Joan Carol P. v. The United States Social Security Administration
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- David D. Leshner (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a pro se complaint filed by Joan Carol P. against the Social Security Administration for unpaid benefits and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Granted“Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Dkt. No. 2] is GRANTED.” | agree with court The court applied the standard that a party need not be absolutely destitute but must demonstrate an inability to pay fees while affording necessities of life. The plaintiff's affidavit stated she had $1,000/month income, $968 in savings, and had lived in motels/streets. This meets the threshold for IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and Ninth Circuit precedent. |
Complaint Dismissed Without Prejudice“Plaintiffs Complaint [Dkt. No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.” | agree with court The court identified multiple independent grounds for dismissal: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to identify a statutory basis for the court's authority (e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requires a final decision and timely filing, which were not established); (2) improper venue because the plaintiff resides in the Central District of California, not the Southern District; and (3) failure to state a claim under Rule 8 and Supplemental Rule 2(b) because the complaint was ambiguous and lacked essential facts. Dismissing without prejudice is appropriate when jurisdiction is in doubt or the complaint is curable, though the court noted skepticism about curability. |
The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly applies the IFP standard, identifies the mandatory screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and provides multiple independent grounds for dismissal (jurisdiction, venue, pleading standards). The court properly construes the pro se complaint liberally but notes it cannot supply missing essential elements or indulge unwarranted inferences. The dismissal without prejudice is appropriate given the jurisdictional doubts and the possibility that the plaintiff might file in the correct district with a proper complaint.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOAN CAROL P., Case No.: 24-cv-983-DDL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA 14 THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL PAUPERIS; SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 15 (2) SCREENING COMPLAINT Defendant. 16 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and 17 (3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 18 WITHOUT PREJUDICE 19 20 On June 4, 2024, pro se plaintiff Joan Carol P. (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint 21 against the Social Security Administration (the “Administration”) for “Benefits Not 22 Paid.” Dkt. No. 1. On the same date, Plaintiff moved to proceed in this matter in 23 forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled 24 “Reli[e]f Request.” Dkt. No. 4. For the reasons explained in this Order, the Court 25 GRANTS the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 26 The Court has conducted the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. 27 § 1915(e)(2)(B) and, for the reasons explained below, DISMISSES Plaintiff’s 28 complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 1 A. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 This Court may “authorize the commencement . . . of any suit, action or 3 proceeding, civil or criminal, without prepayment of fees or security therefor” by 4 any person who demonstrates his or her inability to pay such fees. See 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(a)(1). A party need not be “absolutely destitute” to proceed in forma 6 pauperis. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).1 7 Instead, “[a]n affidavit in support of an [in forma pauperis] application is sufficient 8 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the 9 necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) 10 (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339). “[A] plaintiff seeking [in forma pauperis] status 11 must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. 12 Here, Plaintiff avers she receives $1,000 per month in “retirement” income 13 and has $968 in her checking account. Dkt. No. 2 at 2. Plaintiff does not identify 14 any employment or other source of income. See id. Although Plaintiff does not 15 provide further detail regarding her expenditures, she relates that she has “had to 16 live in the streets, motels . . . [and] rooms in peoples houses” due to her economic 17 condition. Id. at 5. Based upon the record before it, the Court finds that Plaintiff 18 has adequately demonstrated that she lacks the financial resources to pay the 19 filing fee and still afford the necessities of life. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application 20 to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Dkt. No. 2] is GRANTED. 21 B. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 22 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (“Section 1915(e)”), the Court must 23 sua sponte evaluate the sufficiency of any complaint brought in forma pauperis. 24 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court must dismiss any such complaint if it fails 25 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous or malicious, or seeks 26 27 1 All citations and internal quotation marks are omitted, and emphasis added, 28 1 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune. See id.; see also Lopez v. Smith, 2 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but 3 requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state 4 a claim.”). Bearing this screening responsibility in mind, the Court has carefully 5 reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and the document titled “Reli[e]f Request”2 and finds 6 that the complaint must be dismissed. 7 Plaintiff’s Allegations. The Court begins with a summary of Plaintiff’s 8 allegations. In her complaint, Plaintiff requests that the Court “grant [her] . . . 9 overdue benefits from [the] Social Security Administration” and further alleges she 10 is owed $260,000 for “benefits not paid” for the years 1963 through 1974 and 1979 11 through 1981. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Attached to Plaintiff’s complaint is a printout of her 12 gross earnings for the years 1962 through 1996, with handwritten marginalia by 13 Plaintiff. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also identifies her former employers and states that she 14 “sent for her earnings and tax payer returns,” and received “transcripts” from the 15 Administration, in 2017. Id. at 4, 5. Plaintiff states repeatedly that her “benefits” 16 were “not paid,” for which she seeks her “day in court.” Id. at 1, 4, 5 and 6. Plaintiff 17 completed a Civil Cover Sheet to accompany her complaint, on which she 18 indicates the nature of the suit is the “Employee Retirement Income Security Act.” 19 Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff’s “Reli[e]f Request” states as follows: 20 I’am [sic] asking for punative [sic] damage for the 17 years of back pay starting at the age of 62 years old. My disability insurance has paid for 21 my health needs and some Social Security was paid to me. When I 22 worked my disability Ins. was paid from earnings, I’m asking for 3.2 million dollar’s [sic] for damages to me and my family. . . . I don’t want 23 24 25 2 The Court construes this as an amendment to the complaint. This District’s Civil Local Rules prohibit piecemeal amendments to pleadings, but for the sake of 26 expediency the Court has considered the “Reli[e]f Request” and its contents in 27 evaluating Plaintiff’s complaint. See CivLR 15.1.a (“Every pleading to which amendment is permitted . . . must be complete in itself without reference to the 28 1 social security, income, I rather get my own insurance. I’am [sic] done with social security. I need my benefit!” 2 3 Dkt. No. 4. 4 As a threshold matter, it is not clear from Plaintiff’s complaint what type of 5 benefits were allegedly “not paid” or are “overdue,” whether and when Plaintiff 6 sought any such benefits from the Administration, whether Plaintiff has followed all 7 available procedures for doing so such that her administrative remedies have been 8 exhausted, and whether and when the Administration issued a ruling on Plaintiff’s 9 request. The Court could infer from Plaintiff’s multiple requests for “benefits,” 10 reference to disability insurance, and decision to sue the Social Security 11 Administration that she intended to file a civil action for judicial review of a denial 12 of disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Section 405(g)”). On the 13 other hand, Plaintiff’s statement that she seeks “back pay” and indication that this 14 action relates to the “Employee Retirement Income Security Act,” suggest that the 15 action relates to her retirement benefits. Plaintiff’s disclaimer of any interest in 16 receiving “Social Security income” and request for an award of punitive damages 17 could arise out of either scenario, or perhaps to a different alleged wrong 18 altogether. 19 Although the Court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint “liberally,” it is 20 not required to “supply essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially pled.” 21 Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court is also “not 22 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 23 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, even construing Plaintiff’s filings as 24 generously as possible, the Court finds them so replete with ambiguities and 25 lacking in important facts as to prevent the Court from proceeding. 26 Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Most importantly, the basis of the Court’s 27 subject matter jurisdiction over the action has not been established. “[F]ederal 28 courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and may only adjudicate those matters 1 authorized by Congress or the Constitution. See General Atomic Co. v. United 2 Nuclear Corp., 655 F.2d 968, 969 (9th Cir.1981) (further noting that “[t]he limits 3 upon federal jurisdiction . . . must be neither disregarded nor evaded.”) (quoting 4 Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978)); see also 5 Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 19 (2017) (“Only 6 Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”). 7 Section 405(g) authorizes the Court to review any “final decision of the 8 Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which [the plaintiff] was 9 a party,” if the complaint seeking judicial review is filed within 60 days of such 10 decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Assuming (without so finding) this action relates 11 to disability benefits, it is not clear from the record whether there was such a final 12 decision and if so, whether Plaintiff timely sought review in this Court. And, if the 13 basis of Plaintiff’s complaint is something other than an adverse decision regarding 14 disability benefits, neither the complaint nor the “Reli[e]f Request” set forth any 15 facts to support another basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. See General Atomic Co., 16 655 F.2d at 969 (“A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular 17 case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.”). Because Court is not assured it 18 has subject matter jurisdiction over the action, it must dismiss the complaint. See 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 20 Potential Immunity of Defendant. Section 1915(e) also requires the Court 21 to assess whether the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is 22 immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In that regard, it should be noted 23 that “the United States may not be sued without its consent and . . . the existence 24 of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” Dep’t of Treasury-I.R.S. v. Fed. Lab. 25 Rels. Auth., 521 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). “Absent a waiver, a sovereign 26 immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. 27 Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Again, while a federal district court may hear 28 disputes arising out of adverse disability determinations pursuant to the terms of 1 Section 405(g), other wrongs may require the Administration’s consent to be sued. 2 As the basis of Plaintiff’s claims is not apparent from her complaint, this further 3 erodes any basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over the action. 4 Improper Venue. Even if this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the 5 action, venue appears improper. A civil action for judicial review of a denial of 6 disability benefits must be “brought in the district court of the United States for the 7 judicial district in which the plaintiff resides, or has his principal place of business,” 8 subject to certain exceptions not applicable here. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff 9 resides in Anaheim, California (see Dkt. No. 1 at 1, Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1), which is 10 located in the Central District of California, not this District. To the extent Plaintiff’s 11 complaint arises out of something other than a denial of disability benefits, there 12 are insufficient facts before the Court to determine whether it is appropriate for the 13 action to proceed in this District. 14 Supplemental Social Security Rule 2(b). The Court’s determination that 15 the basis for its subject matter jurisdiction over the matter has not been established 16 is a sufficient basis for dismissal. Nevertheless, the Court has also evaluated 17 whether Plaintiff’s complaint and “Reli[e]f Request” comply with applicable 18 pleading requirements. A complaint pursuant to Section 405(g) – if that is what is 19 before the Court – must meet the pleading requirements specified in Rule 2(b) of 20 the Supplemental Rules for Social Security Actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. SUPP SS 21 Rule 2(b)(1)(A)-(E). As is relevant here, that Rule requires the complaint to 22 explicitly identify Section 405(g) as the basis for relief, identify the final decision to 23 be reviewed, and state the type of benefits claimed. See id. For the reasons 24 explained in this Order, Plaintiff’s filings do not satisfy any of these requirements. 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Assuming the complaint seeks relief for 26 another alleged wrong, the Court finds it must be dismissed for failure to comply 27 with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Pursuant to that rule, a complaint must 28 plead “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 1 to relief. . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A proper pleading “does not require detailed 2 factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant- 3 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions 4 . . . will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint 5 suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. 6 When a plaintiff fails to provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 7 plausible on its face,” the Court must dismiss the complaint, either in whole or in 8 part. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). 9 For the reasons stated in this Order, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint fails 10 to plead sufficient facts to establish her entitlement to relief, and indeed fails to 11 establish a cognizable legal theory irrespective of the facts pled. See Balisteri v. 12 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that a complaint 13 may be dismissed as a matter of law for its lack of a cognizable legal theory, or 14 insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory). Section 1915(e)’s provision 15 that a “frivolous” complaint may be dismissed sua sponte provides further support 16 for dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); accord Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 17 319, 325 (1989) (defining a frivolous complaint as one that “lacks an arguable basis 18 either in law or in fact.”). 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint must be 20 dismissed. The Court is skeptical that Plaintiff can correct the shortcomings 21 identified in this Order. However, because the Court’s jurisdiction over the action 22 is in doubt, the dismissal shall be without prejudice to filing her complaint in the 23 appropriate district court. The Court cautions Plaintiff that any further complaints 24 filed in this District are subject to continued screening pursuant to Section 1915(e), 25 and the Court may transfer or dismiss any complaint that is not appropriately filed 26 in this District or that fails to survive further screening, including but not limited to 27 correcting the above described deficiencies. 28 / / / 1 For the reasons stated in this Order, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma 2 ||Pauperis [Dkt. No. 2] is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Complaint [Dkt. No. 1] is 3 || DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close 4 |/the file. 5 || IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: July 18, 2024 nee 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28