Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 JOHNATAN DAVID ESPINOSA ISAZA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03195-RBM-BJW 11 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 12 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 DIRECTOR, OTAY MESA [Doc. 1] DETENTION CENTER, et al., 14 Respondents. 15 16 17 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Johnatan David Espinosa Isaza’s 18 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States without 22 inspection on or around November 8, 2021. (Doc. 1-2 at 1; see Doc. 1-3 at 1.) On 23 November 10, 2021, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner 24 a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging him under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the 25 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as a noncitizen “present in the United States 26 without being admitted or paroled.” (Doc. 1-3 at 1.) After his release, Petitioner filed an 27 application for asylum relief and was granted employment authorization. (Doc. 1 at 2, 4; 28 see Doc. 1-2 at 1.) 1 On February 23, 2026, Petitioner was detained by U.S. Border Patrol agent during a 2 vehicle traffic stop. (Doc. 1-3 at 10.) That same day, DHS served Petitioner with a new 3 NTA. (Doc. 1 at 2; see Doc. 1-3 at 10.) Petitioner remains detained at the Otay Mesa 4 Detention Center. (Doc.1 at 1.) On March 31, 2026, an immigration judge denied 5 Petitioner’s request for custody redetermination based on lack of jurisdiction under Matter 6 of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Doc. 1 at 2; see Doc. 1-3 at 14.) 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 9 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 10 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 11 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 12 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 13 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 14 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 15 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 16 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Petitioner claims his immigration detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due 19 Process Clause and the Immigration and National Act (“INA”). (See Doc. 1 at 1–4.) 20 Respondents assert that “Petitioner was previously released from immigration custody on 21 conditional parole issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)[,]” but nonetheless maintain their 22 position that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” (Doc. 6 at 23 2.) Respondents “acknowledge[ ] that this Court’s prior decisions will control the result 24 here if the Court adheres to its prior decisions, as the facts are not materially distinguishable 25 for purposes of the Court’s decision, and on that basis . . . does not oppose the [P]etition 26 and defers to the Court on the appropriate relief.” (Id. at 2–3.) 27 This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners 28 who were previously released from detention on conditional parole and re-detained several 1 years later. In Faizyan v. Casey, the Court held such petitioners are “subject to the 2 discretionary detention procedures under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and [their] detention without a 3 bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause.” Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 4 WL 3208844, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see Penagos-Alvarez v. LaRose, Case No.: 5 3:26-cv-00865-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 539340 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2026). Applying the due 6 process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court also found that 7 Respondents’ summary revocation of the petitioner’s “conditional parole without an 8 opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his due process rights.” Faizyan, 2025 WL 9 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25- CV- 10 01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding a due process 11 violation where the petitioner was initially released on his own recognizance); Leiva Flores 12 v. Albarran, Case No. 25- cv-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 13 2025) (finding the same and requiring a hearing before detention). 14 Like in Faizyan, Petitioner was previously released from custody on conditional 15 parole under § 1226(a). (See Doc. 4 at 1.) “As ICE was not authorized to release 16 [Petitioner] if [he] was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court must infer 17 from [his] release that ICE determined [he] was neither.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 18 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). There is also no dispute that Petitioner lived in the United 19 States for over four years, was able to apply for asylum relief, and was granted work 20 authorization before he was re-detained in February 2026. (See Doc. 1 at 1–2.) 21 The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here. For those 22 same reasons, the Court finds that: (1) Petitioner is subject to § 1226’s discretionary 23 detention procedures; and (2) ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release on conditional parole 24 without a pre-deprivation hearing violated his due process rights and rendered his detention 25 unlawful. See Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7; E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 26 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Although . . . Petitioner may request a bond hearing while 27 detained, such a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural safeguard 28 because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of liberty.”); Jorge 1 || v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“[I]f Petitioner is detained, 2 || he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid”). 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly: 5 1. The Government is ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, 6 subject to the conditions of his preexisting conditional parole. 7 2. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any re-detention, Petitioner SHALL receive 8 notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before an 9 immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to determine whether detention 10 is warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and 11 convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of 12 flight. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 || DATE: July 2, 2026 16 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28