Saikou Yaya Diallo v. Jeremy Casey, Warden
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Robert Steven Huie (author)
Analysis
Petitioner Saikou Yaya Diallo moved to enforce a prior order directing a bond hearing, arguing the immigration judge misapplied the burden of proof, while simultaneously moving for appointment of counsel. The court denied both motions, holding that the petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies by appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) before seeking federal habeas review of the bond denial, and that exceptional circumstances for appointed counsel were not shown.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Enforce Denied“For the foregoing reasons, the motion to enforce [ECF No. 9] is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the Ninth Circuit's prudential exhaustion doctrine, which requires habeas petitioners to exhaust available administrative remedies (specifically, appealing to the BIA) before seeking federal review of an immigration judge's bond denial. The court properly distinguished its jurisdiction to enforce the *procedural* aspect of its prior order (holding the hearing) from its jurisdiction to review the *merits* of the immigration judge's decision. By declining to review the merits while the BIA appeal is pending, the court adhered to the precedent set in *Leonardo v. Crawford* and *Hernandez v. Sessions*. |
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Denied“The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 8], as Petitioner has not shown “exceptional circumstances” warranting such an appointment here.” | agree with court The court applied the standard from *Palmer v. Valdez*, which requires a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' for the appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. The order states that the petitioner failed to meet this burden. While the order is brief on the specific facts supporting this conclusion, the legal standard cited is correct for the Ninth Circuit. |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly identifies the procedural posture: the district court's prior order mandated a hearing, which occurred. The current motion seeks to overturn the *result* of that hearing. Under Ninth Circuit precedent (*Leonardo*), the proper avenue to challenge the immigration judge's bond decision is an appeal to the BIA, not a motion to enforce the district court's order in federal court. The court correctly distinguishes between enforcing the procedural mandate (which was complied with) and reviewing the merits of the agency's decision (which is subject to exhaustion). The denial of counsel is also supported by the cited standard.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAIKOU YAYA DIALLO, Case No.: 26-cv-2167-RSH-BLM 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. ENFORCE 14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden, [ECF Nos. 8, 9] 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 On April 6, 2026, petitioner Saikou Yaya Diallo filed a petition for writ of habeas 19 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner alleged that his 20 detention without a bond hearing pending removal proceedings had become unduly 21 prolonged. Id. at 2, 4. Respondents filed a return stating that they did not oppose a bond 22 hearing. ECF No. 4 at 1. On April 16, 2026, the Court granted the Petition and directed the 23 government to arrange a bond hearing within seven days at which the government bears 24 the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk. 25 ECF No. 6 at 1. 26 On April 23, 2026, Petitioner timely received a bond hearing before an immigration 27 judge, at which the immigration judge denied bond based on risk of flight. See ECF No. 9- 28 2 (order of immigration judge). 1 Thereafter, on May 26, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to enforce the Court’s order 2 directing a bond hearing. ECF No. 9. Respondents have opposed. ECF No. 11. 3 Petitioner’s motion argues in conclusory terms that the immigration judge did not 4 correctly apply the burden of proof. ECF No. 9 at 1, 3. Petitioner states that he has no 5 criminal record and no prior immigration violations, and contends that he has a U.S. citizen 6 sponsor available. Id. at 2. He also states that he was given insufficient time to prepare for 7 his bond hearing, id., although the immigration judge’s order indicates that “[t]he Court 8 trailed this case to the final date authorized by the Order for [Petitioner] to notify his alleged 9 lawyer and alleged sponsor to provide some evidence, yet the Respondent provided 10 nothing.” ECF No. 9-2 at 2. Petitioner’s motion also states that an immigration judge “must 11 consider alternatives to detention and petitioner’s financial circumstance and that challenge 12 is properly directed to the Board of Immigration [] Appeals.” ECF No. 9 at 1. Petitioner 13 further states that he has exhausted administrative remedies in that he has appealed his 14 denial of bond to the BIA, which appeal is pending. Id. 15 The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 16 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro- 17 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 18 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require prudential 19 exhaustion when: 20 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate 21 a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 22 administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow 23 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. 24 25 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 26 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative 27 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 28 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 1 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “a 2 court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are 3 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, 4 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’” 5 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 6 2004)). 7 The Ninth Circuit has applied the exhaustion doctrine to circumstances similar to 8 those presented here—where a noncitizen seeks review, through a habeas proceeding, of 9 an immigration judge’s denial of bond. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the 10 petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s adverse bond determination before appealing 11 to the BIA. This short cut was improper. Leonardo should have exhausted administrative 12 remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s 13 decision.”). Irrespective of the prudential exhaustion doctrine, however, the Court retains 14 jurisdiction to determine whether a party has complied with its earlier habeas order. Id. at 15 1161 (“[T]he district court had authority to review compliance with its earlier order 16 conditionally granting habeas relief.”). 17 Although Petitioner’s motion argues in general terms that the immigration judge 18 misapplied the burden of proof in contravention of this Court’s order, his claims appear to 19 be routine claims of error that are properly reviewed in Petitioner’s pending appeal to the 20 BIA, the administrative tribunal established to review such claims and possessing expertise 21 in such review. The Court declines to act as a parallel appellate administrative tribunal in 22 addressing the merits of the claimed errors here, where doing so would effectively 23 encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative review process, designed to allow the 24 agency to correct its own errors. Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Leonardo, 25 the Court requires exhaustion of these issues, determines that the prudential exhaustion 26 requirement applies here, and declines to waive that requirement. 27 // 28 // 1 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to enforce [ECF No. 9] is DENIED. The Court 2 DENIES Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 8], as Petitioner has 3 ||not shown “exceptional circumstances” warranting such an appointment here. See Palmer 4 || v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 25, 2026 Kehut ¢ Lowe United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28