gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-03536 · 2026-06-23 · Unknown

Alberto Alonso Vallejo v. Christopher J. Larose, et al.

Proceeding
original
Outcome
other — Petitioner claims that he is entitled to relea
Area
civil
Panel
Jill A. Otake (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:28Z · confidence low

The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a detained non-citizen seeking release and a bond hearing. The court granted the petition in part, ordering an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within fourteen days, while denying the request for immediate release from custody.

What the court decidedThe model
Grant in part of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
“Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within fourteen (14) days.”
agree with court
The court relied on the respondents' non-opposition to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the petitioner's membership in a certified class from a related case (Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz) to order the hearing. The decision to order a hearing rather than immediate release is consistent with the statutory framework distinguishing between mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and discretionary detention under § 1226(a), particularly given the respondents' concession that § 1225(b)(2) does not preclude a § 1226(a) hearing in this context.
Denial in part of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Request for Release)
“The Court DENIES IN PART the Petition to the extent that Petitioner requests to be released from custody.”
agree with court
The court denied immediate release because the petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, not automatic release. This is a standard procedural outcome in habeas cases where the remedy is a hearing to determine conditions of release rather than immediate discharge.
Order regarding EAJA Fees
“Petitioner’s attorney is directed submit an attorney fee application and corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee application.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the procedural requirements of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), which requires a fee application within 30 days of final judgment. The court set a specific timeline for the application and opposition, which is within its discretion to manage the docket.

The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is procedurally sound and relies on the respondents' concession and the statutory framework. However, it is brief and does not explicitly address the petitioner's 'cursory argument' regarding due process grounds for release, nor does it detail the legal basis for why the petitioner is entitled to a § 1226(a) hearing as opposed to being subject to § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention, relying instead on the respondents' non-opposition. This creates a gap in the reasoning, as the court does not independently analyze the statutory applicability or the due process claim.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALBERTO ALONSO VALLEJO, Case No.: 26-CV-3536 JAO (VET)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al., 15 Respondents. (ECF No. 1) 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Alberto Alonso Vallejo’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 19 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Also before the Court is Respondents 20 Christopher J. Larose’s (Warden of Otay Mesa Detention center), Gregory J. 21 Archambeault’s (Immigration and Customs Enforcement San Diego Field Office 22 Director), Todd Blanche’s (Attorney General of the United States), Todd M. Lyons 23 (Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and Markwayne Mullin 24 (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security) (collectively, “Respondents”) 25 Return to Habeas Petition. ECF No. 4. 26 Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, alleges that he has been detained by the United 27 States Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs 28 1 Enforcement (“ICE”) division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since May 26, 2026. 2 See ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to release and a bond hearing. Id. 3 Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista 4 v. Santacruz, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).1 Id. Although Respondents 5 state that the Ninth Circuit has stayed application of that order beyond the Central District 6 of California, they “do not oppose an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be 7 held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” ECF No. 4 at 1–2. Therefore, the Petition (ECF 8 No. 1) is GRANTED IN PART.2 9 I. Attorney’s Fees 10 Petitioner’s counsel still requests costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to 11 the Equal Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. ECF No. 1 at 8. The EAJA provides 12 in part: 13 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an 14 application for fees and other expenses which shows that the 15 party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an 16 itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or 17 appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 18 computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the 19 United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be 20 determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the 21 civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought. 22 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 23 24 25 1 On December 18, 2025, the Bautista Court entered final judgment finding that the July 8, 2025, DHS 26 Notice redefining who is considered an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Bautista v. Santacruz, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 27 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2025). 28 2 Petitioner makes a cursory argument that he should be released on due process grounds, see ECF No. 1 l The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under 2 EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment. 3 CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for 5 || Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner 6 || with an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within fourteen (14) days. 7 ||Respondents SHALL NOT deny Petitioner’s bond on the basis that 8 U.S.C. § 8 || 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention. The Court DENIES IN PART the Petition to 9 || the extent that Petitioner requests to be released from custody. 10 The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under 11 EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment. Petitioner’s attorney is directed 12 submit an attorney fee application and corresponding billing records within thirty (30) 13 || days of this Order, and Respondents are instructed to file any opposition within fourteen 14 || (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee application. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: June 23, 2026 17 gsi, □ a 19 Fy f 0 dot te Otake b> “9 — United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28