analysis of the merits is questionable. The court correctly identifies that the petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), but it fails to apply the holding of *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, which it cited in the jurisdiction section. *Jennings* held that § 1225(b) does not authorize indefinite detention without a bond hearing and that due process requires a bond hearing after a certain period. The court instead relied on *Banda* factors and speculative timelines, effectively ignoring the *Jennings* requirement. The court's reliance on *Rodriguez v. Marin* is also problematic as that case was decided before *Jennings* and was effectively superseded by the Supreme Court's ruling. The court's conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing because he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b) is incorrect in light of *Jennings*.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
record incompleteOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JIAN YANG, Case No. 26-cv-3398-BAS-JAC 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING AMENDED 13 v. PETITION (ECF No. 7)
14 OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming his 18 immigration detention has been arbitrarily and unreasonably prolonged and that he was 19 improperly denied a bond hearing. (ECF No. 7.) The Government opposes. (ECF No. 9.) 20 For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Petition. 21 I. LEGAL STANDARD 22 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 23 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the writ 24 is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 25 A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or she is in 26 custody in violation of the Constitution or Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It applies 27 to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 28 1 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since he is seeking release from custody, he has 2 standing to pursue this Petition. 3 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 Petitioner, a citizen of China, came to the United States seeking asylum on October 5 2, 2025, and was detained at the U.S. border. (ECF No. 7.) On May 28, 2026, an 6 Immigration Judge denied his request for asylum, along with his request for withholding 7 of removal. (ECF No. 9, Ex. 3.) He intends to appeal this decision, although he had not 8 done so as of the date of filing this Petition. (ECF No. 7.) Petitioner argues he should be 9 released because his detention has been arbitrarily and unreasonably prolonged. 10 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 11 A. Jurisdiction Under Section 1252(g) 12 Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips this Court of jurisdiction to 13 proceed. Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 14 claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 15 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal orders against any 16 alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 17 The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute 18 [such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation’ and by the ‘strong 19 presumption in favor of judicial review.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 20 995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)). 21 Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions: 22 commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. Reno v. Am.- 23 Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). “Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in 24 any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision 25 ‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995 26 (alteration original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There are, 27 of course, many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process” that 28 are not one of these three. Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities). “Section 1252(g) 1 does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion 2 connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997. 3 In this Petition, Petitioner is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of 4 removal proceedings against him, nor is he raising an issue with respect to the execution 5 of removal. His detention may be during, but is nonetheless independent of, the removal 6 proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of jurisdiction by section 1252(g). 7 B. Mandatory Detention Under Section 1225(b)(1)(B) 8 Individuals seeking admission into the United States at the border, like the Petitioner 9 in this case, are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. These noncitizens may be 10 released only if the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) determines it is appropriate 11 to parole the noncitizen into the United States. Detention under § 1225(b) is otherwise 12 mandatory, and individuals are not entitled to a bond hearing. 13 C. Arbitrary and Unreasonably Prolonged Detention 14 The Court agrees that at some point, an immigration detention without a bond 15 hearing may be deemed arbitrarily and unreasonably prolonged and thus a violation of the 16 detainee’s Due Process rights. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 17 2018) (“[W]e have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged 18 detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy 19 precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have 20 thought so.”). Following the factors laid out in Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 21 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019), Petitioner fails to show that his detention has been arbitrary or 22 prolonged. 23 Petitioner was arrested on October 2, 2025. He has been detained for nine months 24 and has had his hearing before an Immigration Judge. This is not an unreasonable amount 25 of time from arrest to disposition. Despite his claim that he intends to appeal this decision, 26 the amount of time it will take to complete the appeal is speculative. Petitioner offers 27 evidence that the median appellate processing time for immigration cases is seven months. 28 That means there is an equal likelihood that the case will take less than seven months as | ||there is that it will take longer than seven months. Petitioner fails to show that DHS is 2 responsible for delaying or prolonging his immigration proceedings, nor at this point, does 3 ||his detention appear to be for an indefinite period. Finally, an Immigration Judge has 4 ||denied his requests for relief, which decreases the likelihood that he will be successful on 5 ||appeal. Since Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his detention has been arbitrarily or 6 || unreasonably prolonged, his Petition on this ground fails. 7 CONCLUSION 8 Petitioner fails to show that his detention has been arbitrarily and unreasonably 9 || prolonged. In addition, because he was detained at the border, he is subject to mandatory 10 || detention under § 1225(b) and can only be released if DHS elects to release him on parole. 11 || Thus, the Petition is DENIED. 12 The Clerk is directed to close the case. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 || DATED: July 7, 2026 (yatta Bahar □□ 16 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4A.