gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-02116 · 2026-06-10 · Unknown

Avonte Hartsfield v. CDCR, The People

Proceeding
writ
Outcome
other — 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 28 1 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 2 A motion to proceed in forma pauperis made by a state prisoner must include an 3 affidavit with a statement of all assets showing an inability to pay the $5.00 filing fee and 4 “a certificate from the warden or other appropriate officer of the place of confinement 5 showing the amount of money or securities that the petitione
Area
civil
Panel
Linda Lopez (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:29Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se state prisoner's habeas petition and motion to proceed in forma pauperis, finding deficiencies in the financial affidavit, the identification of the respondent, and the exhaustion of state remedies. The court denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the case without prejudice, allowing the petitioner to file an amended petition and fee payment or proof of indigency by August 10, 2026.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Denied
“Because Petitioner has not provided the Court with the required financial information, the Court is unable to determine whether he qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis and DENIES the motion [ECF No. 2] without prejudice.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, which mandate specific financial documentation (warden's certificate and trust account statement) for prisoner IFP motions. The order notes the petitioner failed to provide these documents. While the footnote suggests the petitioner has ~$90 in his account (which might technically allow payment of the $5 fee), the court's decision to deny the IFP motion for lack of required documentation is procedurally sound, as the court cannot grant IFP status without the statutory certification. The dismissal without prejudice allows the petitioner to cure this defect.
Case Dismissed Without Prejudice for Failure to Name Proper Respondent
“Thus, the Petition is also subject to dismissal for failure to name a proper Respondent.”
agree with court
The court correctly identified that 'CDCR' and 'The People' are not proper respondents in a § 2254 habeas action. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a), the respondent must be the custodian (warden or secretary). The court cited binding Ninth Circuit authority (Ortiz-Sandoval, Brittingham) to support this. Dismissal without prejudice is the standard remedy for this curable defect.
Case Dismissed Without Prejudice for Failure to Exhaust State Remedies
“Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently entitled to federal habeas relief because Petitioner has not exhausted state court remedies as to any of the enumerated claims in the Petition.”
agree with court
The court applied the mandatory exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). The petitioner admitted to having a state habeas petition pending in superior court but did not allege exhaustion in the California Supreme Court. The court correctly noted that under the 'one full round' rule (O'Sullivan v. Boerckel), the petitioner must exhaust in the highest state court. The court cited Rasberry v. Garcia, which permits dismissal when all claims are unexhausted. The dismissal is without prejudice to allow the petitioner to exhaust or demonstrate unavailability of state remedies.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies three independent, curable defects: lack of IFP documentation, improper respondent, and failure to exhaust. The court cites the correct statutory and case law authorities for each defect. The decision to dismiss without prejudice and provide a deadline to cure is consistent with Ninth Circuit practice for pro se prisoner litigation. The court also appropriately cautions the petitioner about the AEDPA statute of limitations and the distinction between habeas and § 1983 claims, which is helpful for the petitioner's future filings. There are no significant gaps in reasoning or misapplication of law.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AVONTE HARTSFIELD, Case No.: 26-cv-2116-LL-BJW 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 13 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT 14 CDCR, THE PEOPLE, PREJUDICE 15 Respondents. [ECF No. 2] 16 17 On March 20, 2026, Petitioner Avonte Hartsfield (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner 18 proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 19 the Eastern District of California, challenging a 2024 San Diego County Superior Court 20 judgment of conviction, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1–2. 21 On April 2, 2026, the case was transferred to this district. See ECF Nos. 6–8. 22 For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion to proceed in 23 forma pauperis and dismisses the instant habeas action without prejudice. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 28 1 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 2 A motion to proceed in forma pauperis made by a state prisoner must include an 3 affidavit with a statement of all assets showing an inability to pay the $5.00 filing fee and 4 “a certificate from the warden or other appropriate officer of the place of confinement 5 showing the amount of money or securities that the petitioner has in any account in the 6 institution.” R. 3(a)(2), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (2019); see also CivLR 3.2. The 7 motion must also “contain a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or 8 institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the 9 filing of the suit or notice of appeal, obtained from the appropriate official of each prison 10 at which the prisoner is or was confined.” CivLR 3.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 11 While Petitioner has submitted the requisite affidavit, Petitioner has failed to provide 12 the Court with the remainder of the required financial information necessary to evaluate 13 this motion, i.e. the prison certificate and the certified copy of his trust fund account 14 statement.1 See generally ECF No. 2. Because Petitioner has not provided the Court with 15 the required financial information, the Court is unable to determine whether he qualifies to 16 proceed in forma pauperis and DENIES the motion [ECF No. 2] without prejudice. 17 Because the Court cannot proceed until Petitioner has either paid the $5.00 filing fee 18 or qualified to proceed in forma pauperis, the instant habeas case is subject to dismissal 19 without prejudice. See R. 3(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (2019). 20 FAILURE TO NAME A PROPER RESPONDENT 21 Upon review, Petitioner has also failed to name a proper respondent. On federal 22 habeas, a state prisoner must name the state officer having custody of him as the 23 respondent. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996), citing R. 2(a), 24 25 26 27 1 In the submitted affidavit, Petitioner indicates that he has cash in the form of “approx. $90 in CDCR account,” see ECF No. 2 at 2, and as such, it appears Petitioner may be able 28 1 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (2019). Federal courts lack personal jurisdiction 2 when a habeas petition fails to name a proper respondent. See id. 3 The warden is the typical respondent. However, “the rules following section 2254 4 do not specify the warden.” Id. “[T]he ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the 5 warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in 6 charge of state penal institutions.’” Id., quoting R. 2(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 7 Cases (2019), advisory committee’s note. 8 Here, Petitioner has incorrectly named “CDCR” and “The People” as Respondents. 9 See ECF No. 1 at 1. For this Court to entertain the Petition filed in this habeas action, 10 Petitioner must name the warden in charge of the state correctional facility in which he is 11 presently confined or the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 12 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) 13 (per curiam); see also Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1968) (“The actual 14 person who is [the] custodian [of the petitioner] must be the respondent.”) Thus, the 15 Petition is also subject to dismissal for failure to name a proper Respondent. 16 FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES 17 Upon review, it also does not appear state court remedies have been exhausted as to 18 any of the enumerated claims in the Petition. Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge 19 either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state prison must 20 first exhaust state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 21 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1987); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (“[A] state 22 prisoner must normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will 23 entertain his petition for habeas corpus.”) “A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion 24 requirement if: (1) he has ‘fairly presented’ his federal claim to the highest state court with 25 jurisdiction to consider it,” which in this case is the California Supreme Court, “or (2) he 26 demonstrates that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 27 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 28 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any 1 constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate 2 review process.”) 3 Additionally, the claims presented in the federal courts must be the same as those 4 exhausted in state court and must also allege, in state court, how one or more of his federal 5 rights have been violated. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 276 (“Only if the state courts have had 6 the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding 7 does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. Accordingly, we have 8 required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the 9 federal courts.”); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) (“If state courts 10 are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, 11 they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the 12 United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling 13 at a state court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 14 Amendment, he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.”) 15 Petitioner raises four enumerated claims for relief, including claims alleging 16 prosecutorial misconduct, insufficient evidence to support his conviction, ineffective 17 assistance of pretrial and appellate counsel and judicial bias/cumulative error.2 See ECF 18 19 2 Petitioner includes with his Petition a lengthy “factual narrative,” see ECF No. 1 at 16– 20 44, a substantial portion of which appears to recount events occurring during his 21 incarceration, including but not limited to allegations of harassment and abuse, denial of law library access, withheld mail, disciplinary infractions, retaliation, and loss and/or 22 denial of property. See id. at 28–44. Petitioner also appends as exhibits to the Petition a list 23 of CDCR grievance log numbers and copies of correctional documents, including rule violation and incident reports, mental health documents, and restricted housing unit 24 placement notices. Id. at 45–72. To the extent Petitioner seeks the Court’s intervention with 25 respect to events occurring during his incarceration, such contentions do not appear cognizable on federal habeas corpus. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact 26 or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he 27 is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus,” while “a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for 28 1 No. 1 at 5–10. In order to proceed on federal habeas, Petitioner must first exhaust the claims 2 he wishes to present here in the California Supreme Court. Petitioner does not allege that 3 he raised any of the four claims he wishes to present here in the California Supreme Court, 4 instead he indicates he currently has a habeas petition pending in the state superior court 5 raising these issues, see id. at 6-11, and generally asserts that: “Although pending in a state 6 habeas corpus matter, the facts of the case reveal an unconstitutional breakdown in the 7 underlying process that cannot be remedied in state court.” Id. at 12. If Petitioner has raised 8 his claims in the California Supreme Court, he must so specify; otherwise, he must 9 “demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson, 88 F.3d at 829. 10 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal 11 of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached 12 exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” R. 4, Rules 13 Governing § 2254 Cases (2019). Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is 14 not presently entitled to federal habeas relief because Petitioner has not exhausted state 15 court remedies as to any of the enumerated claims in the Petition. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 16 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Once a district court determines that a habeas 17 petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire further into the petitioner’s 18 intentions. Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for failure to exhaust.”), citing 19 Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001). 20 The Court additionally cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective 21 Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a 22 23 24 life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499– 25 500 (1973). Any claims or challenges to Petitioner’s conditions of confinement must be brought, “‘if at all,’ under § 1983.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) 26 (en banc) (“[W]e hold that if a state prisoner’s claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas 27 corpus,’ it may not be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.”), quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 28 1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 2 State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of: 3 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 4 seeking such review; 5 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 6 created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 7 the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 8 9 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 10 newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 11 applicable to cases on collateral review; or 12 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 13 presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 14 15 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 16 The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus 17 petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th 18 Cir. 1999), but see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is 19 ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for 20 placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 21 filings.”). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations does run 22 while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 23 (2001). 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 28 I CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis 3 ||[ECF No. 2] and DISMISSES the instant habeas case without prejudice for failure to 4 satisfy the filing fee requirement, failure to name a proper Respondent on federal habeas 5 ||corpus, and failure to exhaust state court remedies. If Petitioner wishes to re-open and 6 || proceed with this habeas case, Petitioner must submit, no later than August 10, 2026, a 7 of this Order along with BOTH: (1) a completed Amended Petition form that cures 8 ||the pleading deficiencies outlined in the instant Order and (2) either the $5.00 fee or 9 ||adequate proof of Petitioner’s inability to pay the fee. The Clerk of Court is directed to 10 ||send Petitioner a blank In Forma Pauperis Application and a blank 28 U.S.C. § 2254 11 || Amended Habeas Petition form together with a copy of this Order. 12 || IT ISSO ORDERED. 13 ||Dated: June 10, 2026 NO 14 eS 15 Honorable Linda Lopez 6 United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28