Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CALIFORNIA SMARTSCAPE, LLC, Case No.: 26-cv-02960-H-DEB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND 14 EVO ENTERPRISES INC.; [Doc. No. 5.] EVOSCAPES; JESSE YORK; MICHAEL 15 MULDER; ELISEO FLORES MACIAS; 16 and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18 19 On May 15, 2026, Plaintiff California Smartscape, LLC filed a motion to remand 20 the action back to state court. (Doc. No. 5.) On May 18, 2026, the Court took Plaintiff’s 21 motion to remand under submission. (Doc. No. 8.) On June 1, 2026, Defendants Evo 22 Enterprises Inc., Evoscapes, Jesse York, Michael Mulder, Eliseo Flores Macias filed a 23 response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. No. 11.) On June 7, 2026, 24 Plaintiff filed a reply. (Doc. No. 12.) For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s 25 motion to remand. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Background 2 The following factual background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s 3 complaint. Plaintiff Smartscape is a San Diego County business that markets, sells, 4 designs, constructs, and manages luxury landscaping projects. (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 14.) 5 Plaintiff relies heavily on advertising and has invested in professional photography of 6 completed jobs as a key driver for traffic to its website and various marketing websites. 7 (Id.) Plaintiff’s images are primarily professional landscape photos taken by the owner of 8 Linear Photography, who transferred ownership and copyright of the images to Plaintiff. 9 (Id. ¶ 20.) 10 Defendant Jesse York is a landscape designer, and he entered into an Independent 11 Contractor Agreement with Plaintiff’s Owner, Best Contracting LLC, on July 7, 2021. (Id. 12 ¶ 23.) In the agreement, York agreed to a confidentiality and non-disclosure clause related 13 to a variety of trade secrets and other information and records owned by the company. (Id. 14 ¶ 24.) In the agreement, York also agreed that Plaintiff would retain ownership in all 15 company and client data and maintain confidentiality of all trade secrets, research data, and 16 company information. (Id. ¶ 25.) 17 Plaintiff alleges that, until April or May 2024, York had broad access to Plaintiff’s 18 images, designs, client lists, client personal identifying information, detailed job data, 19 client reviews, Google Workspaces, Dropbox files, and other tangible and intangible 20 properties. (Id. ¶ 28.) York stopped working for Plaintiff around March 7, 2024. (Id. ¶ 21 30.) 22 Plaintiff alleges that five months prior to the end of his relationship with Plaintiff, 23 York and his co-defendants were actively developing a competing landscape design and 24 build business called Evoscapes. (Id. ¶ 31.) On January 1, 2024, articles of incorporation 25 for Evoscapes were filed with the California Secretary of State. (Id. ¶ 32.) 26 Plaintiff alleges that, sometime around January 15, 2025, Plaintiff was altered by an 27 employee that Evoscapes was posting Plaintiff’s images on its website 28 (https://evoscapes.com), which were featured as “Evoscapes ‘Signature Projects.’” (Id. ¶ 1 42.) Plaintiff alleges that further investigation revealed that hundreds of misappropriated 2 Smartscape images had been used on the website to falsely advertise the work as having 3 been performed by Evoscapes. (Id.) 4 In late February 2025, Plaintiff’s owner contacted York and verbally advised him 5 that he had no authorization to use Plaintiff’s images. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff allege that, 6 despite this, Defendants continue to use hundred of Smartscape images branded as 7 Evoscapes “Signature Projects” and “Featured Projects” and fixed with hovering text 8 stating “Remodeled by Evoscapes” in a variety of online advertising. (Id. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff 9 alleges that Defendants misappropriated the images and their use of the images violates 10 Plaintiff’s copyright in the materials. (Id. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have also 11 published misappropriated client data in Evoscpapes’s online advertising, including project 12 details such as location, budget, year of completion, and zip code. (Id. ¶ 50.) Plaintiff 13 alleges that after the launch of Evoscapes’s website and Evoscapes’s aggressive online 14 advertising using Smartscape images, Plaintiff’s online advertising referrals dropped by 15 nearly 60% in 2025. (Id. ¶ 22.) 16 On April 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint against Defendants in the 17 Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, alleging claims for: (1) breach of 18 contract; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) inducing breach of contract; (4) unauthorized 19 computer use; (5) conversion; (6) receipt of stolen property; (7) intentional 20 misrepresentation/fraud; (8) false advertising; (9) unfair business practices; (10) 21 interference with prospective economic advantage; and (11) violation of the uniform trade 22 secrets act. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶¶ 57–174.) On May 11, 2026, Defendants removed 23 the action from state court to the United States District Court for the Southern District of 24 California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under 25 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Doc. No. 1, 26 Notice of Removal.) By the present motion, Plaintiff moves to remand the action back to 27 state court on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 5.) 28 / / / 1 Discussion 2 I. Legal Standards 3 “A defendant generally may remove a civil action if a federal district court would 4 have original jurisdiction over the action.” Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 628 (9th 5 Cir. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 6 (1987). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, cannot exercise 7 jurisdiction without constitutional and statutory authorization.” Hansen v. Grp. Health 8 Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018). There is a strong presumption against removal 9 jurisdiction, and courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. 10 See Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 11 (9th Cir. 2010). “The removing defendant bears the burden of overcoming the ‘strong 12 presumption against removal jurisdiction.’” Hansen, 902 F.3d at 1057; see also Scott v. 13 Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The party seeking to invoke the court’s 14 jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.”). 15 Here, Defendants removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal question 16 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal ¶ 4.) “Removal 17 based on federal-question jurisdiction is reviewed under the longstanding well-pleaded 18 complaint rule.” Hansen, 902 F.3d at 1057. “This rule provides that an action ‘aris[es] 19 under’ federal law ‘only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s 20 properly pleaded complaint.’” Id. (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392). 21 An independent corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the “‘complete 22 preemption doctrine.’” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 23 768 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393). The complete 24 preemption doctrine “posits that there are some federal statutes that have such 25 ‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that they ‘convert[] an ordinary state common law 26 complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint 27 rule.’” Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). “Once an area 28 of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre- 1 empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises 2 under federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. “Accordingly, ‘[w]hen a plaintiff raises 3 such a completely preempted state-law claim in his complaint, a court is obligated to 4 construe the complaint as raising a federal claim and therefore “arising under” federal 5 law.’” Retail Prop., 768 F.3d at 947. 6 II. Federal Question Jurisdiction 7 Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action 8 because Plaintiff’s complaint alleges only eleven California state law causes of action and 9 does not plead any claims under the federal Copyright Act. (Doc. No. 5 at 7–8.) In 10 response, Defendants contend that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over at least 11 some of Plaintiff’s claims, including Plaintiff’s claim for conversion, because some of 12 Plaintiff’s claims are completely preempted by the Copyright Act. (Doc. No. 11 at 8–16.) 13 Although the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, the Second Circuit, 14 Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and district courts within the Ninth Circuit have 15 all held that the complete preemption doctrine applies to the Copyright Act. See Levy 16 Prod. Grp., LLC v. R&R Partners, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 3d 901, 907 (D. Nev. 2023) (collecting 17 cases); OEG Inc. v. Korum, No. 3:24-CV-05694-TMC, 2025 WL 353927, at *5 (W.D. 18 Wash. Jan. 31, 2025) (collecting cases). “The Copyright Act grants copyright holders an 19 exclusive right to use or authorize the use of their work in five qualified ways.” See 20 Talavera v. Glob. Payments, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (citing 17 21 U.S.C. § 106). These rights include: (1) the right to reproduce the copyrighted work; (2) 22 the right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) the right to 23 distribute copies of the copyrighted work; and, with respect to certain artistic works, (4) 24 the right to perform the work publicly; and (5) the right to display the copyrighted work 25 publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 26 “‘Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,’ that is, 27 anyone who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the 28 copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, ‘is an infringer of the 1 copyright.’” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) 2 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)). Thus, to establish copyright infringement, “two elements must 3 be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of 4 the work that are original.” Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 5 (1991). 6 For there to be complete preemption of a state law claim under the Copyright Act, 7 the state-law claim must meet two requirements. Laws v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 448 F.3d 8 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006); OEG, 2025 WL 353927, at *7; Mattel, Inc. v. Bryant, 441 F. 9 Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2005). First, the subject matter of the state law claim must 10 fall within the subject matter of copyright. Id. Second, the rights granted under the state 11 law must be equivalent to one of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. 12 Id. “‘To survive preemption, the state law claim must include an “extra element” that 13 makes the right asserted qualitatively different from those protected under the Copyright 14 Act.’” OEG, 2025 WL 353927, at *7. 15 The first part of the above two-part test is satisfied here. Plaintiff’s conversion claim 16 is based in part on Defendants’ alleged misappropriation and use of certain professional 17 landscape photography images. (See Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 42–49, 97–99.) Plaintiff 18 alleges that it is the owner and copyright holder of these images. (See id. ¶ 20.) See also 19 Monge v. Maya Mags., Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1177 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Photos are generally 20 viewed as creative, aesthetic expressions of a scene or image and have long been the subject 21 of copyright.”). As such, these images fall within the subject matter of copyright. 22 The Court then turns to part two of the complete preemption test. The Ninth Circuit 23 has explained: 24 To satisfy the “equivalent rights” part of the preemption test . . . the . . . alleged misappropriation . . . must be equivalent to rights within the general scope of 25 copyright as specified by section 106 of the Copyright Act. Section 106 26 provides a copyright owner with the exclusive rights of reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, and display. To survive 27 preemption, the state cause of action must protect rights which are 28 1 qualitatively different from the copyright rights. The state claim must have an extra element which changes the nature of the action. 2 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, 820 F.2d 973, 3 977 (9th Cir. 1987)). 4 Here, Plaintiff’s conversion claim is based, in part, on Defendants’ alleged 5 misappropriation of Plaintiff’s copyrighted digital images, and Defendants’ alleged use of 6 those images in publishing the images on Evoscapes’s website. (See Doc. No. 1, Compl. 7 ¶¶ 42–49, 97–99.) To the extent Plaintiff’s conversion claim is based on these allegations, 8 the conversion claim is asserting rights equivalent to those afforded by the Copyright act 9 with no extra elements. A claim that a defendant has misappropriated and improperly used 10 the plaintiff’s copyrighted images is a claim for copyright infringement. See Feist, 499 11 U.S. at 361; Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144; Del Madera, 820 F.2d at 977 (“Del Madera’s 12 ownership of this material, and the alleged misappropriation by the defendants, are part 13 and parcel of the copyright claim.”). Indeed, in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that 14 Defendants have “violat[ed] Plaintiff’s copyright in the materials.” (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 15 56.) 16 The district court decision in Levy Production Grp., LLC v. R&R Partners, Inc., 658 17 F. Supp. 3d 901, 910 (D. Nev. 2023), is instructive here. In Levy, the district court 18 explained that there is a distinction between state law conversion claims that are based on 19 the alleged misappropriation of intangible property (such as electronic data) and claims 20 based on the misappropriation of tangible property. See id. at 901–11. When a conversion 21 claim is brought based on the alleged misappropriation and use of intangible, electronic 22 data within the subject matter of copyright (as it is here), the Copyright Act completely 23 preempts the claim. See id.; Bokenfohr v. Gladen, 828 F. App’x 485, 486 (9th Cir. 2020); 24 Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586, 598 (5th Cir. 2015) (“SMI’s 25 conversion claim, to the extent it alleges conversion of intangible ‘confidential 26 information’ and ‘certain trade secrets,’ is preempted.”). 27 28 1 Plaintiff argues that its conversion claim is distinguishable from the conversion 2 claim at issue in Levy. (Doc. No. 12 at 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the 3 gravamen of its conversion claim is not merely that Defendants copied a creative work; it 4 is that Defendants wrongfully retained and exploited Smartscape’s business property and 5 project and client information in a competing business after authorization had expired. (Id.) 6 Even assuming Plaintiff’s conversion claim encompasses more than the alleged 7 misappropriation and use of copyrighted images and data, that does not change the fact 8 that, as conceded by Plaintiff in making this argument, the conversion claim is in part based 9 on the alleged copying of copyrighted creative works. As such, the conversion claim is 10 completely preempted – at least in part – by the Copyright Act.1 11 In sum, Plaintiff’s conversion claim is completely preempted in part by the federal 12 Copyright Act. Further, because the conversion claim is completely preempted in part by 13 the Copyright Act, the Court has federal question jurisdiction over the claim.2 See Retail 14 Prop., 768 F.3d at 947. 15 III. Supplemental Jurisdiction 16 Defendants contend that because the Court has federal questions jurisdiction over at 17 least some of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court then has supplemental jurisdiction over the 18 remaining claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (Doc. No. 11 at 16.) Defendants are correct. 19 20 21 1 For complete preemption to apply, the claim need not be entirely preempted by the 22 Copyright Act. A claim can be only partially preempted by the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Spear Mktg., 791 F.3d at 598 (finding conversion claim preempted to the extent it is based 23 on conversion of intangible confidential information and certain trade secrets, but not 24 preempted to the extent it is based on the conversion of physical property). 25 2 Defendants also contend that the Copyright Act completely preempts Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair business practices. (Doc. 26 No. 11 at 13–16.) Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s conversion claim is 27 completely preempted in part by the Copyright Act conferring the Court with federal questions jurisdiction over the claim, the Court declines to address whether these additional 28 1 Under the supplemental jurisdiction statute: “in any civil action of which the district 2 courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction 3 over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original 4 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 5 “A state law claim is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a ‘common 6 nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal claims and the state and federal claims would 7 normally be tried together.” Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). 8 “In analyzing whether such a relationship exists between federal and state claims, courts 9 should examine ‘whether the claims arise from the same facts, or involve similar 10 occurrences, witnesses or evidence.’” Landy v. Pettigrew Crewing, Inc., No. 11 219CV07474RGKAFM, 2019 WL 6245525, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (quoting 12 Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 455 (11th Cir. 1996)); accord Carne v. 13 Stanislaus Cnty. Animal Servs. Agency, 445 F. Supp. 3d 772, 775 (E.D. Cal. 2020). 14 Here, all of Plaintiff’s claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts. All 15 of the claims arise from Defendant York’s prior contractual relationship with Plaintiff’s 16 owner, his alleged access to certain images and records, and his alleged misappropriation 17 and use of those images and records on Evoscapes’s website. (See generally Doc. No. 1, 18 Compl. ¶¶ 14–56.) Thus, all the claims arise from common facts and involve similar and 19 overlapping occurrences and evidence. As such, because all of the claims arise from a 20 common nucleus of operative fact, and the Court has federal question jurisdiction over 21 Plaintiff’s completely preempted conversion claim, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction 22 over the remaining state law claims under § 1367(a). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 27 28 1 Conclusion 2 In sum, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all the claims in this action. 3 such, Defendants’ removal of this action to federal court was proper, and the Court 4 ||denies Plaintiff's motion to remand. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || DATED: June 24, 2026 | | | jul | | | MARILYN ®. HUFF, Distri ge 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28