Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 VINCENT RODRIGUEZ, et al., Case No.: 3:25-cv-01445-GPC-AHG 12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION 13 v. TO EXTEND DISCOVERY DEADLINES 14 FCA US, LLC, et al., 15 Defendants. [ECF No. 27] 16 17 Before the Court is the parties’ joint motion to modify the scheduling order. ECF 18 No. 27. The parties seek approximate 70-day to 100-day continuances of fact and expert 19 discovery deadlines, which impact the remaining case management deadlines. Id. at 4. 20 Parties seeking to continue deadlines in the scheduling order must demonstrate good 21 cause. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with 22 the judge’s consent”); see also ECF No. 15 at 7 (Scheduling Order, stating that “[t]he dates 23 [] set forth herein will not be modified except for good cause shown”); Chmb.R. at 2 24 (stating that any request for continuance requires “[a] showing of good cause for the 25 request”). 26 Courts have broad discretion in determining whether there is good cause. See, e.g., 27 Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992); Ellis v. Arias, 28 3:24-cv-00713-TWR-AHG, 2025 WL 3553673, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025). “Good 1 cause” is a non-rigorous standard that has been construed broadly across procedural and 2 statutory contexts. Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2010). 3 The good cause standard focuses on the diligence of the party seeking to amend the 4 scheduling order and the reasons for seeking modification. ECF No. 15 at 7; Johnson, 975 5 F.2d at 609 (“[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking 6 modification. … If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.”). Therefore, “a 7 party demonstrates good cause by acting diligently to meet the original deadlines set forth 8 by the court.” Doe v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 3:24-cv-217-JLS-AHG, 2025 9 WL 2881574, at *1–*2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) (quoting Merck v. Swift Transp. Co., No. 10 16-cv-1103-PHX-ROS, 2018 WL 4492362, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2018)). 11 The parties represent to the Court that in the past three months since their first request 12 for extension on March 6, 2026, (see ECF No. 18), they have not completed any further 13 discovery, despite the Court setting firm deadlines for doing so. Compare ECF No. 27 with 14 ECF No. 19 (setting April 20, 2026, deadline for certain depositions; setting May 18, 2026, 15 deadline for vehicle inspection; and extending certain expert deadlines). For example, 16 Plaintiffs did not appear for their noticed depositions on April 30, 2026.1 ECF No. 27 at 3. 17 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ counsel never confirmed the April 30, 2026, date for the deposition 18 of Defendants’ Rule 30(b)(6) witness, so it was rescheduled to May 20, 2026, but was not 19 ultimately taken. Id. Further, the vehicle inspection scheduled for May 26, 2026,2 was never 20 completed due to objections served by Plaintiffs’ counsel days before the agreed-to date. 21 Id. The parties refer to conclusory “staffing changes” as reasons for some, but not all, of 22 these delays and failings. Id. As such, the parties seek an approximate 100-day extension 23 of the deposition deadline (from April 20, 2026, to July 27, 2026), an approximate 70-day 24 25 1 The parties do not address why the April 30, 2026, deposition date is 10 days after the 26 Court-ordered deadline of April 20, 2026. 27 2 The parties do not address why the May 26, 2026, vehicle inspection date is 8 days after 28 1 extension of the vehicle inspection deadline (from May 18, 2026, to July 27, 2026) and 2 expert deadlines (from June 8, 2026, to August 17, 2026), and commensurate extensions 3 of all other deadlines set forth in the scheduling order. Id. at 4. 4 The joint motion is deficient for numerous reasons. First, by filing the motion on 5 June 24, 2026—over two months after the April 20, 2026, deadline for the depositions of 6 Plaintiffs and Defendants’ Rule 30(b)(6) witness; over one month after the May 18, 2026, 7 deadline for the vehicle inspection; and over two weeks after the June 8, 2026, deadline for 8 initial expert designations and disclosures—the parties failed to follow the Court’s 9 Chambers Rules. See Chmb.R. at 2 (requiring that “[a]ll requests for continuances must be 10 made by a joint motion no less than seven calendar days before the affected date”) 11 (emphasis added). The parties do not address, or acknowledge, their substantial delay. 12 Second, the motion lacks the requisite specificity. Though the Court appreciates that 13 Defendants’ counsel included a declaration to comply with the undersigned’s Chambers 14 Rules,3 it should have been Plaintiffs’ counsel who filed the declaration, as Plaintiffs’ 15 counsel would be in a better position to fully explain the staffing changes and numerous 16 other shortcomings. Simply repeating “staffing changes” four times in the motion and 17 declaration does not provide any context or show good cause. See Chmb.R. at 2 (requiring 18 that the joint motion for continuance include a “declaration from counsel seeking the 19 continuance that describes the steps taken to comply with the existing deadlines, and the 20 specific reasons why the deadlines cannot be met”) (emphasis added). The Court also 21 notes that, for a second time, no reason was given why Plaintiffs failed to appear for their 22 depositions. ECF No. 27 at 3; ECF No. 19 at 3 (order on first extension request, expressing 23 concern that “the parties do not proffer any reason for the delay in taking the Plaintiffs’ 24 depositions”) (emphasis in original). Without explanation, and therefore without a showing 25 26 3 The Court, however, expresses concern that the declaration is identical to the instant 27 motion for a second time. ECF No. 19 at 3 (“The Court also notes that the parties failed to provide an adequate declaration from counsel, as required by the Court’s Chambers 28 | counsel acted diligently to meet the original deadlines, the Court cannot find good 2 || cause. 3 Third, the Court’s Order regarding the parties’ first motion for extension expressed 4 || concerns regarding the parties’ conduct, in completing discovery and filing the motion. See 5 || ECF No. 19. However, despite the Court’s detailed Order, the parties made no attempt to 6 ||bolster the instant, second, motion. See, e.g., id. at 2 (in first motion, parties did not 7 “address, or acknowledge, their substantial delay” in filing the motion); id. at 3 (in first 8 motion, declaration identical to motion submitted, without specifics included); id. at 3 (in 9 || first motion, inadequate explanation of counsel’s actions over past months, noting that 10 || motion “does not provide any of the information needed for the Court to determine whether 11 parties were actively attempting to comply with the Court’s deadlines’’); id. (in first 12 || motion, no reason given for five-month delay in taking Plaintiffs’ depositions). The parties’ 13 ||repeated shortcomings belie a finding of diligence. 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court does not find good cause here. As such, 15 || the Joint Motion is DENIED. ECF No. 27. The denial, however, is without prejudice, as 16 || the Court will provide another opportunity for the parties to demonstrate diligence by filing 17 |}a Noticed Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order. Such a motion must be filed no later 18 || than July 2, 2026. Before filing, counsel must obtain a hearing date from chambers to affix 19 the motion. CivLR 7.1(b), (e)(1). To obtain the hearing date, counsel must email 20 □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ no later than 11:30 a.m. on the date they seek to file the 21 motion. Court staff will respond to counsel’s email within three hours with the hearing date 22 ||and time. Counsel are advised that telephone calls to chambers seeking a hearing date 23 || will not be accepted. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. *> ||Dated: June 26, 2026 Honorable Allison H. Goddard 27 United States Magistrate Judge 28