Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JUAN C. CALDERON, Case No.: 26-cv-1368-AJB-DEB CDCR #H-75038, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR Plaintiff, 13 RECONSIDERATION vs. 14 (Doc. No. 12)

15 CDCR DIRECTORS; PRISON 16 EMPLOYESS UNION OR UNIONS, 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff Juan C. Calderon, a state prisoner proceeding pro 21 se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff did not 22 prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing, but instead 23 submitted Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a). 24 (Doc. No. 2.) 25 /// 26 27 1 This case was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and was transferred to this Court where venue is proper on March 3, 2026. (See Doc. 28 1 On May 4, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion after finding he was 2 prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) from proceeding IFP in federal court due to having 3 accumulated “three strikes,” that is, three prior civil cases filed as a prisoner which were 4 dismissed “on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 5 relief can be granted.” (Doc. No. 10 at 3–4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).) The Court noted 6 that an exception applies where “the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical 7 injury,” but found the Complaint contained no such allegations. (Id. at 5–6.) The case was 8 therefore dismissed for failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement. (Id. at 6.) 9 On May 28, 2026,2 Plaintiff filed a letter in which he appears to argue he is entitled 10 to proceed IFP despite having three strikes because he can satisfy the imminent danger 11 exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). (See Doc. No. 12.) The Court will construe Plaintiff’s 12 letter as a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s May 4, 2026 Order. See Bernhardt v. 13 Los Angeles Cnty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to construe pro 14 se pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as complaints.”). 15 A motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment 16 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) where, as here, it is filed within 28 days of 17 entry of the order challenged. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 18 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). A court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it “is 19 presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an 20 intervening change in the controlling law.” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 21 2014). But here, Plaintiff has no such showing. 22 Plaintiff contends reconsideration is required because he satisfies the imminent 23 24 25 2 Notations on the envelope in which the document was received indicate Plaintiff turned the 26 document over to prison staff for mailing on May 28, 2026. (See Doc. No. 12 at 26.) Although the motion was not docketed until June 4, 2026, under the “mailbox rule,” a document is deemed to 27 be “filed” when prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–72 (1988); see also Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 28 1 danger exception to § 1915(g). But as discussed in this Court’s previous order, to do so his 2 pleading must contain a “plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of 3 serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 4 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting § 1915(g)). Imminent danger requires plausible allegations of 5 harm “ready to take place,” or “hanging threateningly over one’s head.” Id. at 1056. The 6 exception “cannot be triggered solely by complaints of past injury or generalized fears of 7 possible future harm.” Hernandez v. Williams, 2021 WL 1317376, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 8 2021). Assertions of imminent danger may be rejected as overly “speculative or fanciful,” 9 or “conclusory or ridiculous.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1057, n.11; see also White v. 10 Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating “vague and utterly conclusory 11 assertions” of imminent danger are insufficient). 12 In his Motion, Calderon references only vague, conclusory and somewhat fanciful 13 allegations of “imminent danger imminent danger of serious physical injury.” For instance, 14 he states he is “under some experiment by ex-President B. Obama and U.S. Senate.” (Doc. 15 No. 12 at 4.) He also states he is “dealing with serious health evil [sic] causation of painful 16 illnesses,” and “some experimental sexual situation.” (Id. at 9.) In addition, he refers to 17 health issues, including “abnormal mood disorders, bad humor or temper, irrational 18 madness. . . intestinal illness…pain in joints, muscles [and] bones.” (Id. at 4.) But these 19 vague allegations are insufficient to plausibly allege Plaintiff faced “imminent danger of 20 serious physical injury” at the time he filed his Complaint. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053, 21 1057 n.11 (stating assertions of imminent danger may be rejected as overly “speculative or 22 fanciful,” or “conclusory or ridiculous”); see also Jones v. Messler, 2023 WL 362503, at 23 *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2023) (finding no imminent danger where prisoner’s allegations 24 “show no more than that he suffers from various chronic health conditions and that he 25 disagrees with the course of treatment for those conditions”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion 26 for Reconsideration is DENIED. 27 /// 28 /// I CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 The Court CONSTRUES Plaintiff's letter (Doc. No. 12) as a Motion for 3 || Reconsideration of the Court’s May 4, 2026 Order Denying IFP and Dismissing the action 4 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion 5 the case remains dismissed. The Clerk of Court shall close the file. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: July 1, 2026 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4