Arisdalia Merino Cordero v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States; et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Benjamin J. Cheeks (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a Cuban national detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 following a final removal order. The court granted the petition, finding the detention unlawful under *Zadvydas*, and ordered the petitioner's immediate release with specific injunctions against re-detention and third-country removal.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Petition for writ of habeas corpus granted“The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court correctly applied the *Zadvydas* framework. The petitioner was detained for approximately 14 months (April 2025 to June 2026), exceeding the six-month presumptive period. The government failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by showing a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, as no travel documents had been obtained. The decision follows from the law and the recited record. |
Immediate release of Petitioner“Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner under the conditions when she was previously released on her own recognizance.” | agree with court Release is the standard remedy when habeas corpus is granted due to unlawful detention. The condition of release (own recognizance) is consistent with her prior status and the lack of current detention justification. |
Injunction against re-detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) without travel documents“Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for her removal.” | agree with court This injunction aligns with the *Zadvydas* holding that detention beyond the presumptive period requires a significant likelihood of removal. Requiring travel documents before re-detention ensures the government meets this burden before imposing further custody. |
Injunction against re-detention without following specific regulatory procedures“Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner without first following the procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(1), 241.13(i), and any other applicable statutory and regulatory procedures.” | agree with court The court is enforcing compliance with existing regulations governing detention and removal proceedings. This is a standard procedural safeguard to prevent arbitrary detention. |
Injunction against third-country removal without specific procedural safeguards“Respondents are ENJOINED from removing Petitioner to a third country unless they adhere to the following procedures: a. provide written notice to Petitioner, in a language she can understand and to his counsel; b. provide Petitioner a minimum of ten (10) days to raise a fear-based claim for CAT protection prior to removal; c. if Petitioner demonstrates reasonable fear of removal to the country, Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner’s removal proceedings; d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a reasonable fear of removal to the third country, Respondents must provide a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of fifteen (15) days for Petitioner to seek reopening of his immigration proceedings.” | agree with court The court is imposing procedural requirements to protect the petitioner's rights under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and due process regarding third-country removal. While the specific timeframes (10 days, 15 days) are judicially crafted, they are reasonable measures to ensure the petitioner has a meaningful opportunity to assert her rights before removal to a third country, which is a recognized risk in immigration law. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standard from *Zadvydas* and applies it to the facts. It finds that the six-month presumptive period has expired and that the government failed to meet its burden of proof. The remedies ordered (release and injunctions) are appropriate and tailored to prevent the recurrence of the unlawful detention. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.
How this analysis was made · dispute it
inconsistent with cited authorityOpinion
1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 ARISDALIA MERINO CORDERO, Case No.: 26-cv-2382-BJC-GC 9 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 10 v. 11 MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney [ECF No. 1] General of the United States; et al., 12 Respondents. 13 14 On April 15, 2026, Arisdalia Cordero (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for a writ of 15 habeas corpus. ECF No. 1. On May 18, 2026, Respondents filed a return, ECF No. 14, 16 and on May 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF No. 15. For the reasons set forth 17 below, the Court GRANTS the petition. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba, who entered the United States without 20 being admitted or paroled on June 15, 2022, and was thereafter taken into Immigration and 21 Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. ECF No. 14 at 2. She was released on her own 22 recognizance and was placed in removal proceeding before an Immigration Judge. Id. On 23 April 30, 2025, Petitioner was ordered removed in absentia, and her removal order became 24 final on that day. Id. On March 16, 2026, Border Patrol agents encountered Petitioner and 25 detained her. Id. Petitioner has remained in detention since then. 26 On April 15, 2026, Petitioner filed her petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 27 1, and on May 1, 2026, Petitioner filed an amended petition. ECF No. 9. Respondents 28 1 filed a return on May 18, 2026. ECF No. 14. On May 19, 2026, Petitioner filed a traverse, 2 ECF No. 15, and on May 27, 2026, Petitioner filed supplemental briefing. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 5 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 6 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 7 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 8 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a 9 district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in 10 custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 11 § 2241(c)(3). The petitioner must demonstrate that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the 12 Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 13 III. DISCUSSION 14 Section 1231 governs the arrest and detention of noncitizens subject to a final 15 removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231. It directs the Attorney General to effectuate removal 16 “within a period of 90 days,” known as the “removal period,” during which detention is 17 authorized. § 1231(a)(1)–(2). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court clarified that detention 18 beyond the removal period is presumptively lawful for up to six months; after that, a 19 noncitizen may make a prima facie case for relief by sharing “good reason to believe that 20 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” at which 21 point the burden shifts to “the Government [to] respond with evidence sufficient to rebut 22 that showing.” 533 U.S. at 701. 23 The Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied her burden under Zadvydas. Petitioner 24 was ordered removed in April 2025, ECF No. 14 at 2, and the six-month presumptive 25 detention period has expired. No travel documents have been obtained at this time. See 26 ECF No. 15 at 5. Continued detention must be justified by a significant likelihood of 27 removal within a reasonably foreseeable period, and Respondents have failed to meet that 28 standard. l IV. CONCLUSION 2 || Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: 3 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. 4 2. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner under the conditions when she 5 was previously released on her own recognizance. 6 3. Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 7 1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for her removal. 8 4. Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner without first following 9 the procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(1), 241.13(i), and any other applicable 10 statutory and regulatory procedures. 11 5. Respondents are ENJOINED from removing Petitioner to a third country unless they adhere to the following procedures: a. provide written notice to Petitioner, in a language she can understand and to his 13 counsel; 14 b. provide Petitioner a minimum of ten (10) days to raise a fear-based claim for CAT protection prior to removal; 15 c. if Petitioner demonstrates reasonable fear of removal to the country, 16 Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner’s removal proceedings; d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a reasonable fear of removal to 17 the third country, Respondents must provide a meaningful opportunity, and a 18 minimum of fifteen (15) days for Petitioner to seek reopening of his immigration proceedings. 19 0 6. The Clerk of Court shall close this matter. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 12, 2026 22 23 24 Gar Ck 4 fu 25 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks 26 United States District Judge 27 28 YQ