gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-01032 · 2026-06-02 · Unknown

Burk N. Ashford v. California Superior Court of County of San Diego, Hon. Michael S. Groch Presiding; California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Div. One, Hon. Justice Judith McConnell, Presiding; Court Reporters Board of California; Jennifer

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Todd W. Robinson (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:29Z · confidence high

The court reviewed Plaintiff Burk N. Ashford's First Amended Complaint, which alleged constitutional violations regarding the denial of a free state court trial transcript and a stay of judgment. The court dismissed the case without prejudice and without leave to amend, finding the claims barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

What the court decidedThe model
Dismissal of the First Amended Complaint without prejudice and without leave to amend
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE but WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B).”
agree with court
The dismissal is legally supported by the Eleventh Amendment bar against suing state courts and judges in their judicial capacity, as well as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which precludes federal district courts from acting as appellate courts for state judgments. The denial of leave to amend is appropriate because the defects are jurisdictional and structural (immunity and doctrine), not curable by better pleading.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies that the plaintiff is attempting to use federal district court as an appellate body for state court orders, which is barred by Rooker-Feldman. It also correctly applies Eleventh Amendment immunity to the named defendants (state courts and judges). The court properly notes that Ex parte Young does not apply because the relief sought is retrospective (overturning a past order) and because the defendants are state courts/judges rather than executive officials enforcing unconstitutional laws. The reasoning is complete and supported by binding Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court authority.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 BURK N. ASHFORD, Case No.: 26-CV-1032 TWR (MSB)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING CASE 13 v. PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 14 CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT OF COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, HON. 15 (ECF No. 4) MICHAEL S. GROCH PRESIDING; 16 CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH DISTRICT, DIV. ONE, HON. 17 JUSTICE JUDITH MCCONNELL, 18 PRESIDING; COURT REPORTERS BOARD OF CALIFORNIA; JENNIFER 19 ESQUIVEL, AS THE OFFICIAL 20 COURT REPORTER; AND DOES 1-20, 21 Defendants. 22 23 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Burk N. Ashford’s First Amended Complaint 24 (“FAC,” ECF No. 4), which alleges various constitutional challenges relating to the denial 25 of a state court trial transcript. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s First Amended 26 Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(e)(2)(B). 28 / / / 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. Factual Background 3 Plaintiff filed a state court case in California Superior Court against his landlord 4 based on allegations that the landlord took possession of Plaintiff’s belongings. (See FAC 5 at 3, 16.) Plaintiff’s case went to trial, and he lost. (See id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges due 6 process violations throughout the trial. (See id. at 5.) Plaintiff then filed an appeal in the 7 California Court of Appeal and requested a free trial transcript to aid in his appeal. (See 8 id. at 3.) Plaintiff’s request for a free transcript was denied. (See id.) Plaintiff argues that 9 this decision deprives him of the necessary evidence for his appeal of the trial court’s 10 judgment and his “intellectual personal property.” (See id. at 6.) Additionally, Plaintiff 11 argues that the denial of the transcript constitutes “obstruction and the violation of free 12 speech.” (Id.) 13 Plaintiff also filed a motion in his California Superior Court case requesting a stay 14 pending his appeal to the California Court of Appeals, which was denied. (See id. at 4.) 15 Related to the denial of the stay, Plaintiff alleges “CCP § 1176 was passed and installed 16 ordering that appeals to the federal court are not enforceable and should not be recognized 17 which clearly violates any and all rights to due process of law.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges 18 violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 19 States Constitution. (See id. at 7.) Plaintiff also states his action is being brought pursuant 20 to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). (See id. at 2.) 21 Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: 1) California Superior Court of County of 22 San Diego, Hon. Michael S. Groch Presiding, 2) California Court of Appeal, Fourth 23 District, Div. One, Hon. Justice Judith McConnell, Presiding, 3) the Court Reporters Board 24 of California, and 4) Jennifer Esquivel, as the Official Court Reporter. (See generally id.) 25 Plaintiff requests that this Court order his state court appeal be reinstated and a preliminary 26 and permanent injunction requiring production of his trial transcript. (See id. at 8.) 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. Procedural Background 2 On March 19, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In 3 Forma Pauperis and dismissed his Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (ECF 4 No. 3.) Plaintiff filed the instant First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in response to the 5 Court’s Order. (ECF No. 4.) 6 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 7 I. Legal Standard 8 The Court must screen all IFP complaints before service on defendants to ensure that 9 they are not frivolous or malicious, that they state a claim on which relief may be granted, 10 and that they do not seek monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding 12 that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). A 13 “frivolous” complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 14 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint is also “frivolous” if it “fails to establish subject 15 matter jurisdiction or standing.” L.R. v. Mueller, No. 23-CV-03421-PHK, 2025 WL 16 1635505, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2025). 17 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 18 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 19 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 20 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive screening, all complaints must include a “short and 21 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 8(a)(2). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 23 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 24 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially 25 plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 26 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 27 U.S. at 678. 28 1 II. Analysis 2 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 3 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against 4 a nonconsenting state or arm of the state. See Munoz v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 5 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the California 6 Superior Court, County of San Diego and the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 7 Division One, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment because state courts are arms of the 8 state. See id. (“[T]he Superior Court of the State of California has sovereign immunity as 9 an arm of the state.”) Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims against Justice Michael S. Groch and 10 Justice Judith McConnell are barred by the Eleventh Amendment because “state court 11 judges cannot be sued in federal court in their judicial capacity under the Eleventh 12 Amendment.” Id. at 981. Further, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against Jennifer 13 Esquivel, as the official court reporter. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Court, 14 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the Sacramento 15 County Superior Court (or its employees), because such suits are barred by the Eleventh 16 Amendment.”). 17 Plaintiff alleges his claims are brought pursuant to “Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 18 (1908).” (FAC at 2.) Ex parte Young is an “narrow exception” to Eleventh Amendment 19 immunity limited to actions where private parties “seek judicial orders in federal court 20 preventing state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal 21 law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021). Plaintiff’s attempt to 22 rely on Ex parte Young fails for multiple reasons. First, the Ex parte Young doctrine is 23 limited to actions where a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief to end an ongoing 24 25 1 To the extent Plaintiff attempts to challenge the constitutionality of California Code of Civil 26 Procedure § 1176, it appears Plaintiff does not understand the Code section. Plaintiff states that Section 1176 orders “that appeals to the federal court are not enforceable and should not be recognized.” (FAC 27 at 4.) In reality, Section 1176 allows a trial court to stay a judgment in an unlawful detainer case when there is a showing of “extreme hardship.” Accordingly, this argument is subject to dismissal as frivolous 28 1 violation of federal law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) Here, Plaintiff 2 is seeking retrospective relief, the overturning of a past court order. See Tezak v. LaCasse, 3 No. 2:25-CV-3442 DJC AC (PS), 2026 WL 1067545, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026) 4 (finding that the Ex parte Young doctrine did not apply because the plaintiff sought 5 “retrospective relief, such as vacating purportedly void state court orders.”); see also 6 Mogan v. Petrou, No. 21-CV-06959-TSH, 2021 WL 5359400, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 7 2021) (finding that the plaintiff was not seeking prospective injunctive relief when he was 8 attempting to overturn the imposition of sanctions in a state court action). 9 Second, to the extent Plaintiff is suing the California Superior Court, California 10 Court of Appeal, and Court Reporter’s Board, the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply 11 because these Defendants “cannot be sued in an individual capacity.” Munoz, 91 F.4th at 12 980. Lastly, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have made clear that the Ex parte Young 13 exception does not allow for “injunctions against judges acting in their judicial capacity.” 14 Id.; Whole Woman’s Health, 595 U.S. at 39 (“As Ex parte Young put it, ‘an injunction 15 against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ ‘would be a violation of the whole scheme of our 16 Government.”’ (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163). Instead, if a state court errs in its 17 ruling, the “traditional remedy has been some form of appeal,” including one to the United 18 States Supreme Court, which Plaintiff did in fact pursue.2 Whole Woman’s Health, 595 19 U.S. at 39. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and Plaintiff’s 20 suit is subject to dismissal under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 21 B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 22 Even if Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, his claims 23 would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides 24 that “a losing party in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be 25 appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing 26 27 2 See FAC at 4 (“A motion for a writ of mandamus was timely filed with the appeals court to require production of the transcript which was denied and subsequently appealed to the California Supreme Court 28 1 party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Doe v. Mann, 2 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005– 3 06 (1994)); see also Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Rooker– 4 Feldman doctrine forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in federal district 5 court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, and seeking federal court 6 review and rejection of that judgment.”). 7 Here, Plaintiff seeks relief from a state court order denying him a free trial court 8 transcript and alleges it was legal error for the state court to deny him the free trial court 9 transcript. He also alleges that it was a legal error for the state court to deny him a stay 10 while he appealed his case. Plaintiff requests that his state court appeal be reinstated and 11 “a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the defendant(s) from holding the Trial 12 Reporter’s Transcript.” (FAC at 8.) 13 Because both of Plaintiff’s arguments are de facto appeals of state court’s orders, 14 they are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 781 15 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that when the plaintiff asserted legal error by the state court and 16 requested relief from the state court judgment, the plaintiff’s claim was barred by Rooker- 17 Feldman and it was immaterial that the claim was framed as a constitutional challenge); 18 see also Meredith v. Idaho Dep’t of Correction, No. 1:20-CV-00377-BLW, 2020 WL 19 6536648, at *3–4 (D. Idaho Nov. 4, 2020) (finding the plaintiff’s claim challenging the 20 denial of the ability to proceed in forma pauperis in state court was barred by the Rooker- 21 Feldman doctrine because a decision “would be predicated on a determination that 22 the state court’s decision to deny fee waivers was improper”). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are 23 barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Plaintiff’s suit is subject to dismissal under 42 24 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / I CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE but 3 || WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. 4 1915(e)(2)(B). The Clerk of the Court SHALL CLOSE this case. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Dated: June 2, 2026 —_—— (2 [59 re g Honorable Todd W. Robinson 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28