Christin Powers v. Apple
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Dana M. Sabraw (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, her complaint against Apple, and an omnibus motion. The court granted the IFP motion, dismissed the complaint sua sponte with leave to amend, and denied the omnibus motion.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Granted“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion.” | agree with court The order recites that the plaintiff receives $2,040/month in alimony, is unemployed otherwise, has less than $4.00 in checking, and is $150,000 in debt. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), this financial showing demonstrates an inability to pay fees. The decision follows from the law and the record recited. |
Complaint Dismissed Sua Sponte with Leave to Amend“Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend.” | agree with court The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard (plausibility) to the IFP screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The complaint alleged inconsistent banking opportunities and a dropped call but failed to identify any cause of action or legal theory, explicitly deferring to the judge to assign 'proper legal clauses.' The court correctly noted it cannot supply essential elements of a claim. Dismissal with leave to amend is the standard remedy for a pro se complaint that fails to state a claim but is not frivolous or malicious. |
Omnibus Motion Denied“The Court DENIES the requests in the Omnibus Motion.” | agree with court The court denied the motion because the underlying complaint was dismissed, leaving no operative complaint to base the requests on, and because the requests were vague and lacked legal basis. This is a defensible procedural ruling. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the applicable legal standards for IFP screening and failure to state a claim. It applies the plausibility standard from Iqbal and Twombly, acknowledges the liberal construction of pro se pleadings, but correctly limits that construction by noting the court cannot supply essential elements. The factual basis for the dismissal (lack of cause of action, deferral to the court for legal theories, confusing allegations) is clearly stated. The denial of the omnibus motion is procedurally sound given the dismissal of the underlying complaint.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHRISTIN POWERS, Case No.: 26-cv-03050-DMS-JAC Plaintiff, 12 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; APPLE, DISMISSING COMPLAINT SUA 14 Defendant. SPONTE; DENYING OMNIBUS 15 MOTION 16 [ECF Nos. 1–3] 17 18 Plaintiff Christin Powers, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Defendant 19 Apple on May 15, 2026. (Compl., ECF No 1.) Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to 20 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2), and an omnibus motion, 21 wherein she makes miscellaneous requests (“Omnibus Motion”), (Omnibus Mot., ECF No. 22 3). For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, dismisses 23 the Complaint sua sponte, and denies all requests in the Omnibus Motion. 24 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP 25 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Civil Local Rule 3.2, any action sought to 26 be filed IFP “must be accompanied by an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets 27 which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2. Plaintiff 28 1 receives $2,040 a month in alimony payments. (IFP Mot. 1.) She reportedly is unemployed 2 and does not receive income from another source. (Id. at 1–2.) She has less than $4.00 in 3 her checking accounts and is $150,000 in debt. (Id. at 3–4.) In light of Plaintiff’s financial 4 standing, the Court finds Plaintiff is eligible to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a). 5 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion. 6 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF COMPLAINT 7 A. Legal Standard 8 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint must be screened by the Court. 28 9 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that is frivolous 10 or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 11 immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 12 (per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 13 prisoners”). 14 The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under 15 § 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure 16 to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) 17 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 18 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 19 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 20 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the 21 Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 22 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not 23 initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 24 1982). 25 In addition, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 26 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to 27 state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 if the factual assertions in 28 it, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable 1 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 2 “[T]he pleading standard . . . does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands 3 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting 4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A complaint that is too verbose, 5 long, confusing, redundant, irrelevant, or conclusory may be dismissed for failure to 6 comply with Rule 8.” Alexis v. Contreras, No. 25-CV-1625, 2025 WL 1811819, at *2 7 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2025) (citing Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058– 8 59 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases upholding dismissals for those reasons)). 9 B. Discussion 10 Plaintiff asserts that her “Apple card” and Goldman Sachs have provided 11 inconsistent banking opportunities over several years. (Compl. 2.) She claims the most 12 recent grievance occurred a week prior to filing suit. (Id.) It appears Plaintiff’s card was 13 shut down. (Id.) When she attempted to contact a “human banker,” she was prompted to 14 input her phone number during the call; however, upon entering her phone number, the call 15 would drop. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff wishes to “own and control all of Apple,” as well 16 as JPMorgan Chase. (Id. at 2–3.) 17 Plaintiff fails to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard. The Complaint does not allege 18 any cause of action and fails to plausibly allege facts to support the elements of any claim. 19 See Rashidiasl v. MEP, No. 23-CV-0325-GPC-DEB, 2023 WL 3728685, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 20 May 30, 2023). Plaintiff states she “defer[s] to Judge to assign proper legal clauses [and] 21 law” for this alleged harm. (Compl. 3.) However, the Court cannot tell Plaintiff what 22 causes of action to bring. Cf. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268 (holding a court cannot “supply essential 23 elements of [claims] that were not initially pled”). Further, the allegations pled are unclear 24 and confusing. It is difficult to understand what harm Plaintiff suffered and how that harm 25 allegedly occurred. As pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not afford Defendant a fair 26 opportunity to defend itself. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with 27 leave to amend. 28 I TIT. OMNIBUS MOTION 2 Plaintiff requests the Court (1) transfer this case to “Chief Justice”; (2) make a ruling 3 or before May 22, 2026; (3) schedule a settlement conference attended by a 4 ||representative for each company; and (4) if needed, contact “the bank or the board” about 5 settlement” on or before May 20, 2026. (Omnibus Mot. 1.) First, because the 6 ||Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, there is no operative complaint on which to base 7 || Plaintiff's requests. See Abera v. San Diego Pacificvu LLC, No. 3:25-CV-01437-RBM- 8 || DEB, 2025 WL 1645593, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2025). Second, these requests are vague 9 || and lack any legal basis for the Court to take such actions. The Court DENIES the requests 10 |/in the Omnibus Motion. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP, 13 || DISMISSES the Complaint, and DENIES the Omnibus Motion. Plaintiff may file an 14 || Amended Complaint to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21) 15 || days from the date this Order is entered. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: June 8, 2026 Ig Jrrn Yn « LA Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28