Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 L.B., Case No.: 26-cv-3330-RSH-JLB 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. 14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 On May 29, 2026, petitioner L.B., through counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas 19 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. The merits of the Petition 20 are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 6, 7. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 This Court previously granted the petition in an earlier action by Petitioner, Case 23 No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, in which Petitioner was represented by the same counsel as in 24 the instant case. In the earlier case, on January 28, 2026, the Court determined that 25 Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing had become unduly prolonged in violation of 26 his due process rights, and concluded that she “is entitled to a prompt and individualized 27 bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of 28 clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the 1 community if released.” Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 5 at 2. The Court directed 2 the government to arrange a bond hearing in immigration court within 10 days of the order. 3 Id. 4 On February 2, 2026, Petitioner received a timely bond hearing, at which the 5 immigration judge denied bond on the ground that Petitioner was a flight risk. Case No. 6 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 11 at Ex. 1. 7 On March 2, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to enforce the judgment. Case No. 26- 8 cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 7. Petitioner argued that her bond hearing did not comport with 9 the Court’s order because (1) “the burden of proof was not properly assigned” and (2) the 10 immigration judge “was not a neutral arbiter.” Id. at 1. Respondents opposed, arguing that 11 Petitioner’s claims were unfounded, and that Petitioner also failed to exhaust 12 administrative remedies by appealing the adverse bond decision to the Board of 13 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 11. The Court 14 directed a reply brief from Petitioner addressing exhaustion of administrative remedies, 15 which Petitioner timely filed. Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. Nos. 12, 13. 16 On March 27, 2026, the Court denied Petitioner’s motion to enforce in a written 17 order. Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 14. The Court found that Petitioner failed 18 to establish non-compliance with the Court’s order, and that any other claims of error were 19 subject to the prudential requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. at 4–5. 20 Petitioner filed this action approximately two months later, on May 29, 2026, and 21 the action was assigned at random to a district judge. The Petition alleges at the outset that 22 the district court ordered a bond hearing on January 28, 2026, and that the bond hearing 23 was held on February 2, 2026. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 3. The Petition states, “[w]e now file this 24 action as Petitioner’s bond hearing did not comport with the due process that the 25 Constitution requires.” Id. ¶ 3. The Petition raises substantially similar arguments that 26 Petitioner made in connection with his motion to enforce in the prior case. See, e.g., id. ¶ 27 29 (“This Court ordered a bond hearing …. At Petitioner’s February 2, 2026 hearing, the 28 IJ did not hold DHS to its burden, did not consider all evidence, and did not rely on 1 probative and specific evidence related to flight risk.”); 11 (arguing “failure to hold DHS 2 to its clear & convincing burden of proof”); 20 (arguing that immigration judge was “not 3 impartial”). But the Petition fails to disclose that Petitioner previously filed a motion to 4 enforce in the prior case, or that the motion to enforce was denied. 5 On June 2, 2026, Respondents filed a notice that this case was related to Case No. 6 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB. ECF No. 3. This case was then transferred to the undersigned. ECF 7 No. 4. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 10 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 11 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the 12 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 13 treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 Although the Petition challenges the adequacy of the February 2, 2026 bond hearing 16 ordered by this Court, the Petition does not mention that Petitioner previously brought a 17 similar challenge that the Court denied. Accordingly, the Petition does not directly address 18 the reasoning in the Court’s prior ruling. But that reasoning applies here as well. See Case 19 No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 14; see also Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 20 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Here, [the petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s adverse 21 bond determination before appealing to the BIA. This short cut was improper. Leonardo 22 should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the 23 federal district court to review the IJ’s decision.”). For the reasons previously stated, the 24 prudential doctrine of exhaustion continues to apply to Petitioner’s claims of error in 25 connection with his bond hearing. 26 The Petition devotes a section to exhaustion of administrative remedies, ECF No. 1 27 ¶¶ 17–22, but this discussion is more abbreviated than the similar discussion contained in 28 Petitioner’s reply brief in the previous action, Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 13. 1 ||In arguing that exhaustion would be futile or result in irreparable harm, the Petition 2 ||includes citations to a declaration, two articles, and a district court decision that post-date 3 ||the briefing on the prior motion to enforce—all to argue that the BIA will simply 4 || “‘function[] to rubberstamp” her bond denial. See ECF No. 1 4] 19, 20 & Exs. 10, 11, 14. 5 || Respondents in turn cite numerous recent examples in which petitioners in this district are 6 ||indeed granted bond by immigration judges. Based on the record presented, this Court 7 ||remains unpersuaded that the BIA fails to function as an adequate administrative tribunal, 8 pursuit of a BIA appeal is a futile endeavor, or that Petitioner’s continued detention 9 || pending pursuit of that appeal constitutes irreparable harm. See Reyes v. Wolf, No. C20- 10 ||0377LR, 2021 WL 662659, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2021) (determining that the 11 || petitioner failed to establish that “that civil detention after the denial of a bond hearing 12 || constitutes irreparable harm such that prudential exhaustion should be waived”’), aff’d sub 13 ||nom. Diaz Reyes v. Mayorkas, No. 21-35142, 2021 WL 3082403 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021). 14 || The Court finds that each requirement for prudential exhaustion applies here and declines 15 waive that requirement based on futility or irreparable injury. 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed 18 || to close the case. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: June 18, 2026 ‘ 21 Jekut □ [owe 9 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28