gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-02026 · 2026-07-07 · Unknown

Kent G. Lehman v. F.B.I. et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Jinsook Ohta (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:26Z · confidence high

The court screened a pro se complaint filed in forma pauperis against federal agencies for Bivens, disability discrimination, and Privacy Act violations. It dismissed the Bivens claim with prejudice and the other claims with leave to amend, granting the plaintiff 45 days to file an amended complaint.

What the court decidedThe model
Dismissal of Bivens claim with prejudice
“Upon screening, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Bivens claim with prejudice because Bivens actions cannot be brought against federal agencies.”
agree with court
The decision is legally correct. Under FDIC v. Meyer, Bivens actions are not available against federal agencies, only against individual officers. Because this is a legal bar rather than a factual deficiency, amendment would be futile, supporting dismissal with prejudice.
Dismissal of disability discrimination claim with leave to amend
“The Court dismisses with leave to amend Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim for failing to allege facts about the nature of his disability and the discrimination that he suffered.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the pleading standards from Twombly and Iqbal. The complaint failed to provide the 'fair notice' required by Rule 8(a) regarding the specific elements of a disability discrimination claim (disability, qualified individual, discrimination). Granting leave to amend is appropriate for a pro se plaintiff where the deficiency is curable.
Dismissal of 'Privacy Act' claim with leave to amend
“The Court dismisses with leave to amend Plaintiff’s “Privacy Act” claim because the Court cannot discern from the complaint (1) which statute Plaintiff intends to invoke, as there is no federal statute by this name; (2) the identity of the party or parties who allegedly violated the statute; and (3) the specific conduct constituting the alleged violation.”
agree with court
The court correctly identified that the complaint failed to state a claim because it did not identify the specific statute, defendant, or conduct. The reference to 'no federal statute by this name' is likely a colloquial reference to the fact that the plaintiff did not cite the specific Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) or other specific privacy laws, rendering the claim vague. Dismissal with leave to amend is appropriate.
Grant of leave to file an amended complaint within 45 days
“Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 45 days of the date of this order.”
agree with court
This is a standard procedural order for a pro se plaintiff whose claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim but are potentially curable. The court correctly warned that failure to file will result in dismissal for failure to prosecute.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the screening standard for in forma pauperis cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It accurately cites FDIC v. Meyer for the proposition that Bivens claims cannot be brought against agencies, justifying dismissal with prejudice. It correctly applies Twombly and Iqbal to the disability and privacy claims, identifying specific factual deficiencies that prevent the claims from stating a cause of action. The grant of leave to amend is consistent with pro se litigation standards in the Ninth Circuit. The reasoning is complete and supported by binding authority.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KENT G. LEHMAN, Case No.: 26-cv-02026-JO-BJW 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 14 v. 15 F.B.I. et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 On January 31, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Kent G. Lehman sued the Federal Bureau of 21 Investigations (“FBI”), the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and the 22 Department of State (“DOS”) alleging that they unlawfully disseminated his personal 23 information and intentionally discriminated against him. Dkt. 1. For the reasons stated 24 below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. 25 1. Because the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), 26 Dkt. 8, it screens his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under 27 § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court may sua sponte dismiss a case if it is “frivolous, 28 1 malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] 2 monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 3 2. Upon screening, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Bivens claim with prejudice 4 because Bivens actions cannot be brought against federal agencies. FDIC v. 5 Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994) (Bivens cannot be extended to actions 6 against federal agencies because doing so would impose undue burdens on the 7 federal government without serving purpose of deterring individual officers); see 8 also Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 9 Amendment would be futile because no additional facts can overcome this legal 10 bar. Chappel v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2000) (court 11 may deny leave to amend where amendment would be futile). 12 3. The Court dismisses with leave to amend Plaintiff’s disability discrimination 13 claim for failing to allege facts about the nature of his disability and the 14 discrimination that he suffered. See Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 15 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires that a complaint allege 16 enough facts to provide “fair notice” of both the particular claims being asserted 17 and “the grounds upon which [those claims] rest”) (citations omitted); Ashcroft 18 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint 19 contain a “short and plain statement of the claim”). If Plaintiff wishes to file an 20 amended complaint, he must allege specific facts to explain the nature of his 21 disability, how it impacts his functioning or activities, who discriminated against 22 him, and how the discrimination occurred. See Smith v. Clark County School 23 Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that to bring an ADA claim, 24 the plaintiff must prove (1) they are disabled within the ADA’s meaning; (2) they 25 are a “qualified individual” with a disability; and (3) they were discriminated 26 against because of their disability); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 27 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that requirements for claims under Title II of the 28 1 ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are very similar because the ADA “was 2 expressly modeled” after the Rehabilitation Act.) 3 4. The Court dismisses with leave to amend Plaintiff’s “Privacy Act” claim because 4 the Court cannot discern from the complaint (1) which statute Plaintiff intends to 5 invoke, as there is no federal statute by this name; (2) the identity of the party or 6 parties who allegedly violated the statute; and (3) the specific conduct 7 constituting the alleged violation. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3. Failure 8 to do so will result in dismissal of this claim with prejudice. 9 5. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 45 days of the 10 date of this order. Any amended complaint must be complete by itself without 11 reference to prior pleadings; any defendants not named and claims not re-alleged 12 in the amended complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 13 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th 14 Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. 15 Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed 16 with leave to amend may be considered waived if not re-pled in the amended 17 pleading). 18 6. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint within 45 days, his case will 19 be dismissed based on his failure to prosecute in compliance with this order. See 20 Edwards v. Marin Park, 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The failure of the 21 plaintiff eventually to respond to the court’s ultimatum—either by amending the 22 complaint or by indicating to the court that [he] will not do so—is properly met 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 with the sanction of a Rule 41(b) dismissal.’’). 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 ||Dated: July 7, 2026 6 Honorable Jinsook Ohta 5 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28