Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 CHRISTIN POWERS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03025-RBM-JLB 10 Plaintiff, ORDER: 11 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 TELEGRAM, et al., MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 13 Defendants. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [Doc. 2]; 14 15 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT ON SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [Doc. 1]; 17 AND 18 (3) DENYING MOTIONS AS MOOT 19 [Docs. 8, 11–15]

20 21 22 On November 7, 2025, Plaintiff Christin Powers (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 23 against Defendants Telegram, Coran Capshaw, and Dave Matthews ( “Defendants”). (Doc. 24 1.) That same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 25 (the “IFP Motion”). (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff has also filed several miscellaneous motions. 26 (Docs. 8, 11–15.) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is 27 GRANTED, the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without leave to amend, and the 28 remaining Motions (Docs. 8, 11–15) are DENIED AS MOOT. 1 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a District Court of the 3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 4 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court may authorize the commencement of a suit 5 without prepayment of the filing fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in 6 forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 7 1177 (9th Cir. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The plaintiff must submit a signed affidavit 8 “that includes a statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to pay initial fees or 9 give security.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2(a). The facts of an affidavit of poverty must be stated 10 “with some particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 11 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 12 1981)). “An affidavit in support of an IFP [motion] is sufficient where it alleges that the 13 affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. (citing Adkins 14 v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 15 Based on its review of the IFP Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established 16 the requisite level of financial need. Accordingly, the IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. 17 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 18 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP is subject to mandatory screening 19 and dismissal by the Court if the action: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a 20 claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant 21 who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 22 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to 23 dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”). For the reasons discussed below, 24 25 26 1 Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply 28 1 the Court finds the Complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s allegations are plainly 2 frivolous and do not state a plausible claim. 3 “A complaint . . . is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 4 fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). The definition of frivolousness 5 “embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual 6 allegation.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). When determining whether to 7 dismiss a complaint as “frivolous” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the Court “is not 8 bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept 9 without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Instead, 10 the Court must “pierce the veil of the complaint,” to determine if the allegations are 11 “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Id. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327–28) 12 (addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) which was re-codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). 13 In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint and in her numerous 14 supplemental documents stem from her alleged romantic relationship with high-profile 15 singer Dave Matthews and an alleged conspiracy by his manager, Defendant Coran 16 Capshaw, to “stop [their] sacred marriage” and “continu[e] to control [Matthews’s] money, 17 time, and choice to marry [Plaintiff] beginning in January of 2025.” (Doc. 1 at 2–3.)2 18 Plaintiff claims she has paid over $159,000 in Bitcoin and sold her home “to continue 19 getting to the point of real marriage [with Matthews] as promised and repayment” but that 20 she has not been repaid. (Id.; Doc. 5 at 2.) Although Plaintiff states that law enforcement 21 authorities have informed her otherwise, Plaintiff maintains that “this is corporate control 22 of [their lives]” and “not a scam.” (Doc. 5 at 2, 4.) Plaintiff also accuses Defendant 23 Capshaw of subjecting Matthews to “slavery,” and claims that Defendant Capshaw 24 “handles all band and personal finances 24/7” and that he “coerced” the results of a lawsuit 25 filed against him to continue to control Matthews. (Id. at 2–3; see Doc. 5 at 3–4 (alleging 26 27 28 2 1 that Plaintiff “responded daily to the love of [her] life to discerned [sic] the control of this 2 team by slave owner Coran Capshaw.”).) Plaintiff requests over $350 million, ownership 3 of the Dave Matthews Band, and that Defendant Capshaw “stop . . . slavery and financial 4 control over many acts that abuse women . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 7 at 2.) 5 “No matter how sincerely believed by Plaintiff, these allegations are simply too 6 fantastic to warrant the expenditure of further judicial and private resources.” Meyer v. 7 World Bank, No. 3:19-cv-00017-GPC (JLB), 2019 WL 2009873, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 8 2019) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations—in addition to being rambling and at times 9 incoherent—“rise to the level of irrational or the wholly incredible” and are therefore 10 subject to dismissal as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; see 11 Torres Ramirez v. Val, Case No. 4:24-cv-02969-KAW, 2024 WL 4351138, at *1 (N.D. 12 Cal. Sept. 3, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ramirez v. Val, No. 24- 13 CV-02969-EMC, 2024 WL 4353054 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2024) (finding allegations that 14 “Travis Kelce and his co-defendants are interfering with his marriage to Taylor Swift” were 15 “plainly frivolous” and the requested relief was “plainly unavailable”). 16 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court finds no reason to grant leave to 17 amend because the Complaint lacks any basis in law or fact and such fundamental defects 18 cannot be cured by amendment. See Sandoval v. Castillo, No. 08-cv-1622-WQH-NLS, 19 2008 WL 4790521, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008) (“Plaintiff’s allegations are fanciful and 20 delusional and ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 21 cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 22 1984)); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 n.8 (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or 23 malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to 24 grant leave to amend.”). Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant 25 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) without leave to amend.3 26 27 3 Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under 28 l Ht. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: 3 1. The IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. 4 2. The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 5 without leave to amend. 6 3. The remaining Motions (Docs. 8, 11-15) are DENIED AS MOOT. 7 4. The Court CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this Order would not be taken in 8 good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 9 5. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the file. 10 IT ISSO ORDERED. 11 |} DATE: June 12, 2026 1 Rt Biers Moers □ 3 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 || 12(b)(6), because she identifies no viable claims or basis for the Court’s jurisdiction and 26 does not provide a “short and plain statement” as required by Rule 8. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 27 || 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that while the court must accept a plaintiff's allegations as true, it is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”’) (citations omitted).