Zocima Maria Barragan v. Louis De Joy
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- James E. Simmons (author)
Analysis
Plaintiff Zocima Maria Barragan filed a complaint, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), and a request for appointment of counsel. The court denied both the IFP motion and the request for counsel, finding that Plaintiff's financial affidavit did not demonstrate an inability to pay the filing fee while still affording the necessities of life.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to proceed in forma pauperis denied“Thus, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and request for appointment of counsel DENIED.” | agree with court The court applied the correct legal standard from the Ninth Circuit (Escobedo v. Applebees) requiring a showing that the plaintiff cannot pay costs and still afford necessities of life. The court found that Plaintiff's monthly income of $3,000 exceeds her stated expenses of $2,613.22, resulting in a monthly surplus of approximately $386.78. Additionally, Plaintiff possesses assets including a vehicle and $800 in savings. While the court did not explicitly calculate whether the surplus is sufficient to pay the filing fee while maintaining necessities, the finding that she is not 'persuaded' she lacks funds is a reasonable exercise of discretion based on the recited financial figures. The denial is supported by the record provided in the order. |
Request for appointment of counsel denied“Thus, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and request for appointment of counsel DENIED.” | agree with court The order denies the request for appointment of counsel in the same sentence as the IFP denial, citing the same financial insufficiency rationale. In civil cases, appointment of counsel is discretionary and often tied to the plaintiff's ability to pay or the complexity of the case. Since the court found the plaintiff not indigent for IFP purposes, denying counsel based on the same financial grounds is a consistent and defensible exercise of discretion, although the order does not elaborate on the specific legal standard for counsel appointment beyond the IFP context. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the relevant legal standards for IFP applications in the Ninth Circuit. It applies these standards to the specific financial facts recited in the plaintiff's affidavit (income vs. expenses and assets). The conclusion that the plaintiff is not indigent follows logically from the finding that her income exceeds her expenses, leaving a surplus. The order is concise but legally sufficient for a procedural denial of IFP status.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ZOCIMA MARIA BARRAGAN, Case No.: 3:24-cv-1073-JES-DDL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 LOUIS DE JOY, PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 15 Defendant. and 16 (2) DENYING REQUEST FOR 17 APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 18 [ECF Nos. 2, 3] 19 20 On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff Zocima Maria Barragan (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint, 21 a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), 22 and a motion for appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 1-3. 23 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. 24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court 25 may authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit without payment 26 of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, 27 showing that he or she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an 28 1 || IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs 2 || and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 □□□ 3 || Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. EI. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). 4 ||“[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, 5 || definiteness, and certainty.” /d. (internal quotations omitted). The facts as to the litigant’s 6 ||indigency must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” United 7 || States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9" Cir. 1981). At the same time, however, “the 8 ||same even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered 9 || to underwrite, at public expense ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, 10 ||in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F.Supp. 848, 11 (D.R.L. 1984). The granting or denial of leave to proceed IFP in civil cases is within 12 sound discretion of the district court. Venerable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9% 13 || Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 14 Here, according to her application, Plaintiff has an after-tax monthly income of 15 $3,000, while her expenses are $2,613.22 per month. ECF No. 2 at 2, 5. Plaintiff owns an 16 || automobile that is six years old and has $800 in savings. ECF No. 2 at 4-5. Based on the 17 information provided, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff lacks the funds to pay the 18 || filing fee and “still afford the necessities of life.” See Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. 19 Thus, Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and request for appointment of counsel 20 DENIED. Plaintiff must pay the filing fee no later than August 16, 2024, or her 21 complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 ||Dated: July 19, 2024 24 Sa— Sin, 25 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. United States District Judge 27 28