Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAIRO BALMORE CHICAS Case No.: 26-cv-3501-GPC-DEB GUEVARA, 12 ORDER GRANTING PETITION Petitioner, 13 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. [ECF No. 1] Department of Homeland Security; 15 TODD LYONS, Acting Director, U.S. 16 Immigration and Customs Enforcement; PATRICK DIVVER, San Diego Field Office 17 Director, ICE; WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER; and TODD 18 BLANCHE, Attorney General of the 19 United States, 20 Respondents. 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Jairo Balmore Chicas Guevara’s petition for a writ of 22 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Petitioner seeks immediate release 23 from custody or, alternatively, a constitutionally adequate bond hearing. ECF No. 1, at 10. 24 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition and orders Petitioner’s 25 immediate release. 26 BACKGROUND 27 Petitioner entered the United States in 2019 and has been present in the U.S. for the 28 past seven years. ECF No. 1, ¶ 12. Upon entry, Petitioner was processed as an 1 Unaccompanied Alien Child under the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 2 Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) and placed in a government-monitored shelter 3 for minors. ECF No. 6, at 3. Petitioner was then released to his sister as a vetted family 4 sponsor. Id. To do so, the government flew Petitioner from the border to Los Angeles, 5 California, to deliver Petitioner to his sister’s custody to await asylum proceedings. Id. 6 Petitioner’s asylum proceedings were paused or dismissed in 2022. Id. 7 On April 15, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) intercepted 8 Petitioner at a roadside checkpoint while he was driving home from work. Id. at 4. That 9 day, Petitioner was served a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and placed in physical detention at 10 Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. at 4; ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 9–10. Petitioner’s NTA identified 11 Petitioner a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” 12 ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 9–10. 13 Petitioner has now filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate 14 release or a constitutionally adequate bond hearing. ECF No. 1, at 10. The initial Petition 15 sought relief on the grounds that (1) Respondents are wrongly subjecting Petitioner to 16 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) when Petitioner’s detention should be 17 governed by § 1226(a) and (2) Petitioner is receiving inadequate medical care in detention. 18 See generally ECF No. 1. Upon a request from the Court for supplemental briefing, 19 Petitioner further argues that his re-detention without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing 20 violated due process. ECF No. 6, at 4–5. 21 DISCUSSION 22 In their supplemental briefing, Respondents concede that Plaintiff was previously 23 released from immigration custody on parole in 2019. ECF No. 7, at 2. Rather than address 24 the due process issues raised by Petitioner’s prior release, Respondents instead (1) maintain 25 that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and (2) argue that Petitioner’s request for 26 release due to inadequate medical care is not a proper habeas claim. Id. Respondents also 27 acknowledge that “this Court’s prior decisions will control the result here . . . and on that 28 1 basis the government does not oppose the petition and defers to the Court on the appropriate 2 relief.” Id. at 2–3. 3 Despite Respondents’ lack of opposition to the petition, the Court will still assess 4 the merits of Petitioner’s claims. The Court begins by analyzing the claim not addressed 5 by Respondents: whether Petitioner’s re-detention without notice or a hearing violated his 6 due process rights. 7 I. Petitioner’s Detention Violates Due Process 8 In supplemental briefing ordered by the Court, Petitioner argues that his re-detention 9 without notice or a chance to be heard violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. 10 ECF No. 6, at 4–5. The Court agrees. 11 Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, no person shall be “deprived 12 of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. Indeed, 13 “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 14 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 15 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Due process rights apply to noncitizens, 16 including those whose presence in the United States is unlawful. Id. at 693. 17 As applied to cases like Petitioner’s: “even when ICE has the initial discretion to 18 detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released 19 from custody [he] has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi v. 20 Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). See also Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25- 21 CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025); Padilla v. U.S. 22 Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023); Ortiz Donis v. 23 Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01228-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 24 2025). In fact, the government’s initial release of an individual from custody “creates an 25 ‘implicit promise’ that the individual’s liberty will be revoked only if they fail to abide by 26 the conditions of their release.” Calderon v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06695-AMO, 2025 WL 27 2430609, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 28 (1972)). An initial release from ICE custody further reflects “a determination by the 1 government that [an individual is] neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.” 2 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034; Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC 3 (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). Thus, DHS may generally not 4 re-arrest a previously released noncitizen “absent a change in circumstances.” Salcedo 5 Aceros 2025 WL 2637503, at *1 (citing Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App'x 787, 788 (9th 6 Cir. 2021); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2017)). 7 When Petitioner was previously released from government custody, he “took with 8 him a liberty interest which is entitled to the full protections of due process.” Ramirez 9 Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025); see also Doe v. 10 Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly 11 recognized that individuals who have been released from custody, even where such release 12 is conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued liberty”). Courts have determined 13 this to be the case when a noncitizen, like Petitioner, entered the United States as an 14 unaccompanied minor and was previously released under the TVPRA. See Cornejo v. 15 Andrews, 823 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (E.D. Cal. 2026); R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141- 16 KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2686866, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025); Perez v. Casey, No. 26- 17 CV-0655-JES-BLM, 2026 WL 370397, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2026) (“Aliens afforded 18 release under the TVPRA have the same due process protections regarding re-detention as 19 those granted parole or release as adults: at a minimum, they are entitled to notice and 20 opportunity to be heard regarding the individualized changed circumstances justifying 21 revocation in their case.”). 22 Having determined that Petitioner maintains a protected liberty interest in remaining 23 out of custody, the Court must next determine “what process is due.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. 24 at 481. 25 “The constitution typically ‘requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives 26 a person or liberty or property.’” G.S. v. Bostock, No. 2:25-CV-01255-JNW-TLF, 2025 27 WL 3014274 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 8, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub 28 nom. G.S. v. Bostock, No. 2:25-CV-01255-JNW-TLF, 2025 WL 3014035 (W.D. Wash. 1 Oct. 28, 2025) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)). To determine what 2 procedures are required by due process, the Court evaluates the three-part test set forth in 3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976). See Ortiz Donnis, 2025 WL 2879514, 4 at *12. Under Mathews, a court must consider (1) “the private interest” at stake, (2) “the 5 risk of an erroneous deprivation” without additional procedures and “the probable value . . . 6 of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) the “Government’s interest, 7 including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens imposed by the 8 additional procedures.” 424 U.S. at 335. 9 As to the first Mathews factor, Petitioner has a significant private interest in his 10 continued liberty. Indeed, Petitioner’s seven years out of government custody “have only 11 heightened [his] liberty interest in remaining out of detention.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. 12 Supp. 3d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025). Thus, this factor favors Petitioner. See Salcedo 2025 13 WL 2637503, *12; Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *12; Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 14 1034-35. 15 Turning to the second Mathews factor, “it is clear that there is a significant risk that 16 the government will erroneously deprive [Petitioner] of that liberty interest if it does not 17 provide [him] with a pre-detention hearing.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035. Where, as 18 here, Petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing upon his re-detention, “‘the 19 risk for erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor 20 [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [his] 21 detention.” Id. (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801, 2025 WL 1918679 (E.D. 22 Cal. July 11, 2025)). Further, courts have noted that “civil immigration detention must be 23 ‘nonpunitive in purpose’ and bear a ‘reasonable relation’ to the authorized statutory 24 purposes of preventing flight and danger to the community.” G.S. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 25 3014274, at *8. By releasing Petitioner into his sister’s custody in 2019, immigration 26 officials determined that he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to his community. See 27 id.; Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *1; Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034. Respondents 28 have not alleged that there has been a change in circumstance since Petitioner’s 2019 1 release. Thus, the risk of erroneous deprivation is particularly high in Petitioner’s case, as 2 there is no evidence of changed circumstances or that Petitioner is a danger or flight risk. 3 Accordingly, this factor also favors Petitioner. 4 Finally, the Government “has failed to show any countervailing interest against 5 providing a pre-detention hearing.” G.S. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3014274, at *9; Salcedo 6 Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *12. Indeed, “in immigration court, custody hearings are 7 routine and impose a minimal cost.” Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (internal quotation 8 marks and citation omitted). There is also no concern that a hearing will delay or obstruct 9 Respondents efforts to remove Petitioner, as Petitioner’s removal proceedings have been 10 terminated due to Petitioner’s eligibility for Temporary Protected Status, which Petitioner 11 has since received. ECF No. 1, ¶ 6. In sum, the Government’s interest in detaining 12 Petitioner without a hearing is low. Singh, 2025 WL 1918679, at *8. 13 Each of the Mathews factors favors Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner was entitled to a pre- 14 deprivation bond hearing. The Government detained Petitioner, without explanation and 15 without notice, despite its own prior determination that Petitioner was not a flight risk and 16 posed no danger to the community. “Under these circumstances, given the government’s 17 conduct, the substantial liberty interests held by [Petitioner], and the fact that the 18 government has no evidence and does not contend that [Petitioner] presents [a] risk or flight 19 or to public safety, a pre-deprivation bond hearing [was] warranted.” Salcedo 2025 WL 20 2637503, *12. At such a hearing, the burden would have been on the government to 21 demonstrate to a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that re-detention 22 was necessary to prevent danger to the community or flight. Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 23 1038; see also Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at *15; Ortiz Donis, 2025 WL 2879514, at 24 *15 (“Since it is the government that initiated re-detention, it follows that the government 25 should be required to bear the burden of providing a justification for the re-detention.”). 26 In light of such a violation, Petitioner’s release from custody is the appropriate 27 remedy. See, e.g., Perez v. Casey, No. 26-CV-0655-JES-BLM, 2026 WL 370397, at *2 28 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2026); Quiroz v. Larose, No. 26-CV-866 JLS (DEB), 2026 WL 673822, 1 *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026); Aliyev v. LaRose, No. 3:26-CV-01119-CAB-JLB, 2026 2 || WL 699818, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2026); Devilmar v. LaRose, No. 3:26-CV-01748- 3 || JES-MSB, 2026 WL 1042439, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026); Perez v. Noem, No. 3:25- 4 || cv-3777-CAP-JBL, 2026 WL 102643, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026).! 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 7 e The Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1. 8 e The Court ORDERS Respondents to release Petitioner from custody 9 immediately. Respondents SHALL NOT impose any additional restrictions 10 on him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that is determined to be 1] necessary at a later custody hearing. 12 e Respondents SHALL NOT re-arrest or re-detain Petitioner absent compliance 13 with constitutional protections, which include, at a minimum, pre-deprivation 14 notice of at least seven days before a pre-deprivation hearing at which the 15 government will bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing 16 evidence that Petitioner is likely to flee or pose a danger to the community if 17 not detained. 18 e The Clerk of Court shall close the case. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: July 1, 2026 73 Sf I Hon. athe Ck 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 || 27 ||' Having reached this conclusion on the grounds that Respondents’ re-detention of 28 Petitioner without notice ora hearing constituted a due process violation, the Court declines to reach the merits of Petitioner’s other claims.