Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 3D SYSTEMS, INC., Case No.: 21-cv-1141-AGS-DDL 4 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR 5 v. NON-JURY TRIAL (ECF 805 & 821) 6 Ben WYNNE, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 3D Systems, Inc., and Evan Kuester request a non-jury trial on Intrepid Automation, 9 Inc.’s remaining claims. But “[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such 10 importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming 11 curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” Beacon 12 Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959). Because they have not made a 13 sufficient showing to overcome that scrutiny, the request is denied. 14 DISCUSSION 15 “The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the 16 Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.” 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a); see also U.S. Const. amend. VII. There is “no similar [constitutional] 18 requirement [that] protects trials by the court.” Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510. 19 Still, 3D Systems and Kuester argue that the circumstances “mandate a bench trial” 20 for two reasons: (1) Intrepid made “no jury demand” for the only remaining claims in this 21 case—Intrepid’s counterclaims and third-party claims; and (2) the parties’ “stipulation” 22 “waiving their right to jury trial requires a bench trial.” (ECF 805, at 3–4.) 23 Taking the second argument first, “stipulations” are “binding on the Court only when 24 approved by the judge.” CivLR 7.2(a). Because this Court rejected the parties’ initial 25 non-jury-trial requests and stipulations (ECF 768; ECF 786), those did not take effect. See 26 De La Torre v. Legal Recovery Law Off., No. 12-cv-2579-LAB-WMC, 2014 WL 4547035, 27 at *2 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2014) (“[P]arties cannot bind the Court by stipulations 28 1 between themselves.”). 2 3D Systems’ and Kuester’s other argument, that Intrepid never properly made a jury 3 demand, fares no better. When Intrepid removed this case from state court, it properly 4 included a concurrent “demand” for a “trial by jury in this action” under “Federal Rule of 5 Civil Procedure 38(b).” (ECF 1-2, at 2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(3)(B) (“[A] party 6 entitled to a jury trial under Rule 38 must be given one if the party serves a demand within 7 14 days after” “it files a notice of removal.”). And because Intrepid did not “specify the 8 issues that it wishe[d] to have tried by a jury,” it was “considered to have demanded a jury 9 trial on all the issues so triable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(c). No one disputes that this was a 10 proper jury demand. (See ECF 821, at 7.) 11 As 3D Systems and Kuester would have it, though, Intrepid had to “file a separate 12 jury demand with the Court on its [later-filed] counterclaims/third party claims” in addition 13 to that general demand. (ECF 821, at 10.) But they provide no authority in support of that 14 point. To the contrary, courts “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of the 15 jury trial right.” Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005) 16 (cleaned up). And “the purpose of Rule 38’s demand requirement”—“to inform the Court 17 and counsel well in advance of trial as to the trial method desired”—was fulfilled here as 18 well. See id. at 1065. 19 The Court became aware of Intrepid’s desired trial method when Intrepid made its 20 general demand at the time of removal. (See ECF 1-2, at 2.) And Intrepid’s initial “jury 21 trial demand” was made “in a separate document” that was “set off from the main body of 22 the pleading in order to make [it] readily recognizable,” further cutting against any 23 argument that the opposition or the Court was not aware of Intrepid’s “desired” “trial 24 method” “well in advance of trial.” See Lutz, 403 F.3d at 1064–65 (cleaned up). What’s 25 more, 3D Systems’ and Kuester’s own briefing indicates that they, too, were informed of 26 that desired trial method. (See, e.g., ECF 489, at 22 (Kuester’s summary-judgment motion 27 arguing that “no reasonable jury could find Kuester misappropriated Intrepid’s trade 28 secrets” (emphasis added)); ECF 654, at 16 (3D Systems’ motion for appellate certification 1 arguing that “all remaining claims can then be heard by a single jury in a single trial” 2 (emphasis added)).) These facts suggest that the opposing parties—and the Court—“were 3 aware” of Intrepid’s jury-trial request for years. 4 That third-party defendant Kuester was “not served with [a jury] demand” once 5 added to this lawsuit does not alter this conclusion. (See ECF 821, at 10.) 3D Systems and 6 Kuester provide no authority suggesting that parties seeking a jury must renew that demand 7 whenever successively named parties are added to a lawsuit. Amended complaints, even if 8 they add counterclaims or third-party claims, do not reset the jury-trial slate—those later 9 filings “do not” “start[] again the time to ask for a jury.” See Lutz, 403 F.3d at 1066. Instead, 10 once “a party properly files a jury demand under the requirements of Rule 38(b), he has 11 satisfied all that is required by the Rules to avoid waiver.” Solis v. County of Los Angeles, 12 514 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2008). Intrepid did just that upon removal by making its request 13 clear to the Court and opposition at the time. Nothing requires it to again file a demand 14 upon later-named Kuester—who shares counsel with 3D Systems and took this lawsuit 15 subject to the general jury demand. 16 3D Systems and Kuester also assert that a jury trial is inappropriate “because 17 Intrepid’s claims do not embrace the same issues and do not rely on the same matrix of 18 facts as 3DS’s claims against Intrepid.” (ECF 821, at 12.) But that analysis only comes into 19 play when one party is trying to rely on another party’s jury demand. See California Scents 20 v. Surco Prods., 406 F.3d 1102, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2005) (engaging in that analysis when 21 plaintiff “did not demand a jury trial” in its “complaint” but still argued it was due such a 22 trial because it “reasonably relied” on defendant’s answer, which “did demand a jury trial 23 ‘as to all counterclaims’”). Because Intrepid properly demanded a jury trial, there’s no need 24 to engage in a “matrix of facts” analysis. But even if that analysis were required, 25 3D Systems’ previous briefing undercuts its arguments here. In its motion for Rule 54(b) 26 appellate certification, for example, 3D Systems argued that “there is substantial factual 27 overlap” between its own “misappropriation claims and Intrepid’s counterclaims,” so much 28 so that the “facts” are “inextricably linked.” (ECF 654, at 8–9.) In other words, a “matrix 1 of facts” analysis would not preclude a jury trial. 2 Nor do the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call for a different result. They permit 3 the Court to accept non-jury-trial requests, but they do not require it. When “a jury trial 4 has been demanded under Rule 38,” a jury is mandatory unless “the parties or their 5 attorneys file a stipulation to a nonjury trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(1). Even after such a 6 stipulation, however, the ability to withdraw a jury request is merely permissive. See 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) (allowing that a “proper demand may be withdrawn” (emphasis 8 added)). Because the jury demand here was followed by a joint stipulation to a judge-only 9 trial (see ECF 711; ECF 778), a jury is no longer mandatory. But the Rules and the Seventh 10 Amendment both favor factual determinations by juries. Thus, courts should err on the side 11 of jury trials. The request for a non-jury trial did not survive this Court’s jury-trial- 12 protecting “scrutin[y]” before, nor does it now. See Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 501; 13 (ECF 786). 14 Finally, 3D Systems and Kuester assert that a bench trial is more appropriate here 15 because it would lessen the burden on this Court by saving it “time and resources,” and the 16 claims involve “complex trade secret disputes regarding 3D-printing technology.” (See 17 ECF 805, at 3, 6–7.) Yet the court-related factors seem to weigh in favor of the 18 constitutionally protected jury right. As 3D Systems and Kuester admit, a bench trial here 19 would still involve adjudicating “extensive motion in limine filings,” so that consideration 20 is neutral. (See id. (referencing ECF 716–720; ECF 724–727; ECF 730).) And the post- 21 trial requirement that “the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of 22 law separately” increases the Court’s burden. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). Those post-trial 23 determinations would inevitably delay the case’s resolution, further cutting in favor of a 24 jury trial. See Fed R. Civ. P. 1 (encouraging “the just, speedy, and inexpensive 25 determination of every action and proceeding”). And as for the “complexity” of the issues 26 (ECF 805, at 3), this Court “decline[s]” the “invitation” “to employ an inquiry into the 27 practical abilities and limitations of a jury as a test for determining the application of the 28 Seventh Amendment,” see In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 1979). 1 In sum, the request for a non-jury trial is DENIED. The unopposed request for 2 judicial notice of other district court filings (ECF 805-1) is granted. 3 ||Dated: June 15, 2026 5 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28