gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-03241 · 2026-06-03 · Unknown

Jerome L. Grimes v. Armada Transport, Inc.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Anthony J. Battaglia (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:30Z · confidence high

The court considered a pro se prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and his civil rights complaint against a towing company. The court denied the IFP motion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's three-strikes rule and dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee.

What the court decidedThe model
Denial of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
“For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S. § 1915(g)”
agree with court
The court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which bars prisoners from proceeding IFP after three prior dismissals for frivolousness, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim. The court relied on judicial notice of its own records and a prior order in a related case (Grimes v. Arguetta) to establish that the plaintiff had 'far more than three' strikes. The court also correctly determined that the plaintiff did not meet the 'imminent danger of serious physical injury' exception, as the complaint alleged past torts (vehicle tampering) rather than an ongoing threat. The application of the law to the facts recited in the order is correct.
Dismissal of Civil Action Without Prejudice
“DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this case based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the full $405 statutory and administrative filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)”
agree with court
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), a civil action must be dismissed if the filing fee is not paid and the plaintiff is not granted IFP status. Since the court correctly denied IFP status under § 1915(g), the dismissal for failure to pay the fee is the mandatory procedural consequence. The dismissal is without prejudice, allowing the plaintiff to refile if he pays the fee or if the three-strikes bar is lifted (e.g., via the imminent danger exception, though not applicable here).
Certification of Frivolous Appeal
“CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal this Order would be frivolous and “not taken in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)”
agree with court
The court certified that an appeal would be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Given the clear statutory bar under § 1915(g) and the plaintiff's extensive history of similar dismissals, an appeal challenging the application of the three-strikes rule would likely be considered frivolous. This is a standard procedural step in such cases.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally and substantively sound. It correctly identifies the legal framework (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and § 1914(a)), applies the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the three-strikes rule, and uses judicial notice of prior court records to establish the plaintiff's strike count. It also correctly analyzes and rejects the imminent danger exception based on the facts of the complaint (past torts vs. ongoing threat). The authorities cited are appropriate and binding within the Ninth Circuit. The reasoning directly answers the motion and the procedural requirement for dismissal.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

record incomplete

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 26-cv-03241-AJB-SBC 14 Plaintiff, ORDER: 15 (1) DENYING MOTION TO 16 v. PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS 17 ARMADA TRANSPORT, INC., BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Doc. No. 2); AND 18 Defendant.

19 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 20 FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 21 REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 22 23 INTRODUCTION 24 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at the Larry 25 D. Smith Correctional Facility in Riverside County, has filed this civil rights action against 26 Defendant Armada Transport, Inc. (See Doc. No. 1.) Because Plaintiff failed to pay the 27 filing fee and is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the case is DISMISSED 28 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 1 DISCUSSION 2 Typically, parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay 3 filing fees of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). “An action may proceed despite failure to 4 pay the filing fees only if the party is granted IFP status.” Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 5 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Moore v. 6 Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). To further “the 7 congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court,” prisoners 8 cannot proceed IFP once they “have, while incarcerated, on 3 or more prior occasions had 9 claims dismissed due to their frivolity, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim.” Tierney 10 v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311–12 (9th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up); see also 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(g) (“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action under this section if the prisoner 12 has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought 13 an action or appeal . . . that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 14 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under 15 imminent danger of serious physical injury.”). 16 When courts review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as one of these three 17 strikes, “the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial” because “the 18 central question is whether the dismissal rang the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act] 19 bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 20 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Prior cases are considered strikes, then, “even if 21 the district court styles such dismissal as denial of the prisoner’s application to file the 22 action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 23 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 24 25 26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional 27 administrative fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). The $55 administrative fee 28 1 demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP for having three strikes, but “in 2 some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 3 satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” 4 Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). 5 While incarcerated, Plaintiff has had numerous prior civil actions dismissed on the 6 grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief 7 may be granted. See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding 8 that “a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records 9 of [different courts] in other cases.”). Indeed, a recent order in another matter found that 10 “Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, while incarcerated, has had far more than three prior civil 11 actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a 12 claim upon which relief may be granted.” Grimes v. Arguetta, No. 25-cv-1979-BAS-MSB, 13 2025 WL 2495242, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025). That order took judicial notice that 14 Plaintiff has filed “over 600 civil actions in multiple federal district courts across the 15 country dating back to 1986[;]” identified at least five specific strikes entered in the Eastern 16 District of California, Middle District of Florida, and District of Maryland; and it noted 17 prior § 1915(g) bars in this Court, the Northern District of California, Western District of 18 Louisiana, Eastern District of Kentucky, Middle and Northern Districts of Florida, and the 19 District of Maryland dating as far back as 2007. Id. at *2–3. 20 Nor can Plaintiff meet the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Imminent danger requires an allegation that a harm is “ready 22 to take place” or “hanging threateningly over one’s head.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 23 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). It “cannot be triggered solely by complaints of 24 past injury or generalized fears of possible future harm.” Hernandez v. Williams, No. 25 21-cv-347-MMA-KSC, 2021 WL 1317376, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2021) (cleaned up). 26 Plaintiff claims Defendant Armada Transport, Inc., a towing/impound yard operator, 27 committed various torts against him by tampering with Plaintiff’s 2007 Ford Focus while 28 it was at Defendant’s tow yard in October 2024. (See Doc. No. 1 at 3–5.) Plaintiff does not | || attempt to allege he is in any imminent danger. Therefore, nothing in his complaint satisfies 2 ||the imminent danger exception. 3 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to proceed 5 ||IFP (Doc. No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); DISMISSES WITHOUT 6 || PREJUDICE this case based on Plaintiffs failure to pay the full $405 statutory and 7 ||administrative filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal 8 this Order would be frivolous and “not taken in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 9 || § 1915(a)(3); and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: June 3, 2026 13 United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4