Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 4 Fujian MA, Case No.: 26-cv-3543-AGS-SBC 5 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 6 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF 2) AND MOTION TO 7 Todd BLANCHE, et al., APPOINT COUNSEL 8 Respondents. 9 10 11 Petitioner, a self-represented detainee, challenges his immigration custody through 12 a habeas corpus petition. In support, he’s requested the Court waive the filing fee and 13 appoint counsel. Both requests are granted. 14 Typically, parties seeking a writ of habeas corpus in a United States district court 15 must pay a $5 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed without payment 16 of fees only if the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed IFP. See Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t 17 of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that when an “IFP application is 18 denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid”). 19 Although the filing fee is only $5, petitioner claims to have “0.00” in wages and listed 20 “none” for all other assets. (ECF 2, at 1–2.) Since it is clear petitioner cannot afford the 21 filing fee, his IFP request is granted. 22 Petitioner also requests appointed counsel in support of his habeas corpus petition. 23 (See ECF 3). Courts may appoint an attorney for an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when 24 “the interests of justice so require.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) 25 (cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this assessment, courts evaluate an 26 indigent petitioner’s (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and (b) “ability . . . to 27 articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn 28 v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the exact contours of 1 || petitioner’s claim is difficult to discern—he repeatedly says “[m]ore than six months have 2 passed since the apprehension of Petitioner” but also claims to have only been “in ICE 3 custody since 5-22-2026” (ECF 1, at 2)—the potential merit to a complicated Zadvydas 4 ||claim coupled with his apparent struggle to adequately explain his case convinces the court 5 ||that counsel 1s warranted. See United States v. Ahumada Aguilar, 295 F.3d 943, 950 6 || (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that immigration law is “second only to the Internal Revenue Code 7 complexity” (quotation marks omitted)); Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 8 2020) (“Divining [the immigration laws’| meaning is ordinarily not for the faint of heart.”’). 9 ||The Court provisionally appoints Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to initially 10 ||determine if petitioner qualifies for representation by that organization. The Clerk is 11 || directed to forward a copy of this order to Federal Defenders. 12 By July 1, 2026, Federal Defenders must submit a notice to the Court concerning 13 || whether it can and will accept the appointment. By that same date, Federal Defenders must 14 || also state whether, under Chief Judge Order 134, it “requests to file supplemental briefing.” 15 Dated: June 17, 2026 17 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28