Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 SAHAND ROSTAMI BORUJERDI, Case No.: 3:26-cv-02296-H-MSB 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. MOTION TO REMAND 13 JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH [Doc. No. 6.] AMERICA, LLC; and DOES 1-50, 14 inclusive, 15 Defendants. 16 17 On May 14, 2026, Plaintiff Sahand Rostami Borujerdi filed a motion to remand the 18 action back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6.) On June 1, 19 2026, Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (“JLRNA”) filed a response in 20 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. No. 10.) 21 A hearing on Plaintiff’s motion is currently scheduled for Monday, June 29, 2026 at 22 10:30 a.m. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court determines the matter is 23 appropriate for resolution without oral argument, vacates the hearing, and submits the 24 motion on the parties’ papers. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion 25 to remand. 26 Background 27 Plaintiff is a resident of the State of California. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 19.) 28 Defendant JLRNA is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of 1 Delaware with its principal place of business located in New Jersey. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12.) 2 On February 26, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a 2022 Land Rover Sport HST, VIN 3 SALWS2RU8NA221152 (“Vehicle”). (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) When the Vehicle was purchased, 4 Plaintiff received express written warranties in which Defendant JLRNA, an automotive 5 manufacturing company, undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of 6 the Vehicle or to provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or performance. (Id. 7 ¶¶ 4, 8.) 8 At the time of delivery and during Plaintiff’s ownership of the Vehicle, the Vehicle 9 manifested defects and nonconformities covered by Defendant’s express warranties. (Id. 10 ¶¶ 9, 16, 33.) Plaintiff delivered the Vehicle to an authorized repair facility. (Id. ¶ 21.) 11 However, Defendant JLRNA and Defendant’s authorized repair facilities were unable to 12 conform the Vehicle to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of 13 repair attempts, failed to service or repair the Vehicle within thirty days pursuant to Civil 14 Code § 1793.2(b), and failed to replace the Vehicle or make restitution in accordance with 15 the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 43, 50, 51.) 16 On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court of California, 17 County of San Diego against Defendant, alleging causes of action for: (1) breach of express 18 warranties pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code § 1790 et 19 seq.; (2) breach of implied warranties in violation of Civil Code § 1791.1, § 1792, and § 20 1794; (3) failure to promptly repurchase product in violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d) and 21 § 1793.1(a)(2); and (4) failure to commence repairs within a reasonable time and to 22 complete them within 30 days in violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b). (Id. ¶¶ 14-51.) 23 Plaintiff explicitly revokes acceptance of the Vehicle in its Complaint and seeks general, 24 special, actual, incidental, and consequential damages. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 26, 36, 37, Prayer for 25 Relief.) 26 On April 10, 2026, Defendant removed the action to United States District Court for 27 the Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on the basis of diversity 28 jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal.) On April 10, 2026, Defendant filed an 1 answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. No. 3, Answer.) By the present motion, Plaintiff 2 moves to remand the action back to the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego 3 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6.) 4 Discussion 5 I. Legal Standard 6 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. United States v. Mark, 530 F.3d 7 799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. 8 Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function 9 remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. 10 v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). A case is removable only if 11 it could have been originally filed in federal court. Chicago v. Int’l Coll. Of Surgeons, 522 12 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). 13 “The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of removal 14 requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore–Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 15 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). 16 This presumption against removal “means that ‘the defendant always has the burden of 17 establishing that removal is proper.’” Id. (quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566). 18 Here, Defendant removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity 19 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. No. 1.) “Traditional diversity jurisdiction 20 requires complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy greater than 21 $75,000.” Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 28 22 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). The Supreme Court has explained that where removal is based on 23 diversity jurisdiction, “a defendant's notice of removal need include only a plausible 24 allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart 25 Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “Where it is not 26 facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing 27 party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets 28 1 the jurisdictional threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 2 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). While “a defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere 3 speculation and conjecture, with unreasonable assumptions,” Ibarra v. Manheim 4 Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015), the defendant need not “research, 5 state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages,” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 6 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he 7 amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise), the costs 8 of complying with an injunction, and attorneys' fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or 9 contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). 10 II. Analysis 11 Plaintiff does not dispute the timeliness of Defendant’s removal, that complete 12 diversity of citizenship exists, or that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 13 requirement. (See generally Doc. No. 6.) Rather, Plaintiff merely asserts that Defendant 14 has the burden of proving that removal is proper both substantively and procedurally as the 15 removing party. (Id. at 8 at 2, 6.) Defendant states it has properly removed this action 16 because it involves citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds 17 $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. (Doc. No. 10 at 7.) The Court agrees. 18 A. Diversity of Citizenship 19 In its Notice of Removal, Defendant notes that there is complete diversity of 20 citizenship. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff does not assert otherwise. 21 For purposes of diversity, citizenship of an individual is established by both United 22 States citizenship and domicile in a state of the United States. See Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 23 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). An individual's domicile is determined at the time the action is 24 filed, see Lew, 797 F.2d at 750, and is established based upon “a fixed habitation or abode 25 in a particular place, and an intention to remain there permanently or indefinitely.” Owens 26 v. Huntling, 115 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1940). A corporation, on the other hand, is a 27 citizen of its state of incorporation and of the state where its principal place of business 28 (i.e., its “nerve center”) is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 1 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010). A limited liability company “is a citizen of every state of which its 2 owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 3 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff, “at the time this action was commenced, was 5 and is still a citizen of the United States who is domiciled in the State of California, in the 6 City of San Diego.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11.) In support, Defendant points to the retail 7 installment sales contract attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint which lists a San Diego address 8 for Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 10 at 14; see Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 19.) Defendant also retained 9 an investigator who found nine addresses for Plaintiff, seven of which were in San Diego. 10 (Doc. No. 10 at 14.) Plaintiff does not contest that he is domiciled in California. (See Doc. 11 No. 6.) Defendant JLRNA is a limited liability company formed under the laws of 12 Delaware with its principal place of business located in New Jersey. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 12.) 13 Defendant JLRNA is a wholly owned subsidiary of Jaguar Land Rover Holdings Limited. 14 (Id. ¶ 13.) Jaguar Land Rover Holdings Limited is a citizen of England with its principal 15 place of business located in Coventry, England. (Id. ¶ 14.) Further, none of the addresses 16 found for Plaintiff are in Delaware or New Jersey. (Doc. No. 10 at 14.) Thus, Defendant 17 has met its burden of establishing that there is complete diversity of citizenship between 18 the parties. 19 B. Amount in Controversy 20 In its Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that the amount in controversy exceeds 21 $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff prays for actual 22 damages, a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages, incidental 23 and consequential damages, and actual attorneys’ fees. (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 17.) 24 Plaintiffs offer no facts or reason to doubt Defendant's assertion. 25 1. Actual Damages 26 California Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(B) provides that the measure of damages 27 in an action such as this one includes restitution in “an amount equal to the actual price 28 paid or payable by the buyer,...including any collateral charges such as sales or use tax, 1 license fees, registration fees, and other official fees[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 2 1793.2(d)(2)(B). While Plaintiff’s Complaint does not provide a clear and unambiguous 3 statement as to actual damages, (see generally Doc. No. 1-2, Compl.), Defendant contends 4 that Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of the price paid for the vehicle throughout the 5 Complaint. (Id. ¶ 25, 38.) The retail installment sale contract attached to the Complaint 6 states the total sale price for the Vehicle as $124,181.20. (Id. at 19, 20.) 7 Section 1793.2(d)(2)(C) permits the manufacturer to reduce the amount payable to 8 the buyer “by that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the 9 buyer first delivered the vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized service 10 and repair facility for correction of the problem that gave rise to the nonconformity.” Cal. 11 Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). The set-off amount is determined by multiplying the “actual 12 price of the new motor vehicle paid or payable by the buyer...by a fraction having as its 13 denominator 120,000 and having as its numerator the number of miles traveled by the new 14 motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer delivered the vehicle” for correction of the 15 problem. Id. Although Defendant did not calculate a mileage offset reduction in its Notice 16 of Removal, Defendant provides mileage figures for Plaintiff’s repair visits in its 17 opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. No. 10 at 11.) Defendant notes that 18 Plaintiff’s first repair visit for a check engine light and Apple Car Play cutting out was 19 August 3, 2022, with 6,081 miles on the odometer at the time of presentation. (Id. at 11, 20 27, 28.) The second visit was on March 25, 2024, with 26,526 miles on the odometer. (Id.) 21 The third visit was on May 3, 2025, with 40,341 miles on the odometer. (Id.) There were 22 two more visits in June 2025. (Id.) Using the more generous 40,341 mileage figure of 23 Plaintiff’s third visit, a mileage offset of $41,746.61 can be calculated.1 Subtracting 24 $41,746.61 from $124,181.20 (total sale price) yields $82,434.59, an estimate of Plaintiff’s 25 actual damages. 26 Defendant’s submission is sufficient to establish by a preponderance of evidence 27 28 1 that Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act actual damages are, after taking mileage offset into 2 account, at least $82,434.59. The actual damage alone readily meets the amount-in- 3 controversy of $75,000 for the purposes of this Motion. 4 2. Civil Penalty Damages 5 Under California Civil Code 1794(c), the buyer of a defective consumer good may 6 receive a civil penalty “not [to] exceed two times the amount of actual damages” if the 7 buyer establishes that the failure to comply was “willful.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). “The 8 Ninth Circuit routinely considers civil penalties when deciding whether the amount-in- 9 controversy requirement has been satisfied, including in Song-Beverly cases.” Wang v. 10 FCA US LLC, 2025 WL 1218745, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2025) (citing Babasa v. 11 LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2007); Morey v. Louis Vuitton North Am., 12 Inc., 561 F. App'x 642, 643 (9th Cir. 2011)). Courts have also rejected the argument that 13 defendants must proffer evidence to support the likelihood of civil penalties for purposes 14 of meeting the amount-in-controversy requirement. See Pulver v. Nissan North America, 15 Inc., 2025 WL 1766529, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2025) (“[I]t is appropriate to consider 16 only the sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint in assessing whether a claim of 17 willfulness should be used in determining whether the amount in controversy is satisfied.”) 18 Plaintiff explicitly alleges that Defendant willfully violated the Song-Beverly Act in 19 multiple ways, including by refusing to comply with its obligations to promptly offer 20 restitution or replacement for the vehicle, or commencing service and repair within a 21 reasonable time or to complete such service or repairs within thirty days. (Doc. No. 1-2, 22 Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23, 24, 47, 50, 51.) Plaintiff also alleges that these violations entitle them 23 to “civil penalty [damages] for each violation, in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s total 24 damages” pursuant to California Civil Code § 1794(c) and (e). (Id. at 17.) Thus, by 25 alleging willfulness and requesting the maximum of civil penalties, Plaintiff has put the 26 maximum amount of civil penalties in controversy and that amount should be included. 27 Defendant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a civil penalty of up to two- 28 times the Vehicle price can be considered in determining whether the amount-in- 1 controversy requirement has been met. Combined with the actual damages of $82,434.59, 2 ||the addition of $164,869.18 readily meets the amount-in-controversy of $75,000 for the 3 || purposes of this Motion. 4 3. Attorneys’ Fees 5 Lastly, Plaintiff's Complaint requests attorneys’ fees pursuant to California Civil 6 ||Code 1794(d). (Doc. No. 1-2, Compl. at 17.) Under California Civil Code 1794(d), a 7 || buyer of a defective consumer good is allowed to recover, as a part of the judgment, “a 8 equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based 9 actual time expended ....” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). In its Notice of Removal, 10 || Defendant cites Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., where the Court recognized that fee 11 || awards in similar lemon law cases regularly included attorney's fees of over $60,000. (Doc. 12 1 4] 23) (citing Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1011 (N.D. 13 2002)). Factoring in negligible attorneys’ fees here, the court finds that Defendant has 14 || met its burden of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 15 Conclusion 16 For the reasons above, the Defendant has satisfied its burden of establishing that 17 |! the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the present action based on diversity 18 || jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion to remand. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || DATED: June 16, 2026 | | | baal | | | 21 7 MARILYN HUFF, DistrtetJudge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 23 24 25 26 27 28