gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-03418 · 2026-06-12 · Unknown

Leonet Ricardo Gamez Sabogal v. Todd Blanche, Acting Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice; Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of Homeland Security; David J. Venturella, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director

Proceeding
original
Outcome
other — Police 12 searched his vehicle and found a marijuana vape pen; because Petitioner did no
Area
civil
Panel
James E. Simmons (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:29Z · confidence high

The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a Venezuelan national detained by ICE after a traffic stop in Florida, alleging his detention violated the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The court granted the petition, determining that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs his detention rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and ordered the government to provide an individualized bond hearing within fourteen days.

What the court decidedThe model
Granting the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
“the Court GRANTS the Petition.”
agree with court
The court correctly identified that the petitioner was not apprehended at or near the border and had been in the U.S. for several years, which aligns with the legal principle that § 1226(a) applies to such individuals rather than the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225(b). The government did not oppose the petition, and the court relied on consistent district court precedent and the logic of *Maldonado Bautista* to reach this conclusion.
Ordering the Government to provide a bond determination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within fourteen days
“The Court ORDERS the Government to provide the noncitizen with a bond determination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), within fourteen (14) days of this Order, unless the noncitizen requests a continuance;”
agree with court
Once the court determined that § 1226(a) governed the detention, the petitioner was statutorily entitled to a bond hearing. The order correctly mandates this relief and sets a reasonable timeline for compliance.
Prohibiting the Government from denying bond solely on the basis of detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
“At the bond hearing, the Government may not deny the noncitizen bond, solely on the basis that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2);”
agree with court
This directive reinforces the court's finding that § 1225(b) does not apply to the petitioner. It prevents the government from using the inapplicable mandatory detention statute as a basis to refuse the bond hearing required by § 1226(a).
Ordering the Government to file a Notice of Compliance within five days of the bond hearing
“The Government is ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance within five (5) days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing;”
agree with court
This is a standard procedural mechanism to ensure the court can verify that the ordered relief was actually provided to the petitioner.
Directing the Clerk to close the suit
“The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this suit.”
agree with court
The court closed the case after issuing the order, likely because the primary relief (the bond hearing) is to be handled by the immigration authorities or a subsequent proceeding, and the habeas petition itself has been resolved by the issuance of the writ/order.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound and relies on consistent district court precedent and a recent Ninth Circuit decision (*Maldonado Bautista*) to reach its conclusion. It correctly applies the legal standard for determining which statute governs the detention based on the facts of the petitioner's entry and apprehension. The court explicitly notes the government's non-opposition, which simplifies the procedural posture. The reasoning is concise but sufficient for a district court order in a non-opposed habeas petition.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEONET RICARDO GAMEZ Case No.: 3:26-cv-3418-JES-BJW SABOGAL, 12 ORDER GRANTING PETITION Petitioner, 13 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 14 TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney 15 General of the United States, Department [ECF No. 1] 16 of Justice; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of Homeland Security; DAVID 17 J. VENTURELLA, Senior Official 18 Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement; PATRICK DIVVER, Field 20 Office Director of the San Diego Immigration and Customs Enforcement 21 Office; JORGE VELARDE, Assistant 22 Field Office Director of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Otay Mesa 23 Detention Center; CHRISTOPHER J. 24 LAROSE; Senior Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, 25 Respondents. 26 27 // 28 // 1 Before the Court is Petitioner Leonet Ricardo Gamez Sabogal’s (“Petitioner”) 2 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”). Pursuant to the 3 Court’s Order to Show Cause, Respondents (the “Government”) filed the Response, which 4 expressed its non-opposition to the Court ordering Petitioner’s bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1226(a). ECF No. 2; ECF No. 4 at 2. The Court has taken the matter under submission 6 and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 7 I. BACKGROUND 8 Petitioner is a 37-year-old Venezuelan national who entered the United States, 9 without inspection or admission, on or about December 15, 2022, and has since been 10 gainfully employed. Pet. ¶¶ 1–2, 18. On April 19, 2026, while driving in Miami, Florida, 11 Petitioner was pulled over for a traffic violation by local law enforcement. Id. ¶ 19. Police 12 searched his vehicle and found a marijuana vape pen; because Petitioner did not possess a 13 medical license required to possess such an item under Florida law, he was arrested. Id. 14 Petitioner paid his bail on April 21, 2026, but instead of being released, he was transferred 15 to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody. Id. 16 Petitioner was, thereafter, transferred through multiple Florida detention facilities 17 before being brought to the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego, California, where 18 he remains in custody. Id. ¶ 20. The Government subsequently initiated removal 19 proceedings against Petitioner, charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 20 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. ¶ 21. Petitioner brings this action, alleging his detention violates the 21 Immigration and Naturalization Act. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A writ of habeas corpus is "available to every individual detained within the United 24 States." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 25 2). "The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 26 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 27 custody." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 28 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the 1 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Challenges to immigration-related 2 detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 3 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 4 III. DISCUSSION 5 The Court finds that the Petition’s issues—specifically, the Court’s jurisdiction and 6 which statute governs Petitioner’s detention—are analogous to those raised in the Court’s 7 decision in Martinez Lopez v. Noem, et al., No. 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457, 8 at *2–7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the reasoning stated 9 therein and incorporates it by reference. Id. 10 A. Jurisdiction 11 The Court finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1252's jurisdiction-stripping provisions do not bar it 12 from considering this habeas petition. Id. Moreover, the prudential administrative 13 exhaustion requirement for 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claims is excused. Id. Imposing that 14 requirement would be futile given the BIA's precedential decision in Matter of Yajure 15 Hurtado, which held that noncitizens who entered without inspection are subject to 16 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) regardless of where or when they were 17 apprehended. 29 I&N Dec. 216, at *4–5. (BIA 2025). Accordingly, the Court finds that it 18 has jurisdiction to hear the Petition. 19 B. Section 1226(a) Governs Petitioner's Detention 20 Although the Ninth Circuit stayed application of the Maldonado Bautista class 21 certification to prospective members outside the Central District of California, this Court’s 22 rulings, when analyzing habeas cases with similar circumstances, have consistently been 23 aligned with Maldonado Bautista's holding. See Maldonado Bautista v. U.S. Dep't of 24 Homeland Sec., No. 26-1044 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026); see, e.g., Velazquez-Beltran v. Noem, 25 No. 3:26-CV-959-JES-MSB, 2026 WL 524056, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026) (holding 26 that noncitizens that entered the country without inspection and were not immediately 27 apprehended near the border are subject to immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 28 not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); Murillo-Ortiz v. LaRose, No. 3:26-CV-1469-JES-BJW, 2026 WL 1 800556, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026) (holding same); Jasbir v. Warden, Imperial Reg'l 2 Adult Det. Facility, No. 26-CV-579-JES-BJW, 2026 WL 353354, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 3 2026) (holding same). 4 Here, Petitioner was not apprehended at or near the border. Pet. ¶ 1. He has resided 5 in the United States and has been in Respondents’ custody since April 21, 2026, well after 6 entering the country in 2022. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. These facts make clear that Petitioner "was not 7 actively entering, attempting to enter or had recently entered, the country when 8 apprehended." Martinez Lopez, 2025 WL 3030457, at *6. Accordingly, the Court finds that 9 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), governs Petitioner's detention. 10 C. Petitioner Is Entitled to a Bond Hearing 11 Noncitizens that are arrested and detained, pending a removal decision, may apply 12 for release on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B). If the 13 Government denies that request, the noncitizen may seek a bond hearing before an 14 Immigration Judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 15 527 (2021). 16 As the Court has found that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner's detention, and 17 given the absence of any opposition from Respondents, Petitioner is entitled to, and shall 18 receive, an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Aparicio Juan v. 19 LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-2099-JES-BJW (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2026) (granting petition and 20 ordering bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on materially identical facts); see ECF No. 21 4 at 2. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 Based on the foregoing: 24 (1) The Court ORDERS the Government to provide the noncitizen with a 25 bond determination hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), within fourteen 26 (14) days of this Order, unless the noncitizen requests a continuance; 27 (2) At the bond hearing, the Government may not deny the noncitizen bond, 28 solely on the basis that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); (3) The Government is ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance 2 within five (5) days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination 3 hearing; and 4 (4) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this suit. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: June 12, 2026 1 □□ Sir, 8 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 «