Xu Yingwu v. Todd M. Lyons, et al.
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court considered a habeas petition filed by an immigration detainee claiming his detention was arbitrarily prolonged and that he was improperly denied a bond hearing. The court denied the petition, ruling that the petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and has not demonstrated that his two-month detention is unreasonably prolonged.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus“Thus, the Petition is DENIED.” | agree with court The court correctly applies the mandatory detention statute for border apprehensions (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)) and correctly notes that the petitioner has not met the high bar for 'arbitrary and unreasonably prolonged' detention, given the short duration (two months) and the upcoming scheduled hearing. The jurisdictional analysis regarding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) is also consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent (Ibarra-Perez, Jennings). |
The order itself: sound — The order is legally sound. It correctly navigates the jurisdictional bar of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) by distinguishing the petitioner's detention claim from the specific actions barred by the statute, citing recent Ninth Circuit authority (Ibarra-Perez). It correctly identifies the applicable statutory scheme for border apprehensions (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)) and applies the appropriate due process standard for prolonged detention, finding the petitioner's two-month detention insufficient to trigger a constitutional violation given the scheduled hearing.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 XU YINGWU, Case No. 26-cv-3140-BAS-JLB 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) 14 TODD M. LYONS, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming his 18 immigration detention has been arbitrarily and unreasonably prolonged and that he was 19 improperly denied a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1.) The Government opposes (ECF No. 4), 20 and Petitioner files a response. (ECF No. 5.) For the reasons stated below, the Court 21 DENIES the Petition. 22 I. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 24 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the writ 25 is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 26 A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or she is in 27 custody in violation of the Constitution or Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It applies 28 to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 1 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since he is seeking release from custody, he has 2 standing to pursue this Petition. 3 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 Petitioner, a citizen of China, entered the United States on March 27, 2026, and was 5 detained at the U.S. border. (ECF No. 1.) His Master calendar hearing has been continued 6 twice and is now scheduled for June 3, 2026. (ECF No. 4.) Petitioner now argues he should 7 be released because his detention has been arbitrarily and unreasonably prolonged. 8 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 9 A. Jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) 10 Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips this Court of jurisdiction to 11 proceed. Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 12 claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 13 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal orders against any 14 alien under this chapter.” 15 The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute 16 [such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation’ and by the ‘strong 17 presumption in favor of judicial review.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 18 995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)). 19 Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled § 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions: 20 commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. See Reno v. 21 Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). “Instead of ‘sweep[ing] 22 in any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision 23 ‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995 24 (alteration original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There are, 25 of course, many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process” that 26 are not one of these three. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 482 (listing 27 possibilities). “Section 1252(g) does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely 28 1 because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 2 997. 3 In this Petition, Petitioner is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of 4 removal proceedings against him, nor is he raising an issue with respect to the execution 5 of removal. His detention may be during, but is nonetheless independent of, the removal 6 proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of jurisdiction by § 1252(g). 7 B. Mandatory Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) 8 Individuals seeking admission into the United States at the border, like the Petitioner 9 in this case, are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. These noncitizens 10 may be released only if the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) determines it is 11 appropriate to parole the noncitizen into the United States. Detention under § 1225(b) is 12 otherwise mandatory, and individuals are not entitled to a bond hearing. 13 C. Arbitrary and Unreasonably Prolonged Detention 14 The Court agrees that at some point, an immigration detention without a bond 15 hearing can be deemed arbitrarily and unreasonably prolonged and thus a violation of the 16 detainee’s Due Process rights. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 17 2018) (“[W]e have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged 18 detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy 19 precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have 20 thought so.”) However, Petitioner fails to show that his detention has been arbitrary or 21 prolonged. 22 Petitioner was arrested on March 27, 2026. He has been detained for two months 23 and has a Master Calendar hearing scheduled for June 3, 2026. Petitioner fails to show that 24 DHS is responsible for delaying or prolonging his immigration proceedings, nor at this 25 point, does his detention appear to be for an indefinite period. Since Petitioner fails to 26 demonstrate that his detention has been arbitrarily or unreasonably prolonged, his Petition 27 on this ground fails. 28 1 |}IV. CONCLUSION 2 Petitioner fails to show that his detention has been arbitrarily and unreasonably 3 || prolonged. In addition, because he was detained at the border, he is subject to mandatory 4 detention under § 1225(b) and can only be released if DHS elects to release him on parole. 5 Thus, the Petition is DENIED. 6 The Clerk is directed to close the case. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 ~ 9 || DATED: May 29, 2026 (yatta Bahar 10 H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A.