Opinion

I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 || SANTOS HERRERA LANZA, Case No.: 26-CV-3215 JAO (JLB) 12 Petitioner.) ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF 13 |] V. HABEAS CORPUS Operations, San Diego Field Office, 16 || Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et 7 al., 8 Respondents. 19 Before the Court is Petitioner Santos Herrera Lanza’s Amended Petition for Writ 20 of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 6). Also before the Court is a1 Respondents Patrick Divver’s (Field Office Director of Enforcement and Removal 22 Operations, San Diego Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”’)), 23 Markwayne Mullin’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security), Todd Lyon’s 24 (Director of ICE), Todd Blanche’s (Acting Attorney General of the United States), and 25 Christopher LaRose’s (Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center) (collectively, “Respondents” or the “Government’”) Return to the Petition (ECF No. 8).

1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition on due process 2 || grounds. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Petitioner is a Honduran national who entered the United States in 2018 and was 5 || detained at the Paseo Del Norte Border Patrol Processing Center. See ECF No. 6 at 2. 6 || After about eight days of detention, Petitioner was released to pursue his asylum claim. 7 || See id. In April 2026, ICE re-detained Petitioner at work. See id. 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 10 || legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district 11 || of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole 12 ||judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 13 ||removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez—Barajas 14 || v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 15 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral 16 |/issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of 17 || indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 18 || Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other 19 || grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. 20 || Supp. 3d 1042, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). 21 DISCUSSION 22 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release from his 2018 23 || detention without notice or a hearing violates the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 6 at 3. 24 || Respondents maintain that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 25 || 1225(b)(2),” but “acknowledge[] that this Court, and Courts in this District, have 26 || repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion under the same and/or similar facts.” See 27 || ECF No. 8 at 1-2. Thus, they “do[] not oppose the petition.” See id. The Court 28 || concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates the Due Process Clause.

l The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 2 || liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 3 || Process Clause applies to all “persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 4 || their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 5 ||533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment 6 || entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 7 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 8 || hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 9 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their 10 || liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a 11 || protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 12 || Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 13 |/individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 14 || release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 15 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 16 ||... conditions [of release].’” Jd. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 17 ||(1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 18 || pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a 19 || protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 20 || (citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 21 Petitioner has been out of custody since 2018, when the government implicitly 22 || determined he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and released him from 23 ||detention. See ECF No. 6 at 4. There is no suggestion that Petitioner violated the terms 24 || of his release in the nearly eight years he has been out of detention. See generally ECF 25 || Nos. 6, 8. Petitioner thus has a protected liberty interest continuing to remain out of 26 custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE 27 || custody after [his] initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that 28 was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong | || interest in remaining at liberty unless [he] no longer meets those criteria.””); Noori v. 2 || LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one 3 || that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time 4 || indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before 5 ||removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2025) 6 || (finding the petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release). 7 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 8 || procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. 9 || Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally 10 || sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors. 11 || See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: 12 (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official B action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 14 additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the 15 Government’s interest including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 16 procedural requirement would entail.” 17 18 The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the 19 || Government’s re-detention of Petitioner without notification, reasoning, or an 20 || opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed 21 above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to 22 release in 2018. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 23 || detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due 24 || Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 25 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free 26 be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal 27 || life.”). 28 l Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as 2 || Respondents revoked Petitioner’s release from custody without providing Petitioner with 3 || notification, reasoning, or a hearing. Since the government’s initial determination in 4 ||2018 that Petitioner should be released because he posed no danger to the community and 5 || was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia 6 || v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a 7 || determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or 8 flight risk.”). Indeed, after his release from custody, Petitioner has apparently complied 9 || with all conditions of release. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits 10 || federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings. 11 ||Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed 12 || circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become 13 }/a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not 14 || received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is 15 || high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to 16 determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 17 || 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned 18 19 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 20 || and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F. 21 || Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Tf the 22 || government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 23 || toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.’’). 24 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in 25 || violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy 26 || Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of 27 || habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was 28 revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the 2 || conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds). 3 CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas 5 || Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from 6 || custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release. The Court ORDERS, prior 7 ||to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for 8 revocation of his release on bond and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to 9 || determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear the burden of 10 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 11 |}community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038. The Parties are 12 || ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by July 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has 13 released. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 ||Dated: July 2, 2026 16 18 wy) Vy” 19 □ Jill A. Otake 0 7 United States District Judge Qa ge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28