Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARLOU H., Case No.: 3:24-cv-02118-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of PETITION FOR ATTORNEY FEES Social Security, 15 AS MOOT; and 16 Defendant. (2) GRANTING JOINT MOTION 17 FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL 18 ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (28 19 U.S.C. § 2412(d))

20 [ECF Nos. 29, 31] 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Before the Court is (1) Plaintiff’s Petition for Attorney Fees, Costs, and Expenses 2 Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Petition”); and (2) the parties’ 3 Joint Motion for the Award and Payment of Attorney Fees and Expenses Pursuant to the 4 Equal Access to Justice Act (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)) (the “Joint Motion”). ECF Nos. 29, 31. 5 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Petition as moot 6 and GRANTS the parties’ Joint Motion. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 The underlying action involves Plaintiff’s appeal of the Social Security 9 Administration’s denial of her application for disability benefits at the agency level. ECF 10 No. 1. On July 14, 2025, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for Judicial Review. ECF 11 No. 24. On February 18, 2026, the Court issued an Order resolving the Joint Motion for 12 Judicial Review, reversing the Commissioner’s denial of benefits to Plaintiff, and 13 remanding the action for the calculation and award of benefits. ECF No. 26. 14 On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed her Ex Parte Petition for attorney fees. ECF No. 29. 15 In Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Petition, she sought an attorney fee award in the amount of $6,328.58 16 under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (“EAJA”), and stated that 17 counsel for the parties had yet to engage in good-faith settlement negotiations on the matter 18 of the appropriate EAJA fee award. Id. at 3. On June 2, 2026, the parties then filed their 19 Joint Motion, in which they state that they stipulated to a reduced EAJA fee award amount 20 of $6,000.00. ECF No. 31 at 1. In light of the parties’ stipulation to a reduced EAJA fee 21 award, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Petition as moot and consider only the relief 22 requested in the parties’ Joint Motion. 23 In support of the initial ex parte petition, Plaintiff’s counsel Monica Perales 24 submitted a time sheet showing that she completed 2.70 hours of work on this case at 25 $251.84 per hour and 19.05 hours of work on this case at $258.46 per hour. ECF No. 31- 26 1. Additionally, paralegals completed 4.05 hours of work on this case at a rate of $179.00 27 per hour. Id. Consequently, the total billed fee amount for Plaintiff’s counsel and the 28 1 paralegals was $6,328.58, but, as noted, the total fee request has been reduced to $6,000.00 2 in the parties’ Joint Motion. See ECF No. 31-1 at 2; ECF No. 31 at 1. 3 II. THRESHOLD ISSUE OF TIMELINESS 4 According to the EAJA, an application for fees must be filed “within thirty days of 5 final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). A final judgment is “a judgment that is final 6 and not appealable . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). The Ninth Circuit has held that the 7 EAJA’s 30-day filing period does not begin to run until after the 60-day appeal period in 8 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).1 Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 612 9 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 Here, judgment was entered on February 19, 2026, and Plaintiff filed the motion for 11 EAJA fees on May 20, 2026. ECF Nos. 28, 29. The motion was filed within thirty days 12 after expiration of the sixty-day appeal period and therefore falls within the EAJA filing 13 period. Accordingly, Plaintiff met the deadline to file a timely motion for EAJA fees. As 14 discussed, after Plaintiff filed the Ex Parte Petition, the parties reached an agreement on a 15 reduced stipulated amount. ECF No. 31. Therefore, the Court considers the EAJA fee 16 motion timely, but will analyze the motion with the reduced stipulated amount in mind. 17 III. DISCUSSION 18 Under the EAJA, a litigant is entitled to attorney fees and costs if: “(1) he is the 19 prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was substantially 20 justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested fees and 21 costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005). The Court 22 will address these elements in turn. 23 24 25 26 1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a “notice of appeal may be filed 27 by any party within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” if one of the parties is the United States or a United States officer sued in an official capacity. Fed. 28 1 A. Prevailing party 2 A plaintiff is a prevailing party if she “has ‘succeeded on any significant issue in 3 litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit . . . sought in bringing suit.’” Ulugalu v. 4 Berryhill, No. 17cv1087-GPC-JLB, 2018 WL 2012330, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) 5 (quoting Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Plaintiff is the prevailing party 6 because she successfully obtained a reversal of the Commissioner’s decision and a remand 7 of her case for the calculation and award of benefits. ECF No. 26; see Shalala, 509 U.S. at 8 300–01. 9 B. Substantial justification 10 The government bears the burden of proving that its position, both in the underlying 11 administrative proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was substantially justified. 12 Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, the parties have stipulated to the 13 EAJA amount, and explain that the stipulation “constitutes a compromise settlement of 14 Harris’s request for EAJA attorney fees[.]” ECF No. 31 at 3. Although Defendant’s 15 stipulation does not constitute an admission of liability on its part, the compromise nature 16 of the request is sufficient to find the second element met, given that “Defendant has 17 stipulated to the attorney[] fees and does not argue that the prevailing party’s position was 18 substantially unjustified.” ECF No. 31 at 3; Krebs v. Berryhill, 16cv3096-JLS-BGS, 2018 19 WL 3064346, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 21, 2018); see also Black v. Berryhill, No. 18cv1673- 20 JM-LL, 2019 WL 2436393, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2019) (finding the second element 21 met because, “in light of the joint nature of the parties’ request and the court’s prior order 22 remanding this action, the government has not shown that its position was substantially 23 justified.”). 24 C. Reasonableness of Hours 25 The parties seek a fee award for 25.80 hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel and 26 paralegals. ECF No. 31-1. The Court finds the number of hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel 27 to be reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The total number of hours billed is within the 28 typical range seen in social security appeals. See, e.g., Costa v. Comm’r of SSA, 690 F.3d 1 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “[m]any district courts have noted that twenty to 2 forty hours is the range most often requested and granted in social security cases”); Stearns 3 v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-05611 JRC, 2016 WL 730301, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2016) 4 (collecting cases to establish that the typical number of hours reported for counsel in a 5 social security case ranged from 18-40 hours). Therefore, the Court will not question 6 counsel’s judgment that the hours expended were necessary to achieve the favorable result 7 for the client in this case. See Costa, 690 F.3d at 1136 (reiterating the Ninth Circuit’s 8 previous position that “courts should generally defer to the ‘winning lawyer’s professional 9 judgment as to how much time [she] was required to spend on the case.’”) (quoting Moreno 10 v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2008)). 11 D. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate 12 The EAJA provides that the Court may award reasonable attorney fees “based upon 13 prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,” but “attorney 14 fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an 15 increase in the cost of living or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 16 2412(d)(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit has established that “the EAJA provides for an upward 17 adjustment of the $125 rate contained in the statute, based on cost-of-living increases[.]” 18 Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit 19 has set its own statutory maximum EAJA rates, factoring in annual increases in the cost of 20 living. The statutory maximum EAJA rate for attorney work performed in 2024 in the Ninth 21 Circuit was $251.84, and the statutory maximum EAJA rate for work performed in 2025 22 was $258.46. See United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates 23 Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory- 24 maximum-rates/ (last visited June 9, 2026); see also Black, 2019 WL 2436393, at *1 25 (considering the Ninth Circuit’s hourly EAJA rate a reasonable rate). Consistent with the 26 Ninth Circuit’s hourly EAJA rates, Plaintiff’s counsel billed at a rate of $251.84 per hour 27 for work performed in 2024 and $258.46 per hour for work performed in 2025. ECF No. 28 31-1 at 2. Additionally, paralegal time was billed at a rate of $179.00 per hour. Id. at 1. As 1 such, the Court finds that the hourly rates billed by counsel and the paralegals are 2 reasonable. 3 E. Assignment of Rights to Counsel 4 The parties jointly request that fees be made payable to Plaintiff, but that if the 5 Department of the Treasury determines Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, payment may 6 be made directly to Plaintiff’s attorney pursuant to Plaintiff’s assignment. ECF No. 31 at 7 2; see also ECF No. 31-2 ¶ 4 (Representation Agreement signed by Plaintiff stating in 8 pertinent part, “Attorney shall seek compensation under the Equal Access to Justice Act 9 and such amount shall credit to the client for fees otherwise payable for that particular 10 work. Client shall endorse such documents as are needed to pay Attorney any amounts 11 under the EAJA and assigns such fee awards to Attorney”). 12 The Supreme Court has held that “a § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigant 13 and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant 14 owes the United States.” Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 588–89 (2010). Nonetheless, 15 “district courts have recognized that Ratliff does not prevent payment of a fee award 16 directly to the attorney where there has been a valid assignment and the plaintiff does not 17 owe a debt to the government.” Ulugalu, 2018 WL 2012330, at *4–*5 (reviewing 18 Plaintiff’s assignment agreement and ordering that the EAJA fees be paid to plaintiff’s 19 counsel, subject to any administrative offset due to outstanding federal debt); Bell v. 20 Berryhill, No. 16cv809-MMC, 2018 WL 452110, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (same); 21 Blackwell v. Astrue, No. CIV-08-1454-EFB, 2011 WL 1077765, at *4–*5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22 21, 2011) (same); see also Calderon v. Astrue, No. 08cv1015-GSA, 2010 WL 4295583, at 23 *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010) (“Plaintiff, as the prevailing litigant, would normally be 24 awarded the fees described above, subject to any offset for applicable government debts. 25 Defendant, however, seems to be content to permit payment to Plaintiff’s counsel if 26 Plaintiff does not have any qualifying government debt . . . This Court finds the 27 government’s position to be reasonable and will therefore permit payment to Plaintiff’s 28 counsel provided Plaintiff has no government debt that requires offset”); cf. Hernandez v. 1 || Berryhill, No. 15cv1322-DB, 2017 WL 2930802, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2017) (declining 2 ||to order that the EAJA fees be paid to plaintiff's counsel, subject to any administrative 3 || offset due to outstanding federal debt, because the parties failed to produce evidence of an 4 || assignment agreement). 5 Here, Plaintiff assigned her right to EAJA fees to her attorney. ECF No. 31-2. 6 || Accordingly, if Plaintiff has no federal debt that is subject to offset, the award of fees may 7 || be paid directly to Monica Perales pursuant to Plaintiff's assignment. 8 ||IV. CONCLUSION 9 Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 10 1. Plaintiffs ex parte petition (ECF No. 29) is DENIED as moot; 11 2. The parties’ Joint Motion for the Award and Payment of Attorney Fees and 12 Expenses Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (ECF No. 31) is 13 GRANTED; 14 3. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees under the EAJA in the amount of $6,000.00; 15 and 16 4. Pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 588-89 (2010), any payment shall 17 be made payable to Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff's counsel, unless 18 Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt. If the United States Department of the 19 Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, the government 20 shall accept Plaintiffs assignment of EAJA fees and pay fees directly to 21 Monica Perales. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: June 26, 2026 24 25 _ AnwioenH. Honorable Allison H. Goddard 26 United States Magistrate Judge 27 28