Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 HECTOR RAMIREZ PEDRO, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03186-RBM-SBC 10 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 11 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 12 TODD BLANCHE, U.S. Attorney General, et [Doc. 1] al., 13 Respondents. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Hector Ramirez Pedro’s (“Petitioner”) 17 Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) 18 challenging the lawfulness of his detention by United States Immigration and Customs 19 Enforcement. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States without inspection 22 in or about 2005. (Id. ¶ 27.) He has resided here continuously since then, and has no 23 criminal history. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.) On April 30, 2026, while driving in Florida, Petitioner 24 was stopped by a police officer and “subsequently taken into ICE custody based on his 25 immigration status.” (Id. ¶ 9.) On May 4, 2026, he was issued a Notice to Appear charging 26 him as inadmissible under Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 27 212(a)(7)(A)(i). (Id. ¶ 36.) Petitioner is now detained at the Imperial Regional Detention 28 Facility. (Id. ¶ 21.) 1 On May 21, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition. (Doc. 1.) The Court set a briefing 2 schedule the next day. (Doc. 3.) Respondents filed their Response to Petition on May 28, 3 2026. (Doc. 6.) Petitioner filed his Reply in Support of Habeas Corpus Petition on June 4 2, 2026. (Doc. 7.) 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 7 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 8 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 9 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 10 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 11 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 12 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 13 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 14 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Petitioner argues that his detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the Fifth 17 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 54–72.) He seeks immediate release or, 18 alternatively, a prompt § 1226(a) bond hearing. (Id., Prayer for Relief; Doc. 7 at 2–3.) 19 Respondents do not substantively respond to Petitioner’s arguments, noting only that they 20 “do not oppose an order from this Court directing a bond hearing be held pursuant to 21 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” (Doc. 6 at 1–2.) 22 The Court has granted petitions filed by similarly-situated petitioners. See, e.g., 23 Silvestre-Mendoza v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03206-RBM-DDL, 2025 WL 3512410, at 24 *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025). In that decision, the Court found that “‘a proper 25 understanding of the relevant statutes, in light of their plain text, overall structure, and . . . 26 case law interpreting them, compels the conclusion that § 1225’s provisions for mandatory 27 detention of noncitizens seeking admission [do] not apply to someone like [the petitioner],’ 28 who has been residing in the United States” for several years. Id. at *1 (quoting Lopez 1 Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). The Court incorporates its 2 reasoning in Silvestre-Mendoza, and makes the same findings, here. 3 There is no dispute that Petitioner was detained on April 30, 2026, in the interior of 4 the United States, after having resided here for 20 years. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9, 27.) Therefore, the 5 discretionary detention procedures of § 1226 govern Petitioner’s detention, and the Petition 6 must be granted. The Court also finds that immediate release, rather than a bond hearing, 7 is the appropriate remedy. See E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. 8 Wash. 2025) (“Although the Government notes that Petitioner may request a bond hearing 9 while detained, such a post-deprivation hearing cannot serve as an adequate procedural 10 safeguard because it is after the fact and cannot prevent an erroneous deprivation of 11 liberty.”); Jorge M.F. v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (“if 12 Petitioner is detained, he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid”); 13 Domingo v. Kaiser, Case No. 25-cv-05893 (RFL), 2025 WL 1940179, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 14 July 14, 2025) (“Even if Petitioner[] received a prompt post-detention bond hearing under 15 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and was released at that point, he will have already suffered the harm 16 that is the subject of his motion; that is, his potentially erroneous detention.”). 17 IV. CONCLUSION1 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly: 19 1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody. 20 2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall 21 receive a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to 22 determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall bear the burden of 23 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,2 that Petitioner poses a danger to the 24 25 1 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining 26 grounds for relief. 27 2 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her 28 1 community or a risk of flight. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 ||DATE: June 3, 2026 5 oe RUTH cual MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 25 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [a 6 noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond’’). 27 ||° This relief has been granted in similar matters. See E.A. T.-B, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1324; 28 Duong v. Kaiser, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1043-44 (N.D. Cal. 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119-20 (E.D. Cal. 2025).