Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HENRRY AMAYA-INGLES, Case No.: 3:26-cv-02223-RBM-MMP 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241 AS 14 KRISTI NOEM, in her Official Capacity, MOOT Secretary of the Department of Homeland 15 Security, et al., [Doc. 1] 16 Respondents. 17 18 19 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Henrry Amaya-Ingles (“Petitioner”) Petition 20 for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Petition is DENIED AS MOOT. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 A. Factual Background 24 Petitioner, a citizen and national of El Salvador, is currently detained at the Imperial 25 Regional Detention Center. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 30.) On October 16, 2024, an immigration judge 26 (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 27 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and ordered him removed. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 31.) 28 Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the 1 BIA dismissed his appeal on February 6, 2025. (Id. ¶ 32.) Petitioner then appealed the 2 BIA’s dismissal before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Id. ¶ 4.)1 3 Petitioner moved to reopen his case before the BIA, and the BIA denied his motion 4 on March 11, 2026. (Id. ¶ 33.) Petitioner filed an appeal of the BIA’s denial of his motion 5 to open with the Ninth Circuit, which remains pending. (Id. (citing Amaya-Ingles v. Bondi, 6 No. 26-1691 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026).) 7 On January 29, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 8 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Arizona Petition”) in the United States District Court for the District of 9 Arizona. (Doc. 9 at 1.) On May 7, 2026, as discussed further below (see Sec.I.B.), District 10 Judge Angela M. Martinez adopted Magistrate Judge John Z. Boyle’s recommendation to 11 grant the Arizona Petition in part and “ordered [that] Petitioner be provided an 12 individualized bond hearing within three days of the Court’s order.” (Id. at 1–2.) 13 Pursuant to the Arizona district court’s order, Petitioner received an individualized 14 bond hearing before an IJ on May 11, 2026. (See Doc. 11-1 at 2–5.) At the hearing, the IJ 15 denied Petitioner’s release on bond, finding that Petitioner “poses a risk of flight” and “a 16 danger to the community, as he has a significant criminal history.” (Id. at 4.) The IJ noted 17 that Petitioner had been previously removed from the United States in 2014 and then again 18 in 2024, and that Petitioner has multiple criminal convictions including one for which he 19 received an eight year sentence. (Id.; see also Doc. 1 ¶ 36 (alleging that Petitioner has a 20 criminal history in the United States).) 21 22 23 24 25 1 Based on the Court’s review of the cited docket, the Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s appeal concerning his removal order on October 10, 2025, 26 and denied his subsequent motion for reconsideration on January 30, 2026. See Amaya- 27 Ingles v. Bondi, No. 25-898 (9th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025), ECF No. 20 (order concerning Petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT 28 1 B. Procedural Background 2 On April 8, 2026, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed the instant Petition (Doc. 1), a 3 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2), and a Motion for 4 Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 3). Shortly thereafter, the Court issued an Order granting 5 the IFP Motion, appointing Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. as counsel, and setting a 6 briefing schedule. (Doc. 4 at 1–3.) 7 On April 29, 2026, Respondents filed a Notice of Habeas Relief informing the Court 8 that Petitioner previously filed the Arizona Petition in the District of Arizona and 9 Magistrate Judge Boyle had partially granted the Arizona Petition on April 17, 2026. (Doc. 10 9 at 1.) That next day, the Parties filed a Joint Motion to Stay in which they clarified that 11 the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation for relief as to the Arizona Petition had not yet 12 been adopted and requested that this action be temporarily stayed. (Doc. 10 at 2.) 13 On May 15, 2026, the Parties filed a Joint Status Report stating that Judge Martinez 14 had adopted the recommendation and confirming that Petitioner was provided with an 15 individualized bond hearing on May 11, 2026. (Doc. 11 at 2.) The Parties also stated that 16 they “met and conferred [but] were unable to come to an agreement on a recommendation 17 to the Court” regarding the instant Petition. (Id.) Petitioner states he has no further briefing 18 to add to the Petition and requests that the Court rule on his remaining claims. (Id.) 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 21 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). 22 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 23 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 24 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may 25 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 26 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the 27 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 28 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Petitioner claims his continued detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and the Fifth 3 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 114–121.) Respondents argue that the 4 Petition should be dismissed as moot because “Petitioner has already been granted the 5 habeas relief he seeks in the instant [P]etition before the Court.” (Doc. 11 at 2.) 6 Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “actual, 7 ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). 8 The “basic question in determining mootness is whether there is a present controversy as 9 to which effective relief can be granted.” Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 10 1244 (9th Cir. 1988). “A case becomes moot when interim relief or events have deprived 11 the court of the ability to redress the party’s injuries.” United States v. Alder Creek Water 12 Co., 823 F.2d 343, 345 (9th Cir. 1987); see also NASD Disp. Resol., Inc. v. Jud. Council, 13 488 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding appeal was moot when the plaintiffs had 14 already been granted their requested relief). In the context of immigration, “[f]or a habeas 15 petition to continue to present a live controversy after the petitioner’s release or deportation 16 . . . , there must be some remaining ‘collateral consequence’ that may be redressed by 17 success on the petition.” Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007). 18 In this case, Petitioner claims his constitutional due process rights were violated by 19 his continued detention without a bond hearing. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6–8, 38–41, 90–129.) As 20 relief, Petitioner requests his release from ICE custody “unless [the Government] 21 schedule[s] a hearing before the IJ where it . . . must establish by clear and convincing 22 evidence that Petitioner present[s] a risk of flight or current public danger, even after 23 consideration of alternatives to detention that could mitigate any risk that Petitioner’s 24 release would present; and [ ] if the [G]overnment cannot meet its heavy burden, the IJ 25 orders Petitioner’s release on appropriate conditions of supervisions.” (Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis 26 in original); see id. ¶¶ 9, 94, 131–36.) Petitioner received such a bond hearing on May 11, 27 2026, pursuant to the District of Arizona’s order, at which an IJ found the Government 28 “met their burden by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] poses a danger to the 1 community and denie[d] bond at this time.” (Doc. 11-1 at 4.) In the IJ’s Order, the IJ also 2 ||included several reasons for denying Petitioner bond. (See id.) Because the District of 3 || Arizona’s order granted Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing, “Petitioner’s request for 4 ||release premised on the argument that [he] was wrongfully denied a bond hearing . . . is 5 || both moot and duplicative of the [District of Arizona’s] order.” Birru v. Barr, No. 2:20- 6 ||cv-00890-TLN-DB, 2020 WL 2395078, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2020) (citing Slack v. 7 || McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000) (“Federal courts . . . retain broad powers to prevent 8 || duplicative or unnecessary litigation.”’)). 9 Petitioner does not challenge the sufficiency of the bond hearing he received on May 10 |} 11, 2026, and any such arguments would nonetheless be more appropriately addressed 11 ||before the BIA. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011). Nor 12 Petitioner raise any other collateral consequences to maintain a live case or 13 ||controversy. See Abdala, 488 F.3d at 1064. Because Petitioner received an individualized 14 ||bond hearing, there is no further relief the Court can provide at this time and Petitioner’s 15 ||challenge to his immigration detention without a bond hearing is now moot. See 16 || Valenzuela v. Semaia, Case No. 5:25-cv-02853-SSS-RAO, 2025 WL 4041920, at *3 (C.D. 17 ||Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) (denying petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction as moot 18 || where petitioner sought an individualized bond hearing but had received such a hearing 19 || and the IJ’s bond memorandum included “the reasons behind why [he] was denied bond.”). 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED AS MOOT and the Joint 22 || Motion to Stay (Doc. 10) is DENIED AS MOOT. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED 23 || WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close this case. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ||DATE: June 3, 2026 Rt Barney, Margy 17 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28