gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:25-cv-03083 · 2026-06-03 · Unknown

David Clarence DeGeus v. County of San Diego, et. al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Benjamin J. Cheeks (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:29Z · confidence high

The court reviewed a pro se plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the accompanying complaint. The court granted the motion to proceed IFP and determined the complaint survived mandatory screening.

What the court decidedThe model
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Granted
“As such, the motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The plaintiff demonstrated an inability to pay the filing fee by showing monthly income of $1,867.57 and expenses of $1,783.60, leaving a surplus of approximately $84. This is insufficient to pay the $402 filing fee. The court correctly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Complaint Survives Mandatory Screening
“Having review □□□□□□□□□□ complaint, the Court finds it contains allegations sufficient to survive the “low threshold” proceed beyond screening.”
agree with court
The court applied the standard from 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and cited Wilhelm v. Rotman for the 'low threshold' of pleading. The complaint alleges specific facts regarding child support enforcement, garnishment, and alleged misrepresentations by defendants. While the legal theories are mixed (state law and federal), the factual allegations are sufficient to state a claim at the screening stage, which is a lower bar than a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the statutory basis for IFP status and the mandatory screening requirement. It accurately cites Ninth Circuit precedent (Calhoun) to confirm that non-prisoners are subject to § 1915(e) screening. The application of the 'low threshold' from Wilhelm is appropriate for a screening order. The court's finding that the plaintiff cannot pay the fee is supported by the numbers in the affidavit. The conclusion that the complaint survives screening is defensible given the specific factual allegations provided.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID CLARENCE DEGEUS, Case No.: 25-cv-3083-BJC-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 13 v. 14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et. al., [ECF No. 2] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 INTRODUCTION 20 On November 11, 2025, David Clarence DeGeus, proceeding pro se, filed the instant 21 complaint. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 22 (“IFP”). ECF Nos. 2. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 23 motion to proceed IFP. 24 DISCUSSION 25 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 26 All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 27 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 28 $402. See U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5. A court may authorize the commencement of a 1 suit without prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement 2 of all his or her assets, showing that he or she is unable to pay the fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 3 1915(a). 4 Plaintiff contends he receives monthly retirement payments of $1,867.57. ECF No. 5 2 at 3. He reports no employment history for the last two years, one bank account with a 6 balance of $175, and a home valued at $25. Id. at 4-5. He lists expenses totaling $1,783.60 7 per month. As submitted, it appears Plaintiff is unable to pay the one-time filing fee. As 8 such, the motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. 9 II. Screening of the Complaint 10 A complaint filed by any person proceeding in formal pauperis pursuant to 28 § 11 1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review, and dismissal by the court to the 12 extent it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 13 seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 14 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). A court may also dismiss an action 16 sua sponte, at any time, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); 17 Harmon v. Superior Ct. of State of Cal. In & For Los Angeles Cnty., 307 F.2d 796, 797 18 (9th Cir. 1962). 19 In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 407, 20 California’s Unfair Competition Law, fraud, conversion, negligence, and intentional 21 infliction of emotional distress. He names the County of San Diego, San Diego County 22 Department of Child Support Services (“DCSS”), San Diego County District Attorney’s 23 Office, Family Support Division, Joseph Leon, Jesse Soto, Todd Faucher, Connie Martin, 24 Mark Whitmore, Robert Lafer and Does 1 through 20 as defendants. Plaintiff contends he 25 challenges what he describes as “a decades-long pattern of unlawful child support 26 enforcement by the County of San Diego[.]” ECF No. 1 ¶ 21. He alleges he sought 27 recovery of overpayments of child support and a full audit of the child support account, 28 through counsel, between 2023 and 2025. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 12, 13. He maintains DCSS 1 ||“‘refused to revise its prior audits or extend the review period,” and he received no 2 ||meaningful relief in state court. Jd. J§ 13, 15. After signing a Compromise of Arrears 3 || Program agreement (“COAP”), for which he was provided assurances that the case would 4 closed and enforcement terminated, a statement was issued reflecting a balance owed of 5 |}$52,933.21. Id. 49 23, 24, 46. He was notified that his social security benefits would be 6 || garnished, and he moved to quash the wage assignment. /d. {| 24, 25. Plaintiff alleges 7 ||DCSS made misrepresentations regarding the balance owed during various hearings 8 resulting in an overpayment of $48,932.90. Jd. J§ 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 55, 56. 9 Plaintiff seeks compensation for the improper garnishment of his social security 10 || benefits and tax refunds, the improperly applied COAP payment, inflated balances, and 11 ||mental, emotion and psychological stress. Jd. at 42-43. He also seeks restitution, 12 || disgorgement, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. /d. 43-44. Having review □□□□□□□□□□ 13 || complaint, the Court finds it contains allegations sufficient to survive the “low threshold” 14 proceed beyond screening. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012). 15 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 16 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || Dated: June 3, 2026 19 20 b ep (4 fu a1 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks 22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28