gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03334 · 2026-07-02 · Unknown

Deili Porfidi Mauricio Cano v. Christopher J. Larose, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Dana M. Sabraw (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:26Z · confidence high

Petitioner moved for further relief arguing that the immigration judge (IJ) incorrectly placed the burden of proof on her during a bond hearing ordered by the Court. The Court granted the motion, finding the hearing constitutionally deficient, and ordered a second bond hearing within ten days where the Government must meet its burden of proof.

What the court decidedThe model
Petitioner's Motion for Further Relief is granted.
“Petitioner’s motion for further relief is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The Court correctly identified that the IJ applied the burden of proof for a standard § 1226(a) bond hearing (burden on detainee) rather than the burden applicable to prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) (burden on Government to prove flight risk/danger by clear and convincing evidence). Because the IJ explicitly relied on the improper burden to deny bond, the hearing was constitutionally deficient. The Court's decision to waive exhaustion is supported by the distinct factual circumstance of the IJ's explicit legal error.
Respondents are ordered to provide a second bond determination hearing within ten days.
“The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a second bond determination hearing within ten (10) days of entry of this Order.”
agree with court
This is the appropriate remedy for a bond hearing that was procedurally defective due to the misapplication of the burden of proof. The Court correctly specifies that the Government must justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.
Respondents are ordered to provide a status report within five days of the bond hearing.
“Respondents are further ORDERED to provide a status report within five (5) days of providing Petitioner with a bond hearing, notifying this Court of the results.”
agree with court
This is a standard procedural mechanism to ensure compliance with the court's order and allow for further review if necessary.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly applies the legal standard for prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) as established by Ninth Circuit precedent (Martinez) and district court precedent (Bayani). It accurately identifies the error in the IJ's order (misplaced burden of proof) and provides the correct remedy (new hearing with proper burden). The waiver of exhaustion is justified by the specific legal error made by the IJ.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEILI PORFIDI MAURICIO CANO, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03334-DMS-KSC 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S 13 v. MOTION FOR FURTHER RELIEF 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior [ECF No. 15] Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 15 al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 On November 27, 2025, Petitioner Deili Porfidi Mauricio Cano petitioned for writ 19 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, contesting her detention at the Otay Mesa 20 Detention Center. (Mot., ECF No. 1.) On December 24, 2025, this Court found, over 21 Respondents’ opposition, Petitioner’s prolonged detention violated her due process rights, 22 and granted in part the Petition (“Habeas Order”). (See Habeas Order, ECF No. 12, at 6.) 23 Specifically, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for immediate release, but ordered 24 Respondents to provide her with an individualized bond hearing within fourteen (14) days 25 of entry of the Habeas Order. (Id.) Petitioner received a hearing on January 6, 2026, 26 wherein the immigration judge (“IJ”) denied bond because Petitioner “failed to 27 demonstrate that she does not present an extreme risk of flight such that no amount of bond 28 1 was warranted.” (IJ Order, ECF No. 21-1, at 7.) Petitioner appealed to the Board of 2 Immigration Appeals, which remains pending. (See Mot. ¶ 18.) Now, Petitioner moves 3 this Court for further relief, arguing the IJ incorrectly placed the burden on Petitioner. (Id. 4 ¶ 28.) This matter is fully briefed, (see ECF Nos. 18 (Respondents’ opposition), 19 5 (Petitioner’s reply)), and suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil 6 Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Considering the briefs, submitted evidence, and legal authority, the 7 Court grants Petitioner’s motion. 8 “District courts have the authority to review compliance with prior orders granting 9 habeas relief, including orders for bond hearings.” Bayani v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-0266, 10 2026 WL 1270059, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2026) (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 11 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)). Specifically, “the Court retains jurisdiction to determine 12 whether a party has complied with its earlier habeas order.” Lara v. Bondi, No. 26-cv- 13 1125, 2026 WL 892021, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2026) (citing Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1161). 14 Federal courts also have jurisdiction to review whether the agency properly applied the 15 burden of proof. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024). When conducting 16 bond hearings for detainees held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, IJs must place the burden on the 17 Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee is either a flight 18 risk or danger to the community. Bayani, 2026 WL 1270059, at *5 (citations omitted). 19 “The clear and convincing evidence standard is an ‘intermediate burden of proof’ applied 20 when ‘particularly important interests are at stake.’” Id. (citation omitted). 21 Here, the IJ misplaced the burden onto Petitioner. In its Habeas Order, the Court 22 conducted its analysis assuming Petitioner was properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), 23 rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Habeas Order 4.) Under this assumption, the Court found 24 Petitioner’s detention became unconstitutionally prolonged in violation of the Fifth 25 Amendment’s Due Process Clause and, for that reason, ordered Respondents to provide 26 Petitioner with a bond hearing before an IJ. (Id. at 5–6.) Thus, it was the Government’s 27 burden to prove Petitioner was either a flight risk or a danger to the community. However, 28 the IJ’s written order recites the burden of proof for a § 1226(a) bond hearing, rather than 1 |}a §1225(b)(2)(A) prolonged detention hearing. (See IJ Order 6.) Further, the IJ denied 2 Petitioner bond because Petitioner “failed to demonstrate that she does not present an 3 ||}extreme risk of flight.” (Ud. at 7.) Thus, the IJ misplaced the Government’s burden of 4 ||proof onto Petitioner and relied upon this improper burden when denying bond. 5 || Accordingly, the Court finds the bond hearing was constitutionally deficient. Petitioner’s 6 motion for further relief is GRANTED.! 7 The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a second bond 8 determination hearing within ten (10) days of entry of this Order. See Bayani, 2026 WL 9 || 1270059, at *8 (ordering second bond hearing when immigration judge failed to place 10 |/burden on Government). At this bond hearing, Respondents must justify Petitioner’s 11 |/continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that she would likely 12 || flee or pose a danger to the community if released. Elikaei v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-03219, 13 WL 3539165, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025). Respondents are further ORDERED 14 || to provide a status report within five (5) days of providing Petitioner with a bond hearing, 15 notifying this Court of the results. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: July 2, 2026 f 18 a YM « 19 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 ' Respondents argue that Petitioner must first exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking relief from this Court. (See ECF No. 18, at 2-4.) While this Court previously required prudential exhaustion, 26 || Elikaei v. Larose, No. 25-CV-03219, 2026 WL 1625645, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2026), the present case is factually distinct in that the IJ explicitly recited and relied on an improper burden of proof. Thus, 27 considering the circumstances in this case and the narrow scope of the Court’s review, waiver of 28 exhaustion is warranted. See Singh v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-1425, 2026 WL 1387428, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 2026); Bayani, 2026 WL 1270059, at *5.